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1Introduction
Every day of our lives, we make countless decisions; some are small and rela-
tively easy to make, while others are important and complex. Often the diffi-
culty in making these decisions arises because consequences are not determinis-
tic, that is, an element of risk is involved. At the same time many decisions have
consequences on others besides the decision-maker. The desire to understand
the determinants of such decisions is at the heart of behavioral economics. For
this purpose both theoretical models of decision-making as well as its controlled
examinationwith laboratory experiments rely on two core concepts: preferences
and beliefs.
Throughout this thesis we take the view that preferences are something akin
to a character trait, that is, a relatively stable feature of a person’s “economic
personality” affecting decision-making. They describe how a person trades off a
specific aspect of different options. For risk preferences this aspect is the riskiness
of each option, while for social preferences it is the social implications.
Although we do not assume a specific functional form of either risk or social
preferences, we assume that such preferences can be measured by observing
decisions or through relevant survey measures. Depending on which measure
is used, the inferred preference parameter can be quite different. However, this
is not necessarily only due to noise. Rather specific decisions depend on factors
beyond preferences, e.g., the decision environment, other character traits or
psychological states.
The notion of beliefs that we employ here differs from that in a game-
theoretical sense where in equilibrium beliefs are always equal to objective prob-
abilities and adjust instantaneously if new information becomes available. In
contrast, we consider a belief to be the subjective probability assessment a de-
cision maker holds and which experimenters can measure independently from
measuring behavior. Such an assessment exists even in the absence of informa-
tion and does not necessarily adjust fully to new information.
2 | 1 Introduction
The first three chapters of this thesis are dedicated to empirically examining
factors beyond risk preferences that influence decision-making under risk: psy-
chological states (Chapter 2), character traits (Chapter 3), and (stable) beliefs
regarding the riskiness of situations (Chapter 4).
Chapter 2 deals with the impact different psychological states, in this case a
state of low self-control, have on measured risk preferences. A core prediction
of recent “dual-self” models is that risk attitudes depend on self-control. While
these models have received a lot of attention, empirical evidence regarding their
predictions is lacking. We derive hypotheses from three prominent models for
choices between risky monetary payoffs under regular and reduced self-control.
We test the hypotheses in a lab experiment, using a well-established ego deple-
tion task to reduce self-control, andmeasuring risk attitudes via finely graduated
choice lists. Manipulation checks document the effectiveness of the depletion
task. We find no systematic evidence in favor of the theoretical predictions. In
particular, ego depletion does not increase measured risk aversion.
Chapter 3 examines a channel through which a stable aspect of personality,
optimism, affects measured risk preferences. We show that the disposition to
focus on favorable or unfavorable outcomes of risky situations affects willingness
to take risk as measured by the general risk question. We demonstrate that this
disposition, which we call risk conception, is strongly associated with optimism,
a stable facet of personality and that it predicts real-life risk taking. The general
risk question captures this disposition alongside pure risk preference. This also
explains why the general risk question is a better predictor of behavior under
risk across different domains than measures of pure risk preference.
Next, we take a closer look at the interaction between preferences and the
other building block of economic decision-making: beliefs. In standard economic
theory, beliefs only depend on the available information and adjust immediately
once new information becomes available. This means that under full rational-
ity beliefs are the same for everyone when objective probabilities are explicitly
stated.
Chapter 4 shows that this is not necessarily true. Extending the idea of Chap-
ter 3, we show that even in situations where the decision environment is fully
specified, i.e., in a lottery with objective probabilities, the perception of the risk-
iness of a situation differs considerably between people. We present evidence
from a longitudinal experiment introducing a novel task asking subjects to as-
sess the likelihood of winning a 50-50 lottery. We find substantial and systematic
heterogeneity in answers. Moreover, there are robust correlations with several
different risk preference measures such as lottery choices and the general risk
question. Testing several channels for this relationship, we find little evidence
that our findings are driven by differential perceptions of probabilities or prob-
ability weighting. We hence conclude that belief-related factors akin to person-
ality traits play a role in decision making under risk.
| 3
Chapter 5 examines the relationship between measured preferences and be-
liefs in a setup where beliefs more traditionally are assumed to matter: social
interactions. The assumption that beliefs only depend on available information
also gives rise to the idea that the concepts of preferences and beliefs are distinct
and unrelated in the sense that they don’t influence on another. However, empir-
ical evidence supports that own preferences influence beliefs about others. This
phenomenon is known as the consensus effect. In this chapter we advance the
hypothesis that the consensus effect may depend on the salience of own prefer-
ences when forming beliefs about others. We present two pieces of supportive
evidence from a binary trust game experiment. First, the consensus effect is
stronger when preferences elicitation precedes belief elicitation. Second, we ob-
serve a larger consensus effect when preferences and beliefs are elicited in the
same session rather than two weeks apart.
Although each of the following four chapters addresses a distinct research
question they are connected by one overarching question: What influences mea-
sured preferences and beliefs?
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2Does self-control depletion aect
risk attitudes?
Joint with Holger Gerhardt and Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch
2.1 Introduction
A decision maker’s attitude toward risk is a core component of her “economic
personality”. Risk preferences are an integral part of theoretical models in vir-
tually all domains of economics, and empirical evidence documents that risk
attitudes are an important predictor of both economic and health outcomes. For
instance, a higher willingness to take risks is positively correlated with being
self-employed, investing in stocks, and not having insurance, as well as being
a smoker, drinking heavily, and being overweight (Barsky et al., 1997; Ander-
son and Mellor, 2008; Kimball et al., 2008; Dohmen et al., 2011).
Given the central role of risk attitudes in economic theory and their predic-
tive power for individual behavior, a better understanding of factors that poten-
tially influence risk attitudes is of great importance to economists. Inspired by
the difficulty of expected-utility theory to explain empirical phenomena like the
Allais paradox or small-stakes risk aversion, various recently developed mod-
els build on insights from psychology and posit that risk attitudes are shaped
by the interaction of “dual systems” (a deliberative and an affective system, re-
spectively; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005; Mukherjee, 2010) or of “dual
selves” (a long-run and a short-run self; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, 2011,
2012). In this framework, “self-control” amounts to the long-run self imposing
restrictions on the short-run self. Consequently, a crucial determinant of a deci-
sion maker’s risk attitude is her current level of self-control resources. In partic-
ular, the prominent Fudenberg–Levine model predicts that lower levels of self-
control induce stronger risk aversion for stakes within a particular range.
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In this paper, we derive three explicit hypotheses on the relationship be-
tween self-control and risk preferences, using the model by Fudenberg et al.
(2014), a version of the Fudenberg–Levine model that is particularly well-
suited to address decision making under risk in the case of pairwise lottery
choice. The hypotheses refer to choices among pairs of two-outcome lotteries,
choices among a safe payoff and two-outcome lotteries (all paid out immedi-
ately), and to choices among pairs of two-outcome lotteries that will only be
paid out with a delay. We adopt a fourth hypothesis directly from Loewenstein
and O’Donoghue (2005); their model predicts that self-control depletion leads
to more pronounced probability weighting (p. 28). From the similar dual-self
model by Mukherjee (2010) we derive a set of alternative predictions. We test
these hypotheses in a laboratory experiment.
The purpose of the experiment is to provide causal evidence on the link
between self-control and risk preferences. We exogenously manipulate the level
of self-control between subjects using ego depletion, a concept from psychology
(Baumeister et al., 1998). In doing so, we also provide sound empirical evidence
regarding the effect of ego depletion on risk attitudes.
Our experiment uses a between-subject design with two conditions. At the
beginning, subjects in the treatment group perform a so-called ego depletion
task that is well-established in the literature and has been found to induce low
self-control in numerous studies (see the meta-analysis by Hagger et al., 2010).
Depletion tasks are based on the notion that the exertion of self-control in one
activity consumes self-control resources, thereby increasing self-control costs
in subsequent activities (Baumeister et al., 1998). The control group performs
a similar, though nondepleting task, i.e., a task that does not reduce self-control
resources.
Immediately following the respective task, we obtain precise measures of
subjects’ risk attitudes. Our measures are based on finely graduated choice lists,
one for each of the four hypotheses derived from Fudenberg et al. (2014) and
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005); they also allow for testing the alterna-
tive predictions based on Mukherjee (2010). Each row of the choice lists con-
sists of a choice between two two-outcome lotteries. Inspired by Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006) and Ebert and Wiesen (2014), we chose one lottery to be
a mean-preserving spread of the other, with a sure payoff (a risk premium) be-
ing added or subtracted. A noteworthy feature of this method is that it allows
quantifying subjects’ risk attitudes without assuming a specific utility function.
This is particularly important in our case, since the Fudenberg–Levine model
contains several functions of unknown parametric form as well as unobservable,
difficult-to-estimate quantities.
Contrary to the predictions that we derive from the Fudenberg–Levine
model, we do not find any evidence for increased risk aversion after ego de-
pletion. For all of our four choice lists, subjects in the depletion group even
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exhibit a nonsignificant tendency toward less risk-averse choices, compared to
the control group. Also evidence in favor of the fourth hypothesis (taken from
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005) that reduced self-control leads to more
pronounced probability weighting is limited at best. Neither do we find support
for the alternative predictions derived from the model by Mukherjee (2010).
We do not observe that subjects behave in a more random manner under de-
pletion. Depleted subjects also do not decide more quickly, as one would expect
if they relied on heuristics to a stronger extent. Finally, self-control as a charac-
ter trait (as opposed to the temporary level of self-control resources) does not
explain heterogeneity of risk attitudes across individuals.
Overall, we deem our empirical results on the apparently weak link between
self-control and risk attitudes informative for the future modeling of decision
making under risk. In principle, we have no doubt that economics can benefit
from incorporating psychological concepts in general and self-control in partic-
ular. Just as much, we acknowledge the potential of dual-self models to explain
behavior in neighboring areas like intertemporal choice and economic theories
of addiction. However, different levels of self-control do not seem to influence
risk attitudes strongly—and if they do, the influence is primarily in the opposite
direction of the prediction of the most prominent applicable model. This casts
doubt on the “unified explanation” offered by Fudenberg and Levine (2006).
Taking a broader perspective, our paper adds to a recently emerging field
of research that investigates whether aspects of the decision environment that
go beyond incentives and constraints—such as self-control, cognitive load, emo-
tions, or stress—influence decision making under risk.1 A common feature of
this line of research is that it challenges the standard assumption of stable prefer-
ences (which has shaped economics since Stigler and Becker, 1977). Our results
provide evidence that self-control does not belong to the aspects of the decision
environment that induce large variations in risk preferences; hence, the stan-
dard view of stable preferences may be adequate at least with regard to risk
preferences and self-control.
1 For instance, the results of Cohn et al. (2015), Guiso et al. (2014), Schulreich et al. (2014),
and Schulreich et al. (2016) are based on emotional priming and suggest that sadness and fear
induce stronger risk aversion. By contrast, the results of Conte et al. (2016) indicate that sadness,
fear, anger, and joviality induce risk-seeking behavior. Benjamin et al. (2013), Deck and Jahedi
(2015), and Gerhardt et al. (2016) find that cognitive load increases risk aversion. Concerning
stress, Kandasamy et al. (2014) find that induced stress increases risk-averse behavior, while
Buckert et al. (2014) observe stronger risk proclivity for gains, however only for a relatively
small subgroup of participants.
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Related literature
Traditionally, economics has modeled decision makers without any reference to
psychological concepts like “self-control”. However, in some cases, the standard
models of economic choice—expected-utility theory and the discounted-utility
model—have difficulties explaining observed behavior both in the field and in
the laboratory. To remedy these problems, numerous theoretical models have
been developed recently which capture the notion that some economic deci-
sions may involve a competition between conflicting motives. Resolution of the
conflict depends on the use of “self-control” (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2007;
Dekel et al., 2009).
In particular, models involving “multiple selves” or “multiple systems” have
become increasingly popular in economics. These “selves” or “systems” are ei-
ther conceived of as diverging motives held by a decision maker at different
points in time (e.g., Laibson, 1997; Diamond and Kőszegi, 2003; Heidhues and
Kőszegi, 2009) or as conflicting motives that are present in a decision maker si-
multaneously (e.g., Loewenstein andO’Donoghue, 2005; Fudenberg and Levine,
2006; Brocas and Carrillo, 2008; Fudenberg and Levine, 2011, 2012; Fudenberg
et al., 2014).While themost common application of thesemodels is temporal dis-
counting, the dual-self model by Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011) as well as
the “dual-system” models by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) and Mukher-
jee (2010) also explicitly address decision making under risk.
A particular strength of the model by Fudenberg and Levine is that it of-
fers a “unified explanation” (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, p. 1449) for several
commonly observed discounting-related phenomena such as time inconsistency
as well as risk-related phenomena such as the Rabin paradox2 (Rabin, 2000)
and the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953). More specifically, a core prediction of the
Fudenberg–Levine model is that lower levels of self-control induce more risk-
averse behavior for stakes within a specific range. However, empirical evidence
on this particular relationship between self-control and risk attitudes is scarce.
This paper aims at providing the first direct test of a central prediction of the
Fudenberg–Levine model.
Fudenberg and Levine (2006, p. 1467), Fudenberg et al. (2014, p. 66), and
especially Fudenberg and Levine (2012, p. 3) motivate characteristics of their
dual-self model by referring to the so-called “strength model” of self-control.
This model was introduced to the psychology literature by Baumeister et al.
(1998). The strength model is based on the idea that exerting self-control con-
sumes self-control resources that can be depleted. As a consequence, use of self-
control in one task reduces the availability of self-control resources in a sub-
2 This paradox refers to the observation that the levels of small-stakes risk aversion observed
in laboratory experiments are too high to be reconciled with behavior for higher stakes when
assuming that decision makers care only about final wealth.
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sequent task. This process is referred to as “self-control depletion”, “willpower
depletion”, or “ego depletion” (in analogy to the Freudian ego that controls the
id). The strength model has also found its way into the economics literature. Not
only does it serve as the basis of the models by Fudenberg and Levine (2012)
and Ozdenoren et al. (2012); it is also part of the motivation of the analysis of
resource allocation in the human brain by Alonso et al. (2014).
The foundations and implications of the strength model of self-control have
been empirically investigated by both psychologists and economists numerous
times (see Hagger et al., 2010, Carter and McCullough, 2014, Hagger et al.,
2016, for extensive overviews and meta-analyses; see Bucciol et al., 2011, 2013,
for economic applications). Yet, regarding the link between ego depletion and
risk attitudes, the existing evidence is scarce and inconclusive. Moreover, none
of the existing papers is tailored to testing the predictions of the Fudenberg–
Levine dual-self model or the models by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005)
and Mukherjee (2010). Unger and Stahlberg (2011) find that depleted subjects
make more risk-averse decisions, based on the results of a strongly framed in-
vestment experiment. Since Unger and Stahlberg instructed subjects to imagine
that they were managers making a decision on behalf of their firm, subjects’ de-
cisions in this experiment do not necessarily reflect only their own individual
risk preferences. Measuring risk attitudes via choice lists, but with a total sam-
ple size of only N = 54 in a between-subject design, Stojić et al. (2013) find that
subjects tend to be more risk-averse under ego depletion—however, not signifi-
cantly so. By contrast, Friehe and Schildberg-Hörisch (2017) find that depleted
subjects tend to be less risk-averse than nondepleted subjects. Their measure of
risk attitudes, however, only captures risk-averse up to risk-neutral behavior and
does not cover the domain of risk proclivity.3
The experimental method perhaps most closely related to willpower deple-
tion is putting subjects under concurrent cognitive load while they make deci-
sions. Cognitive load usually takes on the form of working-memory load. So far,
three studies have investigated the relationship between individual risk attitudes
and cognitive load: in Benjamin et al. (2013) and in Deck and Jahedi (2015), the
working-memory load manipulation was remembering a 7-digit number, while
it was remembering a spatial arrangement of dots in Gerhardt et al. (2016). All
3 There are some additional, less closely related studies. Combining prior losses and ego deple-
tion in a single treatment, Kostek and Ashrafioun (2014) find a higher degree of risk aversion. In
contrast, two psychological studies (Bruyneel et al., 2009; Freeman and Muraven, 2010) find in-
creased “risk taking” under ego depletion. These use, however, either (unincentivized) vignettes
or tasks with unknown probabilities, such that subjects decided under ambiguity instead of risk.
Haan and Veldhuizen (2015) used, by contrast, incentivized, risky gambles. They also observe
a reduction of risk aversion after depletion. However, the observed effect is not only small but also
present in just one out of their three experiments, and Haan and Veldhuizen cannot rule out that
it was caused by depleted subjects choosing more randomly (p. 59).
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three studies consistently find a significant increase in risk aversion due to cog-
nitive load. At first glance, these findings seem to contradict the findings of our
study, but at closer inspection they do not.
While closely related, willpower depletion and cognitive load are not identi-
cal. Baumeister and Vohs (2016b, p. 70) see the crucial difference in that ego de-
pletion targets self-regulation, while cognitive load affects attention. This view is
supported by the results of Maranges et al. (2017). A similar distinction is made
by Kahneman (2011, p. 43): “Ego depletion is not the same mental state as cog-
nitive busyness.” He posits that “unlike cognitive load, ego depletion is at least
in part a loss of motivation” (pp. 42/43). If one wanted to frame it in terms of
dual-system thinking, ego depletion could be interpreted as shifting the balance
of power between the affective “System 1” and the deliberative “System 2” in
favor of “System 1”, while cognitive load rather seems to influence the contents
of “System 2”. Hence, it is not clear that the two manipulations should have the
same effect.
Moreover, as Gerhardt et al. (2016, p. 27) note, the stake sizes in their study
are so low that the Fudenberg–Levine model is unlikely to predict any effect.
Thus, it is unlikely that the particular channel envisioned by Fudenberg and
Levine (2006, 2011) can account for the observed increase in risk attitudes
caused by cognitive load. From the point of view of Gerhardt et al. (2016), cog-
nitive load probably influences risk attitudes through a different channel.
Our study goes beyond the existing literature in that it tests the role of self-
control guided by the theoretical frameworks of Fudenberg and Levine (2006),
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005), and Mukherjee (2010). Additionally, we
provide particularly clean evidence regarding the effect of ego depletion on risk
attitudes. For this purpose, several aspects of the design of our experiment are
crucial. We use (i) incentivized choices, (ii) ego depletion is the only manipula-
tion, and (iii) all probabilities associated with the payoffs are known to subjects.
Our risk measure (iv) covers the entire domain of possible risk attitudes and
(v) enables us to detect even small effect sizes. (vi) We take restrictions on the
magnitude of the involved payoffs, as they follow from the Fudenberg–Levine
model, into account.
Moreover, we use several survey and behavioral responses of our subjects
to provide an independent manipulation check, showing that subjects in the
treatment group were more depleted than subjects in the control group.
Finally, our sample size (N = 308) yields sufficient statistical power to docu-
ment relevant effect sizes. The average effect size (Cohen’s d) is d= 0.62 in the
meta-analysis by Hagger et al. (2010) that is based on a total of 83 papers con-
taining 198 independent studies. Carter and McCullough (2014) reevaluate the
same ego depletion literature. They find evidence for small-study effects which,
when controlled for, lead to lower estimates of the average effect size. In order
not to fall prey to this issue, our study features a comparatively large sample
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size (N = 308; this exceeds the sample size of all but one of the 198 studies cov-
ered by Hagger et al., 2010). Given our large number of observations, a power
analysis shows that, using a t-test and a significance level α= 0.05, we are able
to detect, for each choice list separately, an effect size as small as d= 0.32 at
the conventional level of power of 80% or above.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the Fuden-
berg–Levine model (2.2.1) and the hypotheses that we derive from the model
regarding the impact of reduced self-control on risk attitudes (2.2.2) as well
as the hypotheses based on Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) (2.2.3) and
Mukherjee (2010) (2.2.4). Section 2.3 describes the design and procedural de-
tails of our laboratory experiment. Section 2.4 presents the results. Section 2.5
discusses our findings and concludes.
2.2 Theory and hypotheses
In the psychology literature, it has been argued that depletion induces an in-
creased propensity to engage in risk-seeking behavior (Freeman and Muraven,
2010). The dual-self model by Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011) makes the
opposite prediction: we should typically observe more pronounced risk aversion
under depletion. Fudenberg et al. (2014) explicitly model self-control as a de-
terminant of choices between lotteries. Thus, their model allows us to derive
precise hypotheses regarding the influence of ego depletion on pairwise lottery
choice between two-outcome lotteries (as we use in our experiment).
2.2.1 Overview of the model by Fudenberg et al. (2014)
In all variants of the Fudenberg–Levine model, decision making is the outcome
of the interaction of a short-run and a long-run self. One might think of the
interaction between the two selves as that of a “planner” (the long-run self)
and a “doer” (the short-run self), a terminology introduced by Thaler and She-
frin (1981). Both “selves” have the same per-period utility function, which is
assumed to be monotonically increasing and concave. They differ, however, in
the way they regard the future. The short-run self is completely myopic, i.e., it
cares only about same-period consumption.4 Consequently, it prefers to spend
all available income immediately. Having a concave per-period utility function,
the short-run self is risk-averse. The long-run self, in contrast, also derives util-
ity from consumption in future periods and discounts them exponentially. Com-
bined with its concave per-period utility function, this creates a preference for
smoothing consumption over time. As a consequence of spreading consumption
4 In Fudenberg and Levine (2012), the authors allow for an only partially myopic short-run
self.
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over a large number of periods, the long-run self is (very close to) risk-neutral
(for a formal derivation, see Fudenberg and Levine, 2011, p. 44).
The short-run self’s preference for immediate consumption and the long-run
self’s consumption-smoothing motive generate a conflict of interest. By exerting
self-control, the long-run self can restrict the short-run self to a consumption
level below the latter’s desired consumption level. Importantly, in the model by
Fudenberg and Levine, the described conflict of interest only arises for unantic-
ipated income. Anticipated income does not create a need to exert self-control:
based on foreseeable income, the long-run self allocates a budget to the short-
run self of each period, and the short-run selves spend exactly that budget.
Exertion of self-control when deciding over how to spend unanticipated in-
come is assumed to be costly. This cost increases in the difference between the
short-run self’s utility derived from the consumption that the long-run self “per-
mits” and the short-run self’s preferred course of action, i.e., spending the entire
period income immediately. To fit “the psychological evidence that self-control
is a limited resource” as well as to explain the Allais paradox, the self-control
cost function has to be convex, as Fudenberg and Levine (2006, p. 1467; 2011;
2012, pp. 3, 16) argue.
Fudenberg et al. (2014) develop a version of the Fudenberg–Levine model
that improves the model’s applicability to decision making under risk. Their
main simplifying assumption is linearity of the long-run value function. This
means that the marginal utility of saving is constant, such that the long-run self
is completely risk-neutral (instead of being only very close to risk-neutral). In
Section 2.A, we use this version of the Fudenberg–Levine dual-self model to for-
mally derive Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. In the following, we present the hypotheses
and explain the intuition behind them.
2.2.2 Hypotheses derived from Fudenberg et al. (2014)
Hypothesis 1. Ego depletion leads to greater risk aversion for choices between
lotteries if at least one of the lotteries contains a small payoff below and another
larger payoff above a cutoff value zˆ.
zˆ denotes a threshold such that monetary lottery payoffs below zˆ are spent
completely, while any part of a payoff that exceeds zˆ is saved for future con-
sumption. The threshold zˆ is endogenously determined by the interplay of the
long-run self and the short-run self. It depends on the lottery under considera-
tion, the menu of lotteries as well as the marginal cost of self-control. Therefore,
ego depletion—which increases the marginal cost of self-control if the cost func-
tion is convex—shifts the balance of power in favor of the risk-averse short-run
self, resulting in an increase in the degree of risk aversion expressed by the lot-
tery choice. This is due to two effects: First, for a given zˆ and a lottery with one
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payoff below and one payoff above zˆ, the relative contributions of the short-run
self’s and the long-run self’s utility to the expected utility of this lottery change,
with the effect that the combined preferences exhibit increased risk aversion (see
Section 2.A). Second, the threshold zˆ increases. As a consequence, there are de-
cisions which the short-run self is entirely in charge of under depletion even
though the long-run self would have exerted self-control under nondepletion.
Hypothesis 2. The effect of ego depletion (i.e., increased risk aversion) is stronger
when one “lottery” is a sure payoff.
When the per-period utility function is concave, a sure payoff leads to higher
utility than a lottery with the same expected value. Consequently, self-control
costs are higher in case the long-run self actually exerts control over the short-
run self. Compared to a decision among two two-outcome lotteries, this ampli-
fies the increase in risk aversion due to ego depletion (see also Fudenberg and
Levine, 2011, pp. 35, 46, 66).
Hypothesis 3. When payoffs are delayed, ego depletion has no effect.
In case we observe the effects of ego depletion that we predict in Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2, these need not necessarily be caused by a decrease in self-control
resources. Other channels—for instance, a change in the propensity to rely on
heuristics—could generate the same effects. Our third hypothesis thus serves
to distinguish an influence of self-control from other possible explanations.
For this purpose, we exploit a particular feature of the dual-self model,
namely that the short-run self cares only about the current period. Although
Fudenberg and Levine (2006) do not specify the length of one period—i.e.,
the time horizon for one short-run self—it should not exceed a few days: “the
horizon of the short-run self is on the order of a day to a week” (Fudenberg
and Levine, 2011, p. 39). Thus, when both lotteries exclusively feature payoffs
that occur in the future—i.e., beyond the short-run self’s time horizon—self-
control does not affect decisions. Therefore, self-control costs or an increase in
self-control costs will not make a difference for risk attitudes over future pay-
offs.5 If, however, ego depletion affected risk attitudes through the increased
use of heuristics, this would also be the case for choices concerning the future.
Thus, according to this alternative hypothesis, we would find the same change
in risk aversion when payoffs are delayed as when they are immediate.
5 See also Fudenberg and Levine (2011, p. 48) for the implication that Allais-type paradoxes
disappear “if the results of gambles are delayed long-enough that they fall outside the time hori-
zon of the short-run self.”
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2.2.3 Hypothesis derived from Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005)
Hypothesis 4. For a long shot, ego depletion leads to a lower degree of risk aver-
sion.
A long shot is a lottery that offers a low probability of obtaining a high payoff
and a high probability of obtaining a low payoff. These lotteries are sometimes
also referred to as “dollar bets”. Hypothesis 4 is based on the idea that the de-
cision maker overweights small probabilities and that this distortion becomes
more pronounced under ego depletion. Overweighting the small probability of
winning a large amount makes a long shot subjectively attractive despite its be-
ing relatively risky. A stronger distortion of the small probability in the direction
of ½ under ego depletion should thus make risk-averse decision makers less
risk-averse, and risk-seeking decision makers more risk-seeking.
Hypothesis 4 is a direct implication of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005,
p. 28). It deviates from the Fudenberg–Levine model in that Fudenberg and
Levine assume the absence of probability weighting and a strictly risk-averse
short-run self. The background of this hypothesis is empirical evidence that
many subjects exhibit risk proclivity for long shots (Harbaugh et al., 2010).
A common explanation for this phenomenon is probability weighting, in par-
ticular overweighting of small probabilities that are associated with large pay-
offs (as modeled by cumulative prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Probability weighting is modeled explicitly as the outcome of the interaction of
a deliberative and an affective system by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005).
In their model, the preferences of the deliberative system can be represented
by expected-utility maximization, i.e., the deliberative system takes probabili-
ties at face value. In contrast, the affective system assigns identical weight to all
possible outcomes (i.e.,½ in the case of two-outcome lotteries) instead of using
the true probabilities. The interplay of both systems then results in an inverse-
S-shaped probability weighting function. Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005,
p. 28) explicitly state that “if a person’s willpower is depleted . . . , then she
should exhibit a more [inverse-]S-shaped probability weighting function”. Thus,
for long shots, we expect reduced risk aversion or increased risk proclivity, re-
spectively, under depletion, because attaching a higher probability weight to the
large payoff makes picking the long shot more attractive.
2.2.4 Hypotheses derived from Mukherjee (2010)
Hypothesis 1 b. (Alternative to Hypothesis 1.) Ego depletion leads to increased
risk aversion when choosing between 50%-50% lotteries.
Hypothesis 2 b. (Alternative to Hypothesis 2.) Ego depletion leads to increased
risk aversion when choosing between a 50%-50% lottery and a sure payoff.
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Hypothesis 3 b. (Alternative to Hypothesis 3.) Ego depletion also leads to in-
creased risk aversion when choosing between two 50%-50% lotteries for which the
payoffs are delayed.
Assuming that the strength of the affective system relative to the deliberative
system depends on self-control resources, we can also derive predictions for our
experiment from the model by Mukherjee (2010). According to this model, the
affective system replaces all original nonzero probabilities by a weight of 1/n
(just like in the model by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2005), and it combines
these with a concave value function (e.g., vA(x)= sgn(m)xm with m< 1). Note
that the combination of both effects can generate risk-averse as well as risk-
neutral or risk-seeking behavior. The deliberative system, by contrast, uses the
correct probabilities and combines them with a linear value function, i.e., it
exhibits risk neutrality. Total valuation is given by aweighted sum of the separate
valuations by the affective and the deliberative system.
In combining the affective with the deliberative valuation, a parameter
γ ∈ [0,1] determines the relative strength of the affective system. As a conse-
quence, a decrease in willpower—i.e., an increase in γ—affects risk attitudes
through two simultaneous effects: a shift in probability weighting (in the direc-
tion of completely uniform 1/n weighting) and a shift in the evaluation of the
outcomes (in the direction of more strongly concave valuation).
This entails that the prediction regarding a weakening of willpower is
straightforward for equal-probability gambles: for a 50%-50% two-outcome
gamble, the 1/nweighting is exactly correct, so that both systems use the same,
correct weighting of probabilities. At the same time, the depletion-induced shift
away from the linear toward the concave value function leads to increased risk
aversion. Hence, the model by Mukherjee (2010) predicts the alternative Hy-
potheses 1 b, 2 b, and 3 b.
Hypothesis 4 b. (Alternative to Hypothesis 4.) For a long shot, there is greater
variance of observed risk attitudes in the depleted group than in the nondepleted
group of subjects.
The model’s prediction for the “long shot” is a bit more involved. Since a de-
crease in willpower entails the two effects described above that potentially go
in opposite directions, the total effect depends on two factors: the exact proba-
bilities of the outcomes and the exact curvature of the affective system’s value
function (see Table 2 of Mukherjee, 2010, for an illustration). More precisely, de-
pending on the probabilities and outcomes, there is a curvature parameter m∗
such that form<m∗, the affective system exhibits risk aversion, and an increase
in γ leads to greater risk aversion of the total valuation. Conversely, for m>m∗,
the affective system exhibits risk proclivity, and an increase in γ leads to greater
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risk proclivity of the total valuation. For m=m∗, both systems are risk-neutral,
such that γ has no effect.
Hence, subjects who are risk-averse for a long shot in a nondepleted state
should become more risk-averse when depleted, while subjects who are risk-
loving when not depleted should become even more risk-loving when depleted.
Finally, depletion should have no effect for risk-neutral subjects. Assuming that
there is heterogeneity in subject’s baseline risk aversion, we should thus observe
a greater variance of risk attitudes in the depleted group. This leads to Hypoth-
esis 4 b as an alternative to Hypothesis 4.
2.3 Experiment
2.3.1 General setup
Our objective is to test whether there is a causal effect of the current level of self-
control on risk attitudes. We employ a between-subject design with two groups
and exogenously vary the level of self-control using an ego depletion task.6 More
specifically, subjects in the depletion and in the control group work on different
versions of a task that bring about different levels of self-control capacity. Sub-
sequently, we measure subjects’ risk attitudes via incentivized choices between
lotteries.
2.3.2 Depletion task
In our experiment, the depletion task serves as the source of exogenous variation
between subjects. Being such a vital part of the experiment, we required it to
be both well established and as effective as possible in inducing low self-control.
The task of our choice, the crossing-out letters task, meets both criteria and is
also easily implementable in the lab. According to the meta-analysis of Hagger
et al. (2010) the crossing-out letters task is the most effective of all ego depletion
tasks. It has been used successfully to induce changes in outcomes like persis-
tence in watching a boring movie, resistance to persuasion, advice on risk taking
given to others in a vignette-style questionnaire, and offers made in a dictator or
ultimatum game (Baumeister et al., 1998; Wheeler et al., 2007; Freeman and
Muraven, 2010; Achtziger et al., 2015, 2016, respectively).
6 A within-subject design would have had the advantage of providing us with a baseline mea-
sure of risk attitudes at the individual instead of group level. However, we would have needed
to present subjects the same lottery choices before and after the self-control manipulation. This
would have been a severe drawback because subjects are likely to remember their earlier choices.
Pairedwith a preference for consistency (Falk and Zimmermann, 2017), recalling previous choices
might counteract any depletion effect.
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In the depletion group, the task works as follows. Subjects are first given
a printed text spanning 22 lines and are asked to cross out all instances of the let-
ter “e” (including the uppercase letter “E”). Subjects work on this task for three
minutes. Immediately afterwards, subjects in the depletion group are given a dif-
ferent text spanning 44 lines. This time they are asked to cross out all instances
of the letter “e” except when there is a vowel right after the “e” or two letters
away (in either direction). Subjects work on this second part of the task for seven
minutes. The rationale why this task depletes self-control is that it requires the
constant cognitive suppression of an automatic impulse—the impulse to cross
out the letter “e” that was built up in the first part of the task.
The task assigned to the control group also follows the standard of the lit-
erature. Subjects work on the same texts as the depletion group for the same
duration but are only required to cross out all “e”s, without any additional rule,
in both parts. Hence, there is no self-control–consuming impulse suppression in
the control group.
We chose texts that we expected to be irrelevant and uninteresting to most
subjects. The texts were based on the appendix of a statistics text book (Bam-
berg and Baur, 2001) and describe criteria for the choice of statistics software
in a very general way. We provide the exact texts of the depletion task in ap-
pendix 2.D.
We deliberately chose not to pay subjects for this task because there is ev-
idence that receiving payment for a task counteracts ego depletion (Muraven
and Slessareva, 2003). In addition to announcing private feedback (to be pro-
vided at the end of the experiment), the instructions asked subjects to work on
the task conscientiously. The data show that the vast majority of subjects did.7
2.3.3 Measure of risk attitudes
We used the following criteria to choose the method for quantifying subjects’
risk attitudes:
• It does not require assuming a specific utility function or choice model.8
7 For the first paragraph of the first part of the task, 85% of subjects reported the correct value
or a value within the 10% interval around the correct value (typically below the correct value).
This task was the same for both groups. For the first paragraph of the second task, performance
was comparable for the control group (91% of subjects reported values inside the 10% interval
around the correct value), but inferior for the treatment group who had a more difficult task to
fulfill (only 56% of subjects stated values inside the 10% interval around the true value).
8 We deliberately did not aim at designing an experiment that enables us to estimate the mod-
els’ parameters. Structural estimation requires simultaneous estimation of several of the models’
parameters. Any such estimation would need to rely on strong assumptions regarding functional
forms and various unobservable quantities.
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• Lotteries of various types, including long shots (lotteries with a low prob-
ability of winning a high prize) and safe choices (degenerate lotteries),
need to be implementable.
• It has to allow for the measurement of risk aversion, risk neutrality, and
risk proclivity—ideally in a single decision situation.
• It should provide a fine measure of risk attitudes to enable us to detect
small effect sizes.
Following these criteria, we chose a measure using two-outcome lotteries
and mean-preserving spreads of these lotteries. Our method was inspired by
Ebert and Wiesen (2011, 2014) whose experimental measures are based on the
model-independent concept of risk apportionment (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger,
2006). Ebert and Wiesen (2014) classify an individual as risk-averse if she
prefers a lottery L= (cL,1,pL,1; cL,2,pL,2)= (x− r, 50%;x− k, 50%) over the lot-
tery M = (cM,1,pM,1; cM,2,pM,2)= (x− r− k, 50%;x, 50%), where x, r, and k are
monetary payoffs. Note that this coincides with preferring a lottery to a mean-
preserving spread of that lottery. In case the individual prefers M over L, she is
classified as risk-seeking. In general—i.e., with arbitrary probabilities pL,1,pL,2—
LotteryM is constructed by setting cM,1 = x− (pL,2 /pL,1) r− k. This is needed for
constructing the mean-preserving spread of the long shot.
To measure the intensity of a subject’s risk attitude, we determine the mon-
etary amount m (compensation or “risk premium”) that is needed to make
her indifferent between the lotteries L and M+m. To this purpose, we use
a choice list format, as introduced by Holt and Laury (2002). The switching
row in the choice list delivers a proxy of the indifference-generating risk pre-
mium m∼(L,M). If m∼(L,M)> 0, the decision maker exhibits risk aversion for
that particular lottery pair; conversely, m∼(L,M)< 0 indicates risk proclivity.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of all four choice lists (one per hypothesis)
that we used, in the order in which they were presented to subjects: Choice List A
is designed to address Hypothesis 1, while Choice List B relates to Hypothesis 2,
Choice List C to Hypothesis 4, and Choice List D to Hypothesis 3.
We decided not to randomize the order of the choice lists since the most
basic hypothesis, Hypothesis 1, is addressed by Choice List A. We had all subjects
complete this choice list first to ensure that even if depletion effects fade out over
a time as short as a minute, they should be present consistently when testing
our most basic hypothesis.
In the instructions we referred to the choice lists as “tables”. A sample screen-
shot displaying the exact representation that subjects saw is included in Fig-
ure 2.1.
Each choice list starts from a first-order stochastically dominated choice and
spans risk aversion, risk neutrality, and risk proclivity. To make the decisions
easy for subjects to grasp, probabilities remain the same within a given choice
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Table 2.1. Overview of the choice lists presented to subjects.
Alternative A Alternative B
cA,1 pA,1 cA,2 pA,2 cB,1 pB,1 cB,2 pB,2
Choice List A: risky/risky (x = 22.00 €, r = 7.50 €, k = 11.50 €; 25 rows)
Top row 3.00 € 50% 22.00 € 50% 3.00 € 50% 7.00 € 50%
Center row 3.00 € 50% 22.00 € 50% 9.00 € 50% 13.00 € 50%
Row with m = 0 3.00 € 50% 22.00 € 50% 10.50 € 50% 14.50 € 50%
Bottom row 3.00 € 50% 22.00 € 50% 15.00 € 50% 19.00 € 50%
Choice List B: safe/risky (x = 16.00 €, r = 5.00 €, k = 5.00 €; 19 rows)
Top row 11.00 € 100% 11.00 € 50% 21.00 € 50%
Center row 11.00 € 100% 6.50 € 50% 16.50 € 50%
Row with m = 0 11.00 € 100% 6.00 € 50% 16.00 € 50%
Bottom row 11.00 € 100% 2.00 € 50% 12.00 € 50%
Choice List C: “long shot” (x = 14.00 €, r = −36.00 €, k = 7.00 €; 21 rows)
Top row 7.00 € 90% 50.00 € 10% 7.00 € 90% 10.00 € 10%
Row with m = 0 7.00 € 90% 50.00 € 10% 11.00 € 90% 14.00 € 10%
Center row 7.00 € 90% 50.00 € 10% 12.00 € 90% 15.00 € 10%
Bottom row 7.00 € 90% 50.00 € 10% 17.00 € 90% 20.00 € 10%
Choice List D: delayed payos (x = 18.00 €, r = 6.00 €, k = 8.50 €, paid in one week; 20 rows)
Top row 9.50 € 50% 12.00 € 50% 9.50 € 50% 24.00 € 50%
Above-center row 9.50 € 50% 12.00 € 50% 5.00 € 50% 19.50 € 50%
Below-center row 9.50 € 50% 12.00 € 50% 4.50 € 50% 19.00 € 50%
Row with m = 0 9.50 € 50% 12.00 € 50% 3.50 € 50% 18.00 € 50%
Bottom row 9.50 € 50% 12.00 € 50% 0.00 € 50% 14.50 € 50%
list. Moreover, in all choice lists, the left lottery stays constant, while the right
lottery’s payoff changes in steps of €0.50 per row. Additionally, the expected
value of “Alternative A” is similar (between €10.75 and €12.50) for all four
choice lists.
To address a recent criticism of choice-list–based measurement of risk atti-
tudes by Andersson et al. (2016), we put the expected median switching row in
the control condition to the center of each list.9
9 Andersson et al. (2016) show that when subjects make mistakes that lead to random choice
and their “real” risk attitude does not imply a switching row at the center of a choice list, a sys-
tematic measurement error toward indifference at the center of the choice list occurs. Thus, we
designed our choice lists in such a way that the switching row for the median risk attitude that we
expected in the control condition—on the basis of degrees of risk attitudes commonly observed
in experiments—was at the center of the respective choice list. It turns out that our expectations
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Moreover, we balanced the exposition of our choice lists: in two of our choice
lists, the dominated choice in the first row is on the left, and in the other two,
it is on the right.
Obviously, there is a trade-off between the brevity of a choice list and the
fineness and extent of measurement. Some experimenters solve this by using
differently sized increments, i.e., smaller increments in intervals they expect to
be most relevant. Since we were concerned that this might confound subjects’
choices by steering the switching row in a certain direction, we used constant
increments (of 0.50 €) throughout all choice lists. To be able to pick up finer
depletion-induced changes in risk attitudes, switching points in four additional
“small” choice lists were elicited after subjects had made their choices in all four
“large” choice lists. These “small” choice lists consisted of six rows covering the
switching range in the respective “large” choice lists and had increments of 0.10
€. Importantly, one of the rows of the “small” choice lists was randomly chosen
for payment if and only if the respective switching range of the associated “large”
choice list had been selected for payment. This ensures that subjects have no
incentive to misrepresent their preferences in the “large” choice lists in order to
face lotteries with greater expected value in the “small” choice lists.
A particular feature of our computerized implementation of the choice lists
is that, once a subject switches, all subsequent rows are automatically filled in.
Subjects could still adjust their choices and had to press a “Continue” button to
confirm their choices before moving on to the next choice list. This was done to
let as little time as possible pass between the depletion task and the measure-
ment of risk attitudes. While it is typically assumed that self-control resources
replenish after some time, we are not aware of any evidence on how long deple-
tion effects last. Furthermore, we did not want to exhaust or annoy subjects, and
thus possibly impair the quality of our data, by forcing them to make 85 clicks.
A final aspect to consider is the value of zˆ in the Fudenberg-Levine model,
the theoretical threshold above which all additional income is saved. At least
one of the lotteries needs to be such that one outcome is above and one below
zˆ. To elicit a proxy for subjects’ individual zˆ values, we use two vignettes in
the post-experiment questionnaire. The vignettes asked subjects to imagine two
scenarios. The first scenario is going out with friends in the evening. The vignette
asked subjects to indicate the minimal amount of money spent while going out
such that they would consider the evening “expensive”. The second scenario is
casually discovering an item that one would like to buy in a store. It asks subjects
to state the minimal price of that item that would induce them to deliberate
about the expenditure instead of buying the item immediately.
were rather accurate. The median switching row in the control group was close to the center (one
to three rows above the center) for all choice lists.
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Median values in the two vignettes are 15 €and 20 €, respectively. Thus,
taking these values as proxies for zˆ, our design of the choice lists ensures that,
for most of the subjects, the vast majority of lottery choices under consideration
should be affected by self-control depletion.
Although the “true” cutoff zˆ is unobservable, one can argue that our choice
lists likely fulfill the payoff requirements mentioned above even without taking
the proxies provided by the vignettes into account. Strictly speaking, zˆ varies be-
tween subjects, between lotteries, and between conditions, as well as over time,
because all these factors might affect the marginal costs of self-control. How-
ever, as long as, for example, 3 €< zˆ< 22 € for Choice List A, the list covers
the payoff range that enables a test of the prediction of the Fudenberg–Levine
model that lower self-control leads to greater risk aversion. The upper bound
of 22 €seems very reasonable given that the median daily disposable income,
net of rent, in our sample is only 10 €(surveyed through the post-experiment
questionnaire). Regarding the lower bound, we argue that the value of zˆ must
be above the minimum payoff of our lotteries (3 €) for the majority of subjects.
If this was not the case, subjects would have to exhibit risk neutrality according
to the Fudenberg–Levine model. Contrary to this, most of our subjects turn out
to be risk-averse, as we report in the Results section. These arguments jointly
suggest that the payoff ranges were appropriate for our purposes.
2.3.4 Manipulation checks
Most studies using ego depletion do not include independent manipulation
checks but simply rely on the effectiveness of the implemented depletion task
based on the results of previous studies. By contrast, we include a multifaceted
manipulation check comprised of several parts in our experiment to be able to
assess independently from possible treatment effects whether the depletion task
did indeed induce variations in self-control. Ideally, one would assess subjects’
state of self-control at the same time as measuring their risk attitudes. This is,
of course, not feasible. One possibility would be to introduce all measures of the
manipulation check in between the depletion task and the measurement of risk
attitudes. Most candidates for manipulation checks (e.g., the Stroop test) are,
however, likely to alter subjects’ level of self-control themselves. We therefore
include a short ad hoc measure that we do not consider depleting right after
the depletion task and a more comprehensive, but possibly depleting part of the
manipulation check right after measuring risk attitudes. Because self-control
resources are generally thought to replenish over time, doing parts of the ma-
nipulation check only after the main part of the experiment may have the dis-
advantage that self-control resources could have already replenished partly or
completely.
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Figure 2.2. Screenshot of the computerized Stroop test.
Notes: The screenshot depicts an incongruent trial, i.e., themeaning of the color word “rot” (“red”)
does not correspond to the color of the word (in this case, shown in blue on the screen). Subjects
would have to press the “Blau” (“Blue”) button.
Our first short ad hoc measure consists of choosing the difficulty of a puzzle
(on a scale from one to ten). Our conjecture was that depleted subjects would
select an easier puzzle. Since the puzzle is solved only later, the mere choice of
its difficulty level should not affect subjects’ level of self-control resources.
The second part of the manipulation check, performed after risk attitudes
have been measured, is a computerized version of the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935;
MacLeod, 1991). The Stroop test is well-established both as a depletion task and
as a dependent variable in depletion studies (see Hagger et al., 2010). In our
computerized version, the name of a color appears in bold letters at the center
of the screen. The letters themselves are also printed in color. In “congruent
trials”, this color corresponds to the word’s meaning, while it differs from the
word’s meaning in “incongruent trials”. Subjects’ task is to indicate the color
in which the letters are printed—and not the meaning of the color word. To
this end, the screen shows six buttons that are labeled with color names and
located on a circle around the bold color word. For a screenshot, see Figure 2.2.
Subjects have to click the button corresponding to the color in which the word
is printed as fast as they can. Just as in the depletion task, in incongruent trials
of the Stroop test, subjects have to exert self-control to suppress an automatic
impulse, namely clicking the button corresponding to the meaning of the word.
Immediately after each button click, a new word appears. Subjects receive no
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feedback. In our experiment, subjects work on this task for threeminutes.Widely
used measures to check for depletion effects are average response times per trial
and the number of correct answers. We expect longer response times and a lower
number of correct answers in the depletion compared to the control group.
As a third measure that is employed frequently (see Hagger et al., 2010),
we asked subjects at the beginning of the final questionnaire how much they
had to concentrate in each part of the depletion task and how exhausted they
felt before the experiment and at the present moment. For both we calculate
differences and compare them between treatment and control group.
Based on these five independent components of the overall manipulation
check (choice of difficulty of a puzzle, response times and number of correct
responses in the Stroop test, difference in self-reported need to concentrate dur-
ing the two parts of the depletion task, and difference in self-reported fatigue at
the beginning and end of the experiment) that all have their distinct strengths
and weaknesses, we construct a joint index of depletion. We z-standardize each
of the five measures, average over them, and again z-standardize the result. Av-
eraging over different measures of the same construct is a common procedure to
reduce measurement error. Thus, we believe that the aggregate depletion index
is suited best to indicate the effectiveness of the depletion task.
2.3.5 Procedural details and implementation
The detailed sequence of events in each session was as follows:
1. Instructions.Upon entering the lab, subjects drew a card containing a num-
ber and were asked to sit in the respective booth. They read the instruc-
tions, were encouraged to ask questions in private, and answered several
control questions on the computer. (A translation of the instructions to
English can be found in Appendix 2.C.)
2. Depletion task. Subjects participated in the treatment-specific version of
the crossing-out letters task that either induced low self-control or left
self-control unchanged.
3. Part 1 of the manipulation check. Subjects chose the difficulty of a puzzle
(on a scale from 1 to 10) that they solved at the end of the experiment.
4. Measurement of risk attitudes. Subjects made lottery decisions in the four
choice lists.
5. Part 2 of the manipulation check. Stroop test.
6. Puzzle. Subjects solved the puzzle with the chosen level of difficulty.
7. Postexperiment questionnaire, including Part 3 of the manipulation check
(self-reported required concentration during each part of the depletion
task and self-reported exhaustion before and after the experiment).
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The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab, using the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) for inviting sub-
jects and for recording their participation. The experiment consisted of thirteen
sessions in July and October 2014. Treatment and control were balanced with
respect to day of the week and time of the day, since there is empirical work that
suggests that both self-control and measured risk attitudes may exhibit a corre-
lation with time of the day (Kouchaki and Smith, 2014).
All written instructions and all recorded data (except, of course, personal
data such as information on subjects’ bank accounts) as well as the source code
used for running the experiment and used in the data analysis are available as
supplementary material on the journal website.
308 subjects participated, each in only one group (152 in the depletion and
156 in the control group). 150 subjects were male (74 in the depletion and 76
in the control group), 158 were female (78 in the depletion and 80 in the con-
trol group). Most subjects (92%) were students and majored in various subjects.
Age varied between 17 and 55 years10 (median age, 24 years; 93% in the range
19–30 years) and did not differ significantly between groups. No particular ex-
clusion criteria applied, except for color blindness.
In total, the experiment lasted about 75 minutes (including payment). Sub-
jects received on average €12.25 from the outcome of one randomly drawn lot-
tery decision (random lottery incentive mechanism; RLIM) plus an additional
€1 for filling out the questionnaire. Given that we are testing theories that de-
viate from expected-utility theory, a comment regarding incentive compatibility
of the payment mechanism is in order. Our instructions tell subjects that it is
in their best interest to treat each choice as if it were the only one because
only one lottery decision will be randomly selected for payment. Nevertheless,
in case subjects do not “isolate” decisions but integrate them at least partially
into a compound lottery, experiments with only one choice may yield different
results than experiments with repeated decisions. This can even occur when
the RLIM is used, unless subjects obey “statewise monotonicity” (Azrieli et al.,
2017), a condition equivalent to “compound independence” (Segal, 1990). In
fact, the Fudenberg–Levine model can predict that different choices are made
in a setup with a single choice than in a setup with multiple choices and re-
muneration via the RLIM. Importantly, however, we show in Section 2.A.4 in
Appendix 2.A that the qualitative prediction regarding the treatment effect is un-
affected. Hence, judged by the dual-self model, the RLIM is appropriate for
detecting treatment differences resulting from reduced self-control.
Payments were made in a separate room to ensure privacy. Those subjects
for whom the delayed lottery was drawn did not receive the lottery’s payoff until
10 Underage subjects must provide written consent by their parents in order to participate in
experiments at the BonnEconLab.
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a week later. They could choose between a dated bank transfer and collecting
the amount in cash in person.
The postexperiment questionnaire measured socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics (age, gender, high school GPA, latest math grade at
school, student status and field of study, experience with experiments) and as-
sessed subjects’ general attitudes toward risk and time, using questions from
the SOEP questionnaire (German Socio-Economic Panel). Additionally, via ten
questions adopted from Hauge et al. (2014), we aimed at measuring whether
subjects primarily used the deliberative or the affective system while making
their lottery choices. Subjects also answered a questionnaire on character trait
self-control (Tangney et al., 2004; Bertrams and Dickhäuser, 2009) as well as
a questionnaire on positive and negative affect at the present moment (Watson
and Clark, 1999).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Manipulation checks
Amanipulation check based on the aggregate depletion index indicates that sub-
jects in the treatment group were significantly more depleted than their counter-
parts in the control group (two-sided t-test, p< 0.001). Translating the aggre-
gate depletion index into a standardized effect size, we find Cohen’s d= 0.74.
Moreover, for each of the five separate parts that comprise the depletion index
(see Section 2.3.4), we observe differences between depleted and nondepleted
subjects in the expected direction. That is, subjects in the depletion treatment
chose slightly lower levels of difficulty of a puzzle (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p= 0.391), had slightly longer response times and a slightly lower
number of correct answers in the Stroop test (two-sidedWilcoxon rank-sum test:
p= 0.286 and p= 0.222, respectively), a stronger increase in concentration re-
quired for the second part of the depletion task (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p< 0.001), and a stronger increase in exhaustion compared to their control-
group counterparts (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p= 0.176).
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Recall that the switching row in each of the four choice lists measures an indi-
vidual’s risk attitude. More precisely, differences in expected values of the less
risky lottery and its mean-preserving spread at the switching row measure an in-
dividual’s “risk premium” m∼ that has to be added to the riskier lottery to make
that subject indifferent between the two lotteries. Based on these indifference-
generating risk premia, we classify subjects’ behavior into four categories: risk-
2.4 Results | 27
Table 2.2. Pairwise Pearson’s correlation coecients of the individual
indierence-generating risk premia in the four choice lists.
mA∼ mB∼ mC∼ mD∼
mA∼ 1
mB∼ 0.3830 1
mC∼ 0.3819 0.2654 1
mD∼ 0.4173 0.5660 0.3481 1
Note. For all correlations shown above: p < 0.0001.
seeking (negative risk premium), risk-neutral (risk premium of zero), risk-averse
(positive risk premium), and dominated choices.
For Choice Lists A, B, and D, 80% to 89% of subjects made risk-averse choices.
This is in line with the widely observed empirical result that a vast majority of
individuals is risk-averse (e.g., Harrison et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2011).
For Choice List C, where one of the alternatives is a long shot, i.e., offers a low
probability of winning a large prize, only 46% of subjects are classified as risk-
averse. This shift in expressed risk attitudes due to the presence of a long shot
is expected, based on the commonly observed fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
(Harbaugh et al., 2010) which is usually attributed to an overweighting of the
small probability associated with the large payoff.
A more detailed description of how the risk premium is calculated and how
the categories are formed as well as a table displaying the absolute and relative
frequencies of choices in the four choice lists can be found in Appendix 2.B.
It is noteworthy that the size of the indifference-generating risk premia re-
acts to differences between the choice lists in a plausible manner: On aver-
age, subjects exhibit the highest risk premium (mA∼ = 2.69€) for Choice List A
(risky vs. risky lottery), i.e., the choice list with the largest difference between
the spreads of the two lotteries. For the long shot, the average risk premium
is mC∼ = −0.36€, indicating that on average subjects behave in a slightly risk-
seeking manner.
The risk premia measured in the different choice lists exhibit significant and
positive pairwise correlation coefficients (see Table 2.2). Hence, we are confi-
dent that our measures of risk attitudes pick up systematic variation in underly-
ing individual risk attitudes.
2.4.3 Treatment eects
Figure 2.3 displays subjects’ choices in detail and serves as a graphical represen-
tation of our main results. The variable on the horizontal axis is the indifference-
generating “risk premium” m∼, i.e., the difference in expected values between
the lotteries in the switching row in euros. Thus, subjects to the right of zero are
classified as risk-averse, while those to the left are classified as risk-seeking.
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Figure 2.3. Treatment comparison of indierence-generating risk premia.
Notes. The horizontal axis displays the indifference-generating risk premia m∼, i.e., the differ-
ence in the expected values of the more risky and the less risky lottery at the switching row (in
euros). Left column: Histograms of observed risk premia. Right column: Estimated kernel densi-
ties (Epanechnikov kernel functions, optimal-bandwidth routine by Stata).
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Result 1. (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 1 b, 2 b.) Ego depletion does not increase risk
aversion.
We do not observe an increase in risk aversion of the treatment relative to
the control group for any of the choice lists. For Choice Lists A and B, Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no treatment difference in
risk premia (two-sided p= 0.245 and p= 0.253, respectively). For both choice
lists, depleted subjects even show a nonsignificant tendency toward less risk
aversion, with depleted subjects exhibiting lower indifference-generating risk
premia in both Choice List A (∆mA∼ = 0.30€; Cohen’s d= 0.13) and Choice List B
(∆mB∼ = 0.10€; Cohen’s d= 0.07).
Result 2. (Hypotheses 3 and 3 b.) When payoffs are delayed, ego depletion does
not affect risk attitudes.
Also in Choice List D, where all payoffs are delayed by one week, de-
pleted subjects are slightly less risk-averse than subjects in the control group
(∆mD∼ = 0.22€; Cohen’s d= 0.15). Using two one-sided mean equivalence tests,
we reject the null hypothesis of a difference of half a standard deviation or more
(p= 0.001). This is in line with our initial hypothesis. However, this result would
only be evidence in support of the Fudenberg–Levine model, had Hypotheses 1
and 2 been confirmed by the data.
Result 3. (Hypothesis 4.) For long shots, there is no evidence for a difference in
risk attitudes under ego depletion.
For Choice List C, where one of the lotteries yields an outcome of 50 €with
10% probability, we hypothesized (based on Loewenstein and O’Donoghue,
2005, p. 28) that ego depletion induces less risk-averse choices through an in-
creased overweighting of the small probability associated with the large payoff.
On average, subjects are mildly risk-seeking in both the treatment and control
group for Choice List C. We again find that depleted subjects made slightly less
risk-averse choices; however, the difference between the two groups is not sta-
tistically significant (∆mC∼ = 0.28€, Cohen’s d= 0.13, Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
two-sided p= 0.335). Thus, for the sample as a whole, we find no evidence in
support of the prediction by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue.
Result 4. (Hypothesis 4 b.) For long shots, there is no evidence for greater variance
of risk attitudes under ego depletion.
When testing for a difference in variances between treatment and control
group for Choice List C, we find no evidence in favor of this hypothesis (Levene’s
robust test statistic, W0, for the equality of variances, p= 0.999). Neither is
there an indication for a difference in variances for any of the other choice lists
(Levene’sW0; p= 0.310 for Choice List A, p= 0.756 for B, and p= 0.069 for D).
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2.4.4 Disaggregating the data: results from linear regressions
Even thoughwe obtain an overall null result regarding the effect of ego depletion
on risk attitudes, it is possible that there is heterogeneity in the effect of ego
depletion depending on subject characteristics. Thus, we investigate whether
choices and the effect of ego depletion in our experiment vary with observable
characteristics. We do so by regressing choices on those observables which are
most likely to determine risk attitudes. The results are presented in Table 2.3.
In addition, the table contains (in its top part) the coefficients of a simple linear
regression of risk attitude on the treatment dummy for convenient comparison.
In the specification with controls, we include gender as an explanatory vari-
able because women are typically found to be more risk-averse than men (see
Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a general survey on gender differences in risk tak-
ing). Furthermore, we regress our measure of risk attitudes on the final grade
at high school (self-reported by subjects; reverse scoring compared to the Amer-
ican GPA, i.e., higher grades are worse) as a proxy for IQ, since cognitive ability
has been found to covary with risk attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2010).11 Since
there may be individual differences in both subjects’ baseline self-control ability
and in the treatment effect on self-control, we include trait self-control (ques-
tionnaire measure; Tangney et al., 2004) and the standardized aggregate score
of the depletion index in the regression.
Columns 1 through 4 display the regression of choices in each choice list
separately, while column 5 uses the data from all choice lists. The dependent
variable is the indifference-generating risk premiumm∼ for the respective choice
list indicated in the column header. Note that the larger m∼, the greater is risk
aversion. The unit of this measure is €.
In line with the literature, baseline risk aversion is higher for women than for
men across all choice lists but only significantly so in Choice List A (p= 0.010).
The coefficients of the IQ proxy and of trait self-control turn out not to be signif-
icant, neither for individual choice lists nor for all choice lists jointly. Moreover,
we find no evidence that risk attitudes vary by the extent of depletion. The co-
efficient of the aggregate depletion index is never significantly different from
zero. Only for Choice List A, it is marginally significant (p= 0.075).
Including the interaction of Female and Ego depletion allows us to split up
the effect of ego depletion by gender. The coefficient on the regressor Ego de-
pletion represents the influence of self-control depletion on men, and the sum
11 Despite evidence that age is a determinant of risk attitudes, we do not include it due to
limited variation in age in our sample. For our sample, we find that the coefficient on age is
heavily influenced by two outliers (above 50 years). Similarly, we do not control for student
status because 92% of our sample are students. When using math grade instead of high school
GPA as a proxy for IQ, the coefficients and their significance levels are virtually unchanged.
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Table 2.3. Linear regressions of the measure of risk aversion on individual
characteristics.
Dependent variable: indierence-generating risk premium m∼ [in €]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model 1: Simple regression Choice
List A
Choice
List B
Choice
List C
Choice
List D
Com-
bined
Ego depletion −0.301 −0.100 −0.284 −0.224 −0.233
(0.271) (0.166) (0.265) (0.177) (0.161)
Constant 2.842*** 1.542*** −0.221 2.317*** 1.636***
(0.183) (0.117) (0.182) (0.114) (0.114)
Observations 303 289 295 304 1191
R2 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.003
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Model 2: Including controls Choice
List A
Choice
List B
Choice
List C
Choice
List D
Com-
bined
Ego depletion −0.563 −0.299 −0.839** −0.425* −0.540***
(0.362) (0.216) (0.379) (0.241) (0.208)
Manipulation check 0.251* 0.111 0.153 −0.036 0.128
(0.141) (0.094) (0.134) (0.104) (0.086)
Female 0.900*** 0.041 0.166 0.313 0.362*
(0.347) (0.228) (0.368) (0.222) (0.216)
Female × Ego depletion 0.173 0.247 0.891* 0.453 0.440
(0.511) (0.326) (0.533) (0.341) (0.306)
Final grade at high school −0.176 −0.019 0.034 0.128 0.002
(GPA equivalent, inversely
coded)
(0.200) (0.149) (0.228) (0.147) (0.135)
Trait self-control −0.017 0.001 −0.017 0.000 −0.008
(0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009)
Constant 2.467*** 1.559*** −0.253 2.142*** 1.493***
(0.247) (0.150) (0.263) (0.163) (0.152)
Observations 303 289 295 304 1191
R2 0.066 0.013 0.042 0.043 0.026
Eect of self-control depletion on women
Ego depletion+
Female × Ego depletion
−0.390 −0.052 0.051 0.028 −0.101
F[Ego depletion+ 0.940 0.033 0.017 0.011 0.156
Female × Ego depletion = 0] (p = 0.33) (p = 0.86) (p = 0.90) (p = 0.92) (p = 0.69)
Notes. Dependent variable: indierence-generating risk premium m∼ for the choice list indicated
in the column header. The larger m∼, the greater risk aversion. Robust standard errors (cluster-
corrected at the subject level for columns 5 and 10) in parentheses. Asterisks indicate signicance
levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Missing observations (N < 308) are due to exclusion of tri-
als in which subjects chose a dominated option. The regressors Depletion Check, Final grade at high
school and Trait self-control are mean-centered (so that the constant represents the indierence-
generating risk premium at the sample mean of these variables). Also note that in the German
grading system, 1 is the best grade, and 4 is the worst among the passing grades.
32 | 2 Does self-control depletion aect risk attitudes?
of this coefficient and that on the interaction term (i.e., Ego depletion+
Ego depletion× Female) represents the effect of depletion on women.
In all choice lists, men tend to become less risk-averse under depletion,
for Choice Lists C and D even (marginally) significantly so (p= 0.028, and
p= 0.079, respectively). Aggregating over all choice lists, the average man is
indifferent at a 54 cent lower risk premium in the depletion than in the con-
trol group (p= 0.010), which goes against our hypotheses.12 Interestingly, self-
control depletion has basically no effect on women, as can be seen from the
bottom three rows of Table 2.3. This finding is in line with Friehe and Schildberg-
Hörisch (2017).
Recall that in Choice List C, one of the lotteries is a “long shot”, i.e., it features
a small probability of winning a large prize. Here, the tendency that depleted
men are on average indifferent at a 84 cents lower risk premium than nonde-
pleted men (p= 0.028) conforms with Hypothesis 4. This could be interpreted
as evidence in favor of increased overweighting of the small probability associ-
ated with the large payoff, as Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) predict for
reduced self-control. However, we find a decrease in risk aversion, albeit less
pronounced and mostly nonsignificant, also across the remaining choice lists—
for which their model does not predict an influence of self-control depletion.
Moreover, the effect is absent for women. Hence, in sum, there is only limited
evidence for the channel proposed by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005).
2.4.5 Summary
Although our manipulation check suggests that the manipulation effectively de-
pleted the self-control resources of subjects in the treatment group, we do not
find any significant difference in risk attitudes between subjects in the treatment
and control group. However, we observe the same nonsignificant tendency for
all four choice lists. Under depletion, subjects behave in a slightly less risk-averse
manner, in contrast to the prediction of the Fudenberg–Levine model.
2.5 Discussion and conclusion
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the causal influence of self-control on risk
attitudes. Self-control, a concept from psychology, has been conceptualized and
formalized in economics through dual-self models (in particular, Fudenberg and
Levine, 2006, 2011, 2012) and dual-system models (in particular, Loewenstein
12 The regression analysis adds significance tests for several coefficients. Given the large share
of nonsignificant results, the significant effect of ego depletion on men’s risk aversion should be
judged with due care.
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and O’Donoghue, 2005; Mukherjee, 2010). These models posit that a central
determinant of risk attitudes is an individual’s current level of self-control.
Building on the Fudenberg–Levine dual-self model, we derive hypotheses for
choices between risky monetary payoffs in a state of low self-control, compared
to regular self-control. We show that the model predicts that lower levels of self-
control induce stronger risk aversion for stakes within a particular range. We
then test the hypotheses in a lab experiment with a large number of subjects by
exogenously lowering self-control resources in half of our subjects via so-called
ego depletion. We do not find any evidence for increased risk aversion after
self-control depletion. Contrary to the theoretical predictions of the Fudenberg–
Levine model, our results document a consistent but nonsignificant tendency
of depleted subjects to become less risk-averse. Only for male subjects, this ten-
dency is significant when considering their decisions across all four choice lists
jointly.
Before discussing the implications of our findings for the modeling of deci-
sion making under risk, we exclude several alternative explanations of our data.
A possible concern might be that some of the payoffs of our choice lists were
not chosen optimally, i.e., the respective choices did not reflect the case in which,
at least in one of the two lotteries, one payoff was below and another above
the theoretical cutoff zˆ. In these cases, the model of Fudenberg et al. (2014)
does not predict any effect of ego depletion on risk attitudes. Using the values
that we measured in the vignettes as proxies for zˆ suggests that this might be
the case for about 33% of the total number of choices (85 per subject), while
our payoff choices imply that ego depletion should affect risk attitudes in the
remaining 67% of choices.13 We find that our results are robust to excluding
those choices for which we predict no effect of ego depletion on risk attitudes
based on the individual zˆ. In particular, we still do not find any significant differ-
ence in risk attitudes between treatment and control group for any of the choice
lists (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p= 0.487 for Choice List A, p= 0.915 for Choice
List B, p= 0.346 for Choice List C, and p= 0.435 for Choice List D).14
Another possible concern may be that all subjects were depleted to begin
with and thus could not have been affected by the treatment difference. We
do not find evidence in support of that view. 65% of subjects report an initial
exhaustion level of 5 or less on a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 10. Moreover,
when we restrict our analysis to those subjects who report initial exhaustion
below the median level of 3, there is no significant increase in risk aversion
either (t-tests, p= 0.244 for Choice List A, p= 0.912 for B, p= 0.089 for C,
13 We assign each subject the average zˆ from her answers to both vignettes.
14 Subjects are included if at their individual switching row, the condition that for at least one of
the two lotteries one payoff is below and the other is above their individual average zˆ is fulfilled.
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and p= 0.362 for D, with subjects in the depletion condition being even less
risk-averse for Choice Lists B through D).
A further hypothesis is that self-control depletion has a different effect on risk
attitudes than is suggested by the Fudenberg–Levinemodel. Rather than causing
a shift in the distribution of risk preferences, it may make subjects more likely to
make mistakes, leading to a higher variance in decisions under depletion. Based
on the tests reported in Section 2.4.3, we do not find evidence in favor of this
hypothesis.
Alternatively, self-control as a stable character trait might explain hetero-
geneity in risk attitudes across individuals, even if temporary changes in self-
control as induced by depletion tasks do not have a significant impact on risk
preferences. In this vein, Fudenberg and Levine (2011, p. 57) state, “One possi-
ble next step would be to try to more explicitly account for the evident hetero-
geneity of the population, and estimate distributions of self-control parameters
. . . .” We therefore measure trait self-control in the questionnaire, using the Ger-
man version of the scale by Tangney et al. (2004). While trait self-control is, for
example, a significant predictor of the final grade at high school in our data, it
does not explain risk attitudes in any of our choice lists.
Moreover, decision making between groups might differ in systematic ways
which do not manifest themselves in choices. For example, subjects may rely
on heuristics to a larger extent in the depletion than in the control group (e.g.,
Loewenstein andO’Donoghue, 2005). It is likely that decision times using heuris-
tics are shorter (Rubinstein, 2007, 2016). According to this measure, we do not
find any evidence for increased reliance on heuristics by depleted subjects. In
fact, decision times of subjects in the depletion group are slightly longer for all
choice lists, albeit insignificantly so (t-tests; 87 s vs. 81 s, p= 0.149 for Choice
List A; 49 s vs. 46 s, p= 0.219 for B; 72 s vs. 68 s, p= 0.474 for C; 81 s vs. 77 s,
p= 0.275 for D; and 72 s vs. 68 s, p= 0.192, cluster-corrected, for all choice
lists jointly).
Being null results, our findings add to the recent skepticism against all
“strength of self-control”-type of models, including Fudenberg and Levine’s.
Most prominently, Carter and McCullough (2014) reanalyze the data of the
meta-analysis of Hagger et al. (2010). They find indications of small-sample
effects, in particular publication bias. When correcting for publication bias, es-
timated effect sizes are smaller, between 0.42 and 0, depending on which sta-
tistical method is used. In reaction to Carter and McCullough (2014), Hagger
et al. (2016) conducted a large-scale, preregistered replication study that failed
to reproduce an effect of a crossing-out letters task on a subsequent self-control
task. Our crossing-out letters task, however, differs from the one in their study in
that it is neither computerized nor does it leave out the stage of establishing the
impulse to cross out the letter “e”. These are exactly the aspects that Baumeister
and Vohs (2016a) regard as the main reasons for manipulation failure in Hagger
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et al. (2016). Thus, our setup gives self-control failure due to ego depletion the
best possible chance to produce an effect.
Nevertheless, one could argue that the effect of ego depletion might not be
strong enough to induce an increase in self-control costs. However, using an
ego depletion task is a way to operationalize self-control that Fudenberg et al.
(2014) themselves suggest in order to make their model testable. Moreover, our
aggregate manipulation check implies that subjects in the treatment group were
indeed significantly more depleted than those in the control group.
Furthermore, our sample size of N = 308 exceeds the sample size of all ex-
cept one of the 198 studies on the effects of ego depletion that are covered by
the meta-analyses by Hagger et al. (2010) and Carter and McCullough (2014)
(only 10 of the 198 studies have a sample size that exceeds 100), and power
analyses show that it yields sufficient power to document relevant effect sizes.
Still, we do not find any evidence for increased risk aversion after ego de-
pletion as predicted by the model of Fudenberg et al. (2014) with convex self-
control costs. On average, depleted subjects even tend to be less risk-averse, al-
beit not significantly so. As we argue in Section 2.4.4, for men there is some but
limited evidence that this decrease in risk aversion is generated by increased
probability weighting, as Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005) predict. Our
findings that men are significantly less risk-averse when considering all choice
lists are also in line with those by Friehe and Schildberg-Hörisch (2017).
Traditionally, economics has modeled decision makers without any reference
to psychological concepts like “self-control”. Due to the inability of the standard
models of economic choice—expected-utility theory and discounted utility—to
explain particular phenomena in intertemporal decision making and decision
making under risk, concepts from psychology have been integrated into new
models to increase their explanatory power.
We have no doubt that economics can benefit from incorporating psychologi-
cal concepts in general and self-control in particular. For instance, we consider it
plausible that self-control plays an important role in savings decisions, addiction,
and health-related behavior such as food choice. However, its influence in deci-
sion making under risk seems limited: in our data different levels of self-control
only carry over to different risk attitudes in a negligible extent. In particular,
given that we observe a nonsignificant tendency toward decreased rather than
increased risk aversion following ego depletion, our findings cast doubt on the
“unified explanation” offered by Fudenberg and Levine (2006): risk attitudes
and intertemporal choice seem to be less interrelated—or related in different
ways—than their model suggests.
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2.A Derivation of hypotheses from the Fudenberg–Levine
model
We briefly sketched the Fudenberg–Levine model in Section 2.2.1. In the follow-
ing, we describe the interaction between the long-run and the short-run self in
greater detail. In particular, we examine pairwise choice between two-outcome
lotteries in the approximate model developed by Fudenberg et al. (2014). Fi-
nally, we explicitly incorporate self-control depletion in the model so that we
can derive hypotheses concerning its effect on choices between two-outcome
lotteries.
2.A.1 The model in detail
2.A.1.1 Mental accounting
Just like in Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011), agents in the approximate
model (Fudenberg et al., 2014) use mental accounting—the mental assignment
of expenditures to different accounts—as a means to avoid costly self-control.15
An agent in this model lives for several periods. Each of these periods can be
thought of as being mentally divided into two subperiods, a “banking period”
for planning and a “night-club period” for spending money. During the bank-
ing subperiod, there is no possibility for consumption. Instead, the long-run self
plans how much “pocket cash” x to take to the night club and how much to save
for future periods. In other words, it chooses an expenditure level for the second
subperiod. During the night-club subperiod, the short-run self spends all
There can be unanticipated income (“windfall profits”) during the night-club
period. This income can be stochastic, and it can present itself in the form of
multiple income opportunities between which the agent can choose, such that
the realized income depends on the agent’s choice (e.g., accepting or declining
the offer to substitute for a coworker who has called in sick on short notice).
Following the notation in Fudenberg et al. (2014), let consumption c refer to
consumption on top of the planned consumption level x. In such a situation,
once planned consumption x has been determined, the short-run self’s choice
between unanticipated income opportunities depends on c only. Hence, we sup-
press x in our notation and can denote the short-run self’s consumption utility
as a function u(c). It is assumed that u′(c)> 0 and u′′(c)< 0. Note that, unlike
“standard” consumption levels, c can be negative, as long as c> −x.
15 What is referred to as mental accounting here is only one component of mental accounting
as described in Thaler and Shefrin (1981).
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2.A.1.2 Lotteries
In this setup, unexpectedly facing a set ℑ of income opportunities is a situation in
which self-control becomes relevant. Lotteries are denoted as discrete random
variables Z ∈ ℑ that can take on values z1, . . . , zn, the lotteries’ outcomes. Since
the short-run self only cares about immediate consumption, its preferred plan
of action is to spend all lottery gains immediately and, thus, to choose the lot-
tery with the highest expected short-run utility Eu(Z). The utility derived from
this is called “temptation” and denoted u?(ℑ)≡maxZ∈ℑ Eu(Z).16 The long-run
self, in contrast, prefers to smooth consumption over time. Its value function is
therefore close to risk-neutral. Through use of self-control it enforces an action
that balances the short-run self’s want for immediate consumption and its own
preference for consumption smoothing.
2.A.1.3 Self-control
This act of self-control is assumed to be costly, with the cost depending on the
temptation u? as well as the actual consumption plan c˜ that the long-run self
enforces. This cost enters the overall objective function through a self-control
cost function g[u? − Eu(c˜)]. The function g[·] is assumed to be smooth, nonde-
creasing, and weakly convex.17 Its argument, u? − Eu(c˜), can be interpreted as
foregone utility: (expected) utility that the short-run self was not allowed to
realize due to being restricted by the long-run self. If Eu(c˜)= u?, no self-control
is exerted and, consequently, no costs arise, g[0]= 0. Whenever the long-run
self enforces an (expected) level of utility that is lower than the one desired by
the short-run self, i.e., whenever Eu(c˜)< u?, self-control costs are nonnegative:
g[u? − Eu(c˜)]≥ 0. It is important to note that this makes preferences over lot-
teries menu-dependent, because these preferences depend on self-control costs
which depend on temptation u? which, in turn, depends on the menu of lotter-
ies ℑ.
2.A.2 Optimization
We will now consider preferences over menus of unanticipated lotteries, which
match the situation in the lab. We address the decision problem that an agent
faces when picking a lottery Z from menu ℑ in two steps. We first calculate
optimal consumption for an arbitrary lottery. Then we derive how lotteries are
ranked for two-outcome lotteries—the case that we employ in our experiment.
16 For notational convenience, we suppress the dependence of temptation u? on the menu ℑ in
the following.
17 In order to model potential effects of varying levels of self-control, a convex self-control
cost function is the relevant—and realistic—case to consider (see Fudenberg and Levine, 2006,
Section V).
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2.A.2.1 Optimal consumption plan in the presence of self-control costs
For each lottery in the menu ℑ, the agent chooses a contingent consumption
plan c˜ with outcomes (c1, . . . , cn), where ci is consumption in case the lottery
outcome zi realizes (i= 1, . . . ,n). Note that choosing the optimal consumption
plan is equivalent to choosing an optimal level of self-control for each of the n
lottery outcomes. It is determined by equating the marginal cost from exerting
self-control and the marginal gain from saving for future periods.
The first-period utility for each lottery is Eu(c˜)− g[u? − Eu(c˜)]. Representing
all future utility using a value function v, the discounted present value of all
future consumption is δEv(w2 + Z− c˜). Here, w2 denotes total wealth at the
beginning of the next period, δ is the discount factor, and Z− c˜ is the random
savings plan implied by consumption plan c˜.
Thus, we get an overall objective function of
V(c˜,u?,Z,w2) = Eu(c˜)− g[u? − Eu(c˜)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
1st-period utility
+δEv(w2 + Z− c˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
future utitlity
.
2.A.2.2 Approximate model
Fudenberg et al. (2014) derive an approximate objective function from this as
follows. First, the authors define a “self-control gain function”
h[Eu(c˜)− u?]≡ Eu(c˜)− u? − g[u? − Eu(c˜)]
which is substituted into the objective function. It captures the effect of exerting
self-control on first-period utility. At Eu(c˜)= u?, no self-control is exerted, and
neither a cost nor a benefit arises. Exerting an additional unit of self-control
both increases the cost of self-control, g[u? − Eu(c˜)], and lowers Eu(c˜)− u?, the
expected utility for consumption plan c˜ compared to succumbing to temptation
completely, i.e., receiving u?. The function h[·] is nonpositive, smooth, strictly
increasing, and weakly concave, while its argument is nonpositive by definition.
Furthermore, it holds that h′(0)≥ 1.
Additionally, the authors perform a first-order Taylor approximation of the
unknown value function v. It is by virtue of this approximation that the long-run
self in the approximate model is completely risk-neutral—instead of only being
very close to risk-neutral, as in the original model.
Note that, since the level of pocket cash was chosen optimally in the absence
of self-control problems, we know that at c= 0 (no incremental consumption), it
must hold that u′(0)= δ v′(w2). This is a useful observation since the unknown
expression δ v′(w2) can be replaced by u′(0).
These two steps lead to the following approximate objective function:
max
c˜
Uc(c˜,u?,Z) = max
c˜
{h[Eu(c˜)− u?]+ u′(0) (EZ− Ec˜)}.
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This optimization problem over c˜ is constrained by ci ≤ zi for i= 1,2, . . . ,n.
Fudenberg et al. (2014)’s main theorem (p. 57) states that this optimization
problem over the optimal consumption plan (a vector of dimension n) is equal to
an optimization problemwhere the choice variable is a single threshold, denoted
z. All lottery earnings are spent in full for realizations below z, while above z,
self-control is exerted, and all earnings beyond z are saved:
maxzU(u
?,Z, z), where (2.1)
U(u?,Z, z) ≡ h[Eu(Z) − u? − Emax{u(Z) − u(z), 0}] + u′(0)Emax{Z − z, 0}.
The optimal z that solves this problem is denoted
zˆ ≡ argmax
z
U(u?,Z, z).
Note that this value is specific to each lottery and menu, as it depends on both
Z and the menu-dependent u?. Refer to the main theorem in Fudenberg et al.
(2014) for proof.
2.A.2.3 Ranking two-outcome lotteries
The final step in the agent’s optimization problem is choosing between lotteries,
taking into account the lottery-specific optimal consumption plans as they were
derived above. That is, the agent ranks lotteries Z according to U(u?,Z, zˆ). While
the preceding derivation was general, the following will be specific to the case
that we use in our experiment: pairwise choice between two-outcome lotteries.
Let us denote these lotteries as discrete random variables ZA (with possible real-
izations zA1 and z
A
2) and Z
B (with possible realizations zB1 and z
B
2). Assume z
A
1 ≤ zA2
and zB1 ≤ zB2, without loss of generality.
In our experiment, we test whether subjects’ choices, i.e., their pairwise lot-
tery rankings, change in response to an increase in self-control costs due to ego
depletion. Formally, such preference reversals come about when the slope of an
agent’s indifference curve, dz2 /dz1|U=const (i.e., her willingness to accept a re-
duction in one payoff of the lottery in exchange for an increase in the second
payoff, holding expected utility constant), changes. Thus, to derive predictions
about how an increase in self-control costs affects agents’ lottery choices, we
need to consider the effect of increased self-control costs on the slope of their
indifference curves.
Let us denote by zˆA the optimal cutoff value associated with Lottery ZA and
by zˆB the optimal cutoff value associated with Lottery ZB, given that the menu
is ℑ= {ZA,ZB}. (Remember that each cutoff value, and thus the ranking of the
lotteries, is menu-dependent through u? =max{Eu(ZA), Eu(ZB)}.)
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The indifference set for a “reference lottery” ZA, I(ZA), is the set of all lotter-
ies ZB for which the agent is indifferent when given the choice between ZA and
ZB, i.e., I(ZA)≡ {ZB | U(u?,ZA, zˆA)= U(u?,ZB, zˆB)}. It is implicitly defined by
U(u?,ZA, zˆA) − U(u?,ZB, zˆB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Φ(ZA,ZB,u?,zˆA,zˆB)
= 0.
Note that Φ(·) is a function of zB1 and zB2 and the associated probabilities
p and 1− p, respectively—as well as ZA, u?, zˆA, and zˆB. To be able to deter-
mine the slope of the indifference curve, i.e., dzB2 /dz
B
1, we use the implicit func-
tion theorem. One of its prerequisites is continuous differentiability of the func-
tion Φ(·) with respect to zB1 and zB2, at least in some neighborhood of the point
ZA = ZB, which is where we calculate the slope. It can be shown that at this point,
dΦ/du? = 0. In addition, it holds for any ZA,ZB that dΦ/dzˆA = dΦ/dzˆB = 0.
This is because zˆA and zˆB maximize U(u?,ZA, zA) and U(u?,ZB, zB), respectively.
Therefore, we only need to consider the dependence of Φ(·) on zB1 and zB2 through
the direct dependence of U(u?,ZB, zˆB) on these values, i.e., the partial derivatives
∂U(u?,ZB, zˆB)/∂ zBi with i= 1,2.
Via the implicit function theorem, it holds that
dΦ(·)
dzB1
+
dΦ(·)
dzB2
dzB2
dzB1
= 0 (2.2)
⇐⇒ dz
B
2
dzB1
= −dΦ(·)
dzB1

dΦ(·)
dzB2
=⇒ dz
B
2
dzB1
= −∂U(u?,ZB, zˆB)
∂ zB1

∂U(u?,ZB, zˆB)
∂ zB2
. (2.3)
Recall that the probability of payoff zB1 is p and that of z
B
2 is 1− p. Then
U(u?,ZB, zˆB)
= h[Eu(ZB) − u? − Emax{u(ZB) − u(zˆB), 0}] + u′(0)Emax{ZB − zˆB, 0}
(2.4)
= h[pu(zB1) + (1 − p)u(zB2) − u?− (2.5)
pmax{u(zB1) − u(zˆB), 0} − (1 − p)max{u(zB2) − u(zˆB), 0}]
+ u′(0)[pmax{zB1 − zˆB, 0} + (1 − p)max{zB2 − zˆB, 0}].
For the derivatives with respect to zB1 and z
B
2, we get
∂U(u?,ZB, zˆB)
∂ zB1
=(
h′[Eu(ZB) − u? − (1 − p)max{u(zB2) − u(zˆB), 0}]pu′(zB1) if zB1 < zˆB
u′(0)p if zB1 > zˆB
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and
∂U(u?,ZB, zˆB)
∂ zB2
=(
h′[Eu(ZB) − u? − pmax{u(zB1) − u(zˆB), 0}](1 − p)u′(zB2) if zB2 < zˆB
u′(0) (1 − p) if zB2 > zˆB
.
2.A.2.4 Case distinctions
Since the following reasoning applies to arbitrary two-outcome lotteries Z, we
now drop the superscript B. The dependence of utility on the cutoff zˆ implies that
when calculating the slopes of the indifference curves that describe preferences
over two-outcome lotteries, we need to distinguish three cases. The three cases
are also illustrated graphically in Figure 2.A.1. Remember that temptation u? is
menu-dependent but identical for both lotteries, while the threshold zˆ is menu-
dependent (through u?) and at the same time lottery-specific. Hence, whenever
it holds that z1 < zˆ< z2 (the 3rd case below) for at least one of the two lotteries,
self-control affects the curvature of the indifference curves and, thus, the agent’s
risk attitudes when she chooses among two lotteries.
1st case: max{z1, z2}≤ zˆ. In this case, the short-run self spends all additional
income. Hence, the slope of the indifference curve is
dz2
dz1
= − h
′[Eu(Z) − u?]pu′(z1)
h′[Eu(Z) − u?](1 − p)u′(z2) = −
pu′(z1)
(1 − p)u′(z2) . (2.6)
Thus, in the 1st case, the combined preferences of the two selves corre-
spond to those of the short-run self, i.e., risk aversion. If all lotteries in the
menu fall into this category, they are ranked according to Eu(Z), expected
utility with the short-run self’s degree of risk aversion.
2nd case: zˆ≤min{z1, z2}. In this case, the amount that the short-run self is per-
mitted by the long-run self to spend in addition to its initial allowance is
smaller than all of the lottery outcomes. Thus, the short-run self derives
the same utility from all outcomes, and the agent’s combined preferences
over lotteries correspond to those of the long-run self. Consequently, the
slope of the indifference curve is
dz2
dz1
= − pu
′(0)
(1 − p)u′(0) = −
p
1 − p . (2.7)
Thus, if all lotteries in themenu fall into this category, the agent behaves in
a risk-neutral manner, and lotteries are ranked according to their expected
value E(Z).
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z1
z
z
2
z
Indifference curves for p1 = 0.5
Figure 2.A.1. Illustration of the three cases.
Notes: Displayed are indifference curves over two-outcome lotteries with payoffs z1 and z2, associ-
ated probabilities p1 = p2 = 0.5, and cutoff z. The agent’s indifference curves are linear for z1 > z
and z2 > z, while they are concave elsewhere. For z1 < z and z2 < z, the curvature is strongest.
Note that this graph only serves to illustrate the rationale of (2.6), (2.7), and (2.8). The optimal
cutoff zˆ is lottery-dependent, and z will thus differ depending on which lottery is considered.
3rd case: z1 < zˆ< z2. In this case, one outcome is below and the other is above
the cutoff zˆ, so that the slope of the indifference curves depends on h′[·],
dz2
dz1
= −h
′[pu(z1) − u? + (1 − p)u(zˆ)]pu′(z1)
(1 − p)u′(0) . (2.8)
Only in this 3rd case does the slope of the self-control gain function enter
the slope of the indifference curves.
Consequently, only in the 3rd case does the slope of the indifference curves
change under self-control depletion, such that depletion can lead to changes in
lottery choices, i.e., measured risk attitudes.
2.A.3 Depletion: model predictions and hypotheses
2.A.3.1 Incorporating dierent levels of self-control
We now apply the model’s predictions for two-outcome lotteries to derive spe-
cific hypotheses concerning the effects of self-control depletion. We incorporate
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depletion and the resulting increase in marginal self-control costs into the model
by defining different self-control cost functions gND[·] and gD[·] for the nonde-
pleted and the depleted state, respectively.
Recall that a greater u? − Eu(c˜) denotes a greater amount of exerted self-
control. Also recall that u? − Eu(c˜)≥ 0, g[u? − Eu(c˜)]≥ 0, and g[0]= 0. We as-
sume that
gND[u? − Eu(c˜)] ≤ gD[u? − Eu(c˜)] for all u? − Eu(c˜).18
The “self-control gain function” was defined as h[Eu(c˜)− u?]≡
Eu(c˜)− u? − g[u? − Eu(c˜)]; hence, h[Eu(c˜)− u?]≤ 0 and h[0]= 0. Thus,
with hND[Eu(c˜)− u?]≡ Eu(c˜)− u? − gND[u? − Eu(c˜)] and hD[Eu(c˜)− u?]≡
Eu(c˜)− u? − gD[u? − Eu(c˜)], we have
hND[Eu(c˜) − u?] ≥ hD[Eu(c˜) − u?] for all Eu(c˜) − u?.
The function g[u? − Eu(c˜)] was assumed to be weakly convex. Therefore,
gND[·]≤ gD[·] implies gND′[·]≤ gD′[·]. It follows that h[Eu(c˜)− u?] is weakly
concave and that
hND
′[Eu(c˜) − u?] ≤ hD′[Eu(c˜) − u?] for all Eu(c˜) − u?.
Intuitively, an increase in the marginal cost of self-control affects optimal
choice by increasing the relative importance of the self-control costs in the cur-
rent period compared to the benefit of saving for future periods. In other words,
the short-run self’s interest to consume right now becomes more important. This
has two effects. The first is immediately apparent from (2.8). When plugging
in a higher value for h′[·] in (2.8), the slope of the indifference curve becomes
steeper. Thus, the agent’s combined risk attitudes exhibit more risk aversion. The
second effect of an increase in marginal self-control costs is that zˆ increases for
each lottery. A higher zˆ implies that some lotteries will be evaluated by (2.6)
that were formerly evaluated by (2.8) and some lotteries will be evaluated by
(2.8) that were formerly evaluated by (2.7). Both effects result in increased risk
aversion.
2.A.3.2 Hypotheses
For one or both of these mechanisms to affect choices, at least one of the two
lotteries needs to be such that (2.8) applies in at least one of the states (depletion
or nondepletion). This leads us to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Ego depletion leads to greater risk aversion for choices between
lotteries if at least one of the lotteries contains a small payoff below and another
larger payoff above a cutoff value zˆ.
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Our second hypothesis refers to the case in which one of the lotteries is a sure
payoff:
Hypothesis 2. The effect of ego depletion (i.e., increased risk aversion) is stronger
when one “lottery” is a sure payoff.
If the per-period utility function is concave, a sure payoff leads to higher
short-run utility than a lottery with the same expected value. A sure payoff is,
thus, more tempting. (See also Fudenberg and Levine, 2011, pp. 35, 46, 66.)
With amore tempting reference lottery, the function g[u? − Eu(c˜)] is evaluated at
a higher level u? − Eu(c˜) than for a less tempting reference lottery. Consequently,
h[Eu(c˜)− u?] and h′[Eu(c˜)− u?] are evaluated for more negative Eu(c˜)− u?. As
h[Eu(c˜)− u?] is weakly concave, the difference in the slopes of the indifference
curves under depletion and nondepletion will be larger with a riskless reference
lottery than with a risky reference lottery. Again, this holds only if for at least
one of the two lotteries in the menu, one lottery outcome is below and the other
is above the cutoff zˆ.
Our third hypothesis serves to differentiate the dual-self model from other
models that potentially make similar predictions as Hypotheses 1 and 2. It does
so by outlining a situation in which changes in self-control should show no ef-
fect according to the model, while, for instance, increased reliance on heuristics
would generate an effect.
Hypothesis 3. When payoffs are delayed, ego depletion has no effect.
The intuition for Hypothesis 3 is provided in the main text.
2.A.4 Choosing between multiple two-outcome lotteries
The derivation above assumes that subjects face a single lottery choice only—or
that they consider each choice among repeated choices in isolation. In our case,
this would mean that subjects conceive of each choice in each row of each choice
list as a separate choice, thus making 85 separate choices between two two-
outcome lotteries. We call such behavior “isolating” (borrowing the terminology
of Cubitt et al., 1998).
In our experiment, we used repeated choices in combination with the ran-
dom lottery incentivemechanism (RLIM; also called “random problem selection”
or “RPS” mechanism) to remunerate subjects. This means that each offered lot-
tery is in fact part of a compound lottery, with the superordinate lottery given by
the RLIM. Subjects might thus perceive the two lotteries offered in each row just
as that: as the second stages of a compound lottery. In that case, choice is not
repeated pairwise choice between two-outcome lotteries anymore but instead
amounts to selecting one out of the available multioutcome compound lotteries.
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To give an example, consider a subject who conceives of determining the
switching row in our Choice List A (which featured 25 rows) as one single choice.
In the terminology of Fudenberg et al. (2014), this subject selects one particular
compound lottery Z out of a choice set ℑ of 25 compound lotteries.19 Thus, Z
is a multioutcome lottery, and the choice amounts to selecting one out of 25
elements in ℑ. Henceforth, we will call this behavior “integrating”.
The question arises whether the predictions regarding the treatment effect
still hold when subjects do not isolate choices but integrate them into a com-
pound lottery. As Azrieli et al. (2017, p. 10) state, it “is well known that the RPS
mechanism is incentive compatible when all admissible extensions satisfy the
expected utility axioms.” However, since the Fudenberg–Levine model was de-
veloped to explain, among other phenomena, deviations from expected utility,
we need to analyze the model’s predictions regarding repeated pairwise lottery
choice for integrating decision makers.
Essentially, the same logic as outlined in Section 2.A.2.3—where zB1 and z
B
2
were the only payoffs in a two-outcome lottery—applies to any pair of payoffs
included in a higher-dimensional compound lottery. A subject who integrates
pairwise choices into a compound lottery still has to trade off the involved out-
comes. Crucially, an integrating subject has to do this for each pairwise choice be-
tween the two-outcome lotteries that ultimately comprise the high-dimensional
compound lotteries. This is due to the structure of our choice lists, which all
feature first-order stochastically dominating alternatives from row to row. Since
the dual-self model respects stochastic dominance (see Fudenberg et al., 2014,
Proposition 4), for our choice lists, the preference order over the compound
lotteries is unambiguously determined by the dual-self’s risk attitudes over pair-
wise choices. Hence, also an integrating subject has to decide which of the two
two-outcome lotteries s/he prefers in every row—just like an isolating subject.
Therefore, all arguments concerning two-outcome lotteries and binary
choices (as isolating subjects would perceive the choice lists) are also valid for
a multialternative choice with multioutcome lotteries (as integrating subjects
would view the decision problem).
While this shows that integrating and isolating subjects’ decisions rely on the
same basic logic, it does not imply that they make identical choices. Recall that
both temptation utility u? and the cutoff zˆ are menu-dependent. Hence, an in-
tegrating subject potentially has different values for u? and zˆ than an isolating
subject. Nevertheless, they will be quantitatively similar, as we argue in the fol-
lowing. For an integrating subject, the short-run self’s temptation utility u? is the
highest achievable expected utility of the compound lottery. This expected util-
19 The 26th option of always choosing the lottery on the right-hand side of the choice list con-
tains a dominated compound lottery, so that choosing it is not consistent with the Fudenberg
et al. (2014) model.
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ity is given by a weighted sum of the highest achievable expected utility in each
row—i.e., it is a weighted sum of the various temptation utilities of an isolating
subject. Hence, u? and, consequently, zˆ will have similar values independent of
whether subjects view a choice list as one decision or as several decisions. Thus,
while the predictions of the model, while not identical, will be quantitatively
similar for both types of subjects.
Another difference between integrating and isolating subjects may arise
from the fact that probabilities of the two-outcome lotteries are downweighted
by integrating subjects, because integrators take into account that each row is
only chosen with a probability of 1/nint (e.g., nint = 85 for the entire experiment
or nint = 25 for Choice List A). For integrating subjects, the associated probabili-
ties of the outcomes in Eq. (2.5) are (1/nint)p and (1/nint) (1− p), respectively.
As argued above, the rest of the calculus remains the same because the choice
of the compound lottery reduces to pairwise choice per row. The factor 1/nint
appears in both the numerator and the denominator in Eqs. (2.6), (2.7), and
(2.8), and thus cancels out. Only in determining where the marginal self-control
gain function h′[·] is evaluated in Eq. (2.8) does it play a role.
Summing up, this means that although isolators and integrators may behave
in quantitatively different ways, the prediction regarding the qualitative effect
of decreased self-control stays the same. This is because integrating subjects
ultimately face a pairwise choice per row of the choice lists. Hence, while the
dual-self model suggests that repeated choices under the RLIM lead to different
expressed preferences than a single choice, the predicted treatment effect for
our experiment is qualitatively the same, regardless of whether subjects isolate
decisions or integrate them into a compound lottery.
2.A.5 Operationalization of the model
As a final aspect, any empirical investigation of the Fudenberg–Levine model
requires making an assumption about timing that the model is silent about. In
the model, the decision maker’s choice of an option with stochastic outcomes,
the realization of the outcome, and the subsequent consumption decision (de-
termined by the interplay of the short-run and the long-run self) all happen
instantaneously. This entails that self-control when making the lottery choice
and when making the consumption decision are identical.
In reality, the simultaneity of the lottery choice and the consumption deci-
sion is unavoidably violated: consumption will always occur later than the lot-
tery choice—in an experiment, subjects usually have to postpone it until after
leaving the lab. Hence, the question becomes important whether self-control ca-
pacity during the lottery choice or during the consumption decision should be
manipulated.
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If one advocates that depletion should be applied at the time of the consump-
tion decision, one has to assume that decision makers forecast their self-control
capacity for the consumption decision and make their lottery choice based on
the anticipated self-control capacity (an assumption which is not part of the orig-
inal model). In contrast to this, Fudenberg and Levine (2011) and Fudenberg
et al. (2014) consider self-control at the time of the lottery choice the relevant
factor. Fudenberg and Levine (2011, pp. 65/66) refer to experimental evidence
by Benjamin et al. (2013) regarding the influence of concurrent cognitive load
on lottery choices, and Fudenberg et al. (2014, p. 66) explicitly advocate the use
of ego depletion and/or cognitive load to test their theory: “This means that the
theory implies that reversals . . . can be induced by increasing cognitive load”.
Please note that cognitive load is an even more short-term manipulation than
ego depletion (see Baumeister and Vohs, 2016b, pp. 70/71). A possible justifica-
tion for why self-control at the time of lottery choices matters would be that even
though actual consumption occurs only later, subjects make their consumption
plan already at the time of the lottery choice (e.g., “If I receive the x €payoff,
I will stop by the cafeteria after leaving the lab and buy myself a piece of cake”).
We follow Fudenberg and Levine (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2014) in
their assessment of the relevant point in time of self-control when deriving our
hypotheses from the simplified model by Fudenberg et al. (2014).
2.B Categorization of behavior
The switching row in each of the four choice lists measures an individual’s risk
attitude. More precisely, differences in expected values of the less risky lottery
and its mean-preserving spread at the switching row measure an individual’s
“risk premium”m∼ that has to be added to the riskier lottery to make that subject
indifferent between the two lotteries. We calculate this risk premium as the
average difference of the expected values in the two rows around the switching
point; i.e., a subject who chooses the more risky lottery when the difference in
expected values is 2.60 €but switches to the less risky lottery when it is 2.50
€is assigned a risk premium m∼ = 2.55 €.
Based on these indifference-generating risk premia, we classify subjects’ be-
havior into four categories: risk-seeking, risk-neutral, risk-averse, and dominated
choices. The behavior of subjects whose risk premium is positive is classified as
risk-averse, while a risk premium of zero implies risk neutrality, and a negative
risk premium risk proclivity.20 3% of choices are in favor of the dominated lottery
20 As we observe switching points instead of points of indifference, we cannot technically ob-
serve risk neutrality. We, thus, classify subjects as risk-neutral who switch at or immediately after
the risk-neutral row (m∼ = 0.05€ or m∼ = −0.05€). Subjects with m∼ > 0.05€ are classified as
risk-averse and subjects with m∼ < −0.05€ as risk-seeking.
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in the first row. They are excluded from the further analysis, since dominated
choices are incompatible with any deterministic model of decision making under
risk.21 We decided to abstract from possible stochastic components in decision-
making since the already rather complex “dual-self” models that we test abstract
from them as well.
Table 2.B.1 displays the absolute and relative frequencies of choices in the
choice lists.
Table 2.B.1. Categorization of behavior.
Depletion Control Combined
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Choice List A: Risky/Risky
Risk-seeking 11 7.2 8 5.1 19 6.2
Risk-neutral 15 9.9 7 4.5 22 7.1
Risk-averse 124 81.6 138 88.5 262 85.1
Dominated choices 2 1.3 3 1.9 5 1.6
Choice List B: Safe/Risky
Risk-seeking 10 6.6 11 7.1 21 6.8
Risk-neutral 12 7.9 10 6.4 22 7.1
Risk-averse 119 78.3 127 81.4 246 79.9
Dominated choices 11 7.2 8 5.1 19 6.2
Choice List C: “Long Shot”
Risk-seeking 70 46.1 72 46.2 142 46.1
Risk-neutral 9 5.9 1 0.4 10 3.3
Risk-averse 68 44.7 75 48.1 143 46.4
Dominated choices 5 3.3 8 5.1 13 4.2
Choice List D: Delayed Payos
Risk-seeking 9 5.9 4 2.6 13 4.2
Risk-neutral 9 5.9 8 5.1 17 5.5
Risk-averse 133 87.5 141 90.4 274 89.0
Dominated choices 1 0.7 3 1.9 4 1.3
21 We do not exclude these subjects altogether but just their choices for specific lotteries. Our
results are robust to excluding those subjects altogether.
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2.C Translated instructions for the depletion [control]
group
General explanations
Welcome to this economic experiment.
In the course of this experiment you can earn a nonnegligible amount of money.
The exact amount strongly depends on your decisions. So please read the fol-
lowing instructions carefully! If you have any questions, please raise your hand
and we will come to your seat.
During the whole experiment it is not allowed to talk to other participants, to
use cell phones, or to launch any other programs on the computer. Disregarding
any of these rules will lead to your exclusion from the experiment and from all
payments.
In principle, the earnings resulting from your decisions will be paid out to you
in cash at the end the experiment. Only in an exceptional case, you will receive
your money later, either in cash or via a bank transfer according to which you
choose. (More on that will be announced in a moment.)
On the following pages, we will describe the exact experimental procedure.
The experiment: your decisions
In this experiment you will make 85 different decisions, each between two alter-
natives: A and B. Each of these two alternatives is a lottery. Here is an example
of such a lottery: With a probability of 50% you win 9 €and with a probability
of 50% you win 12 €. Winning probabilities and the amounts in euro that you
can win will vary between decisions.
The 85 decisions are summarized in four large tables, with about 20 rows each.
Each row represents one decision. The four tables will be shown to you on four
subsequent decision screens.
This is a decision screen with one such table. This table only serves as an example
and is, therefore, shortened to five rows.
Please choose whether you prefer Alternative A or B for every row by checking
the respective option with your mouse. Alternative B becomes either more or
less attractive when moving from the top to the bottom, depending on the table.
Therefore, the respective rows are filled out automatically, as soon as you have
switched from Alternative A to B, or from Alternative B to A, for the first time.
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Figure 2.C.1. Screenshot of an example choice list (“table”) that subjects were given as
part of the written instructions.
Translation of the depicted table: “Please choose one alternative in each row. Alternative A [first
row:] 4.00€ with 50% or 19.00€with 50%. Alternative B [first row:] 7.00€with 50% or 23.00
€with 50%.”
As long as you have not hit the “continue” button, you can still change your
decisions. Once you have made all decisions in one of the large tables, please
click the “continue” button in the lower right corner of the screen. You will then
see the next decision screen containing another large table.
Your payment from the experiment is determined in a two-step process: In
Step 1, one of your 85 decisions (i.e., one row from one of the four tables)
will be drawn randomly. This is the only decision that will affect your payment.
That means you should make your decision in every single row as if it were your
only decision. All decisions are drawn with the same probability (1/85).
For the drawn decision, it is determined whether you selected alternative A
or B. In Step 2 the lottery you have chosen is played, determining your pay-
ment. An example: Assume decision 4 from the table shown above is drawn in
Step 1. Alternative B was chosen in decision 4. In Step 2 it is—according to
the lottery—randomly determined whether you receive 5.50 €or 21.50 €. In
this example, the payoffs of 5.50 €and 21.50 €are equally likely (both have
a probability of 50%).
Following those four large tables we will show you additional, smaller tables.
The purpose of those smaller tables is to learn about your decisions in more
detail. You will receive a more detailed description and explanation regarding
these tables on your screen during the course of the experiment.
Further tasks
Before you make your decision (as described above), there are two addi-
tional tasks to be completed. It is very important for the experiment that you
make an effort to complete the tasks diligently and correctly. For each task, you
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will be handed out a sheet of paper containing text that you should work on.
We will collect both sheets of paper at the end of the experiment. Moreover, you
will receive private feedback about your performance in the two tasks on screen
at the end of the experiment.
First task
You will receive a first sheet of paper containing text. Please cross out each in-
stance of the letter “e” (including “E”) in the text. Start the task with working
on the first paragraph and continue paragraph by paragraph.
You have 3 minutes to work on this task. Rather work conscientiously on few
paragraphs than try to work on many paragraphs. The time remaining for the
task is shown in the upper right corner of your screen.
Second task
After having finished the first task, you will receive a second sheet of paper
containing text. Now you have to cross out each instance of the letter “e”
according to the following set of rules:
Generally, you cross out the letter “e”; there are, however, the following excep-
tions:
(a) there is a vowel in the text after the letter “e”, or
(b) there is a vowel in the text two letters after the letter “e”, or
(c) there is a vowel in the text two letters in front of the letter “e”.
If there is a vowel directly in front of the “e” (as, for instance, in case of “circa
elf”), the “e” is to be crossed out.
In counting letters, disregard full stops, commas, hyphens, or spaces. Vowels
comprise: “a”, “ä”, “e”, “i”, “o”, “ö”, “u”, “ü”.
The following schematic representation summarizes the rules:
_ _ e _ _
1 2 3 4
Cross out all instances of “e” in principle. Exceptions: Do not cross out the
“e” if there is a vowel at position 1, 3, or 4.
As in the first task, please start with the first paragraph and continue paragraph
by paragraph.
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Second task [control group]
After having finished the first task, you will receive a second sheet of paper contain-
ing text. Please cross out each instance of the letter “e” (including “E”) in the
text again. This is the same instruction as in the first task. As in the first task,
please start with the first paragraph and continue paragraph by paragraph.
You have 7 minutes to work on this task. Rather work conscientiously on few
paragraphs than try to work on many paragraphs. The time remaining for the
task is shown in the upper right corner of your screen.
Following these two tasks, you will make the 85 decision described previously.
Training and comprehension questions
Before you start working on both tasks, we ask you to answer a few training
questions regarding the decisions. Answering those questions will make it easier
to acquaint yourself with the decision situation.
At the end of today’s experiment—following your decisions—there are a few
screens with questions and the like, before the money you earned is paid out.
In case you have any questions—now or while working on the training tasks—
please raise your hand. We will come to your seat to answer your questions.
Please do not ask any questions aloud!
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2.D German original of the instructions and text of the
depletion task
1 
EXPERIMENT AM 28. OKTOBER 2014 
Allgemeine Erklärungen 
Wir begrüßen Sie herzlich zu diesem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Experiment. 
Im Rahmen dieses Experiments können Sie eine nicht unerhebliche Summe Geld ver-
dienen. Wie viel Geld Sie verdienen, hängt dabei maßgeblich von Ihren Entscheidungen 
ab. Lesen Sie die folgenden Erklärungen daher bitte gründlich durch! Wenn Sie Fragen 
haben, strecken Sie bitte Ihre Hand aus der Kabine – wir kommen dann zu Ihrem 
Platz. 
Während des Experiments ist es nicht erlaubt, mit den anderen Experimentteil-
nehmern zu sprechen, Mobiltelefone zu benutzen oder andere Programme auf dem 
Computer zu starten. Die Nichtbeachtung dieser Regeln führt zum Ausschluss aus 
dem Experiment und von allen Zahlungen. 
Grundsätzlich bekommen Sie das Einkommen aus Ihren Entscheidungen am Ende die-
ses Experiments bar ausbezahlt. Nur im Ausnahmefall erfolgt die Auszahlung später, 
und zwar wahlweise in bar oder per Banküberweisung. (Näheres dazu erfahren Sie 
gleich.) 
Auf  den nächsten Seiten beschreiben wir den genauen Ablauf  des Experiments. 
Das Experiment: Ihre Entscheidungen 
Sie treffen im Rahmen dieses Experiments 85 verschiedene Entscheidungen zwischen 
jeweils zwei Alternativen: A und B. Jede der zwei Alternativen ist eine Lotterie. Ein Bei-
spiel für eine solche Lotterie ist: Mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 % gewinnen Sie 
9 Euro, und mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 % gewinnen Sie 12 Euro. Die Gewinn-
wahrscheinlichkeiten und die Euro-Beträge, die Sie gewinnen können, variieren zwi-
schen den verschiedenen Entscheidungen. 
Die 85 Entscheidungen sind in vier großen Tabellen mit jeweils ungefähr 20 Zeilen zu-
sammengefasst. Jede Zeile einer Tabelle entspricht dabei einer Entscheidung. Die vier 
Tabellen werden Ihnen nacheinander auf  vier verschiedenen Entscheidungsbildschir-
men angezeigt. 
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2 
Hier sehen Sie einen Entscheidungsbildschirm mit einer solchen Tabelle. Diese Tabelle 
soll nur als Beispiel dienen und ist daher auf  fünf  Zeilen verkürzt: 
 
Für jede Zeile klicken Sie bitte mit der Maus an, ob Sie Alternative A oder B bevorzu-
gen. Alternative B wird – je nach Tabelle – von oben nach unten immer attraktiver oder 
weniger attraktiv. Daher füllen sich die entsprechenden Zeilen einer Tabelle automa-
tisch aus, sobald Sie einmal von Alternative A zu Alternative B oder einmal von Alter-
native B zu Alternative A gewechselt haben. 
Solange Sie nicht den „Weiter“-Knopf  drücken, können Sie Ihre Entscheidungen noch 
ändern. Sobald Sie alle in einer großen Tabelle zusammengefassten Entscheidungen 
gefällt haben, drücken Sie bitte den „Weiter“-Knopf  unten rechts auf  dem Bildschirm. 
Es wird Ihnen dann der nächste Entscheidungsbildschirm mit einer weiteren großen 
Tabelle angezeigt. 
Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Experiment wird in einem zweischrittigen Prozess bestimmt: 
Im 1. Schritt wird eine Ihrer 85 Entscheidungen (d. h. eine einzige Zeile aus einer der 
vier Tabellen) zufällig ausgelost. Nur diese eine Entscheidung bestimmt Ihre Auszah-
lung. Dies bedeutet, dass Sie Ihre Entscheidung in jeder Zeile so treffen sollten, als 
wäre es Ihre einzige Entscheidung. Alle Entscheidungen werden mit derselben Wahr-
scheinlichkeit (also 1/85) ausgelost. 
Für die ausgeloste Entscheidung wird festgestellt, ob Sie Alternative A oder B ange-
klickt haben. Im 2. Schritt wird nun für die von Ihnen angeklickte Alternative die ent-
sprechende Lotterie ausgespielt und dadurch Ihre Auszahlung bestimmt. 
Ein Beispiel: Nehmen Sie an, dass in der oben abgebildeten Tabelle in Schritt 1 Ent-
scheidung 4 ausgelost wurde. In Entscheidung 4 wurde Alternative B angeklickt. In 
Schritt 2 wird nun ausgelost, ob Sie 5,50 Euro oder 21,50 Euro ausgezahlt be-
kommen. In diesem Beispiel sind die Auszahlungen 5,50 Euro und 21,50 Euro gleich 
wahrscheinlich (beide haben eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 %). 
Nach den vier großen Tabellen werden wir Ihnen noch weitere, kleinere Tabellen vor-
legen. Der Zweck dieser kleineren Tabellen ist, dass wir Ihre Entscheidung noch ge-
nauer erfragen möchten. Die Details hierzu bekommen Sie im Laufe des Experiments 
auf  dem Computerbildschirm angezeigt und erklärt. 
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3 
Ihre weiteren Aufgaben 
Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidungen – wie oben beschrieben – treffen, haben Sie noch zwei 
Aufgaben zu erledigen. Für das Experiment ist es sehr wichtig, dass Sie die Aufgaben 
gründlich und korrekt bearbeiten.  
Für jede Aufgabe teilen wir ein Blatt mit Text aus, das Sie bearbeiten sollen. Am Ende 
des Experiments sammeln wir beide von Ihnen bearbeiteten Blätter ein. Außerdem 
erhalten Sie am Ende des Experiments auf  dem Computerbildschirm ein privates 
Feedback, wie gut Sie beide Aufgaben bearbeitet haben. 
Erste Aufgabe 
Sie bekommen von uns das erste Blatt mit Text ausgehändigt. Ihre Aufgabe besteht 
darin, in diesem Text sämtliche Buchstaben „e“ (gilt auch für „E“) durchzustreichen. 
Beginnen Sie bitte mit dem ersten Absatz und gehen Sie danach absatzweise vor. 
Insgesamt haben Sie für diese erste Aufgabe 3 Minuten Zeit. Arbeiten Sie lieber gründ-
lich an weniger Absätzen, als mit der Bearbeitung vieler Absätze anzufangen. Oben 
rechts auf  dem Computerbildschirm wird Ihnen die verbleibende Arbeitszeit ange-
zeigt.  
Zweite Aufgabe 
Nachdem Sie die erste Aufgabe erledigt haben, teilen wir ein zweites Blatt mit Text 
aus. Jetzt müssen Sie den Buchstaben „e“ nach folgenden neuen Regeln durch-
streichen: 
Prinzipiell streichen Sie das „e“ durch, allerdings gibt es folgende Ausnahmen: 
a) im Text folgt nach dem „e“ ein Vokal oder 
b) im Text folgt ein Vokal im Abstand von zwei Buchstaben nach dem „e“ oder 
c) im Text steht ein Vokal im Abstand von zwei Buchstaben vor dem „e“. 
Wenn ein Vokal direkt vor dem „e“ steht (wie zum Beispiel im Fall von „zirka elf“), ist 
das „e“ durchzustreichen. 
Bei der Abzählung sind Satzzeichen wie Punkt und Komma sowie Leerzeichen und 
Bindestriche nicht zu beachten. Vokale sind: „a“, „ä“, „e“, „i“, „o“, „ö“, „u“, „ü“. 
Die folgende schematische Darstellung fasst die Regeln zusammen: 
  _ _ e _ _  
 1 2  3 4 
Prinzipiell streichen Sie alle „e“ durch. Ausnahmen: Sie streichen ein „e“ nicht 
durch, wenn auf der Position 1, 3 oder 4 ein Vokal steht. 
Beginnen Sie bitte wieder – wie in der ersten Aufgabe – mit dem ersten Absatz und 
gehen Sie danach absatzweise vor. 
Description of the “second task” in the control group:
3 
Ihre weiteren Aufgaben 
Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidungen – wie oben beschrieben – treffen, haben Sie noch zwei 
Aufgaben zu erledigen. Für das Experiment ist es sehr wichtig, dass Sie die Aufgaben 
gründlich und korrekt bearbeiten.  
Für jede Aufgabe teilen wir ein Blatt mit Text aus, das Sie bearbeiten sollen. Am Ende 
des Experiments sammeln wir beide von Ihnen bearbeiteten Blätter ein. Außerdem 
erhalten Sie am Ende des Experiments auf  dem Computerbildschirm ein privates 
Feedback, wie gut Sie beide Aufgaben bearbeitet haben. 
Erste Aufgabe 
Sie bekommen von uns das erste Blatt mit Text ausgehändigt. Ihre Aufgabe besteht 
darin, in diesem Text sämtliche Buchstaben „e“ (gilt auch für „E“) durchzustreichen. 
Beginnen Sie bitte mit dem ersten Absatz und gehen Sie danach absatzweise vor. 
Insgesamt haben Sie für diese erste Aufgabe 3 Minuten Zeit. Arbeiten Sie lieber gründ-
lich an weniger Absätzen, als mit der Bearbeitung vieler Absätze anzufangen. Oben 
rechts auf  dem Computerbildschirm wird Ihnen die verbleibende Arbeitszeit ange-
zeigt.  
Zweite Aufgabe 
Nachdem Sie die erste Aufgabe erledigt haben, teilen wir ein zweites Blatt mit Text 
aus. Bitte streichen Sie in diesem Text wieder alle Buchstaben „e“ durch. Dies ent-
spricht der Aufgabenstellung aus der ersten Aufgabe. Beginnen Sie bitte wieder mit 
dem ersten Absatz und gehen Sie danach absatzweise vor. 
Insgesamt haben Sie für diese zweite Aufgabe 7 Minuten Zeit. Arbeiten Sie auch hier 
lieber gründlich an weniger Absätzen, als mit der Bearbeitung vieler Absätze anzu-
fangen. Oben rechts auf  dem Computerbildschirm wird Ihnen die verbleibende Ar-
beitszeit angezeigt. 
Im Anschluss an die beiden Aufgaben treffen Sie Ihre anfangs beschriebenen 85 Ent-
scheidungen. 
Übungsaufgaben und Verständnisfragen 
Bevor Sie mit der Bearbeitung der beiden Aufgaben beginnen, bitten wir Sie, am Com-
puter einige Übungsfragen zu den Entscheidungen zu beantworten. Das Beantworten 
dieser Fragen soll es Ihnen erleichtern, sich mit der Entscheidungssituation vertraut zu 
machen. 
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Insgesamt haben Sie für diese zweite Aufgabe 7 Minuten Zeit. Arbeiten Sie auch hier 
lieber gründlich an weniger Absätzen, als mit der Bearbeitung vieler Absätze anzu-
fangen. Oben rechts auf  dem Computerbildschirm wird Ihnen die verbleibende Ar-
beitszeit angezeigt. 
Im Anschluss an die beiden Aufgaben treffen Sie Ihre anfangs beschriebenen 85 Ent-
scheidungen. 
Übungsaufgaben und Verständnisfragen 
Bevor Sie mit der Bearbeitung der beiden Aufgaben beginnen, bitten wir Sie, am Com-
puter einige Übungsfragen zu den Entscheidungen zu beantworten. Das Beantworten 
dieser Fragen soll es Ihnen erleichtern, sich mit der Entscheidungssituation vertraut zu 
machen. 
Gegen Ende des heutigen Experiments – im Anschluss an Ihre Entscheidungen – folgen 
dann noch einige Bildschirme mit Fragen u. Ä., bevor wir zur Auszahlung des von Ihnen 
verdienten Geldes kommen. 
Falls Sie jetzt Fragen haben oder während der Beantwortung der Übungsfragen Ihrer-
seits Fragen entstehen, halten Sie bitte die Hand aus der Kabine. Ein Leiter des Expe-
riments wird dann an Ihren Platz kommen, um Ihre Fragen zu beantworten. Stellen 
Sie Fragen keinesfalls laut! 
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28.10.2014     12:00 Uhr     Kabine: __________ 
 
Aufgabe 1 
Bitte streichen Sie alle Buchstaben „e“ (auch Großbuchstaben „E“) durch. 
Bitte arbeiten Sie 3 Minuten an dieser Aufgabe. 
 
Die Anwendung des statistischen Methodenspektrums auf reale 
Problemstellungen aus Wissenschaft und Praxis bedeutet in der Regel die 
Bearbeitung einer großen Fülle von Primärdaten, die wiederholte Behandlung 
eines Datensatzes mit verschiedenen Methoden oder die mehrmalige 
Anwendung einer Methode auf unterschiedliche Datensätze. Der damit 
verbundene Rechenaufwand ist insbesondere bei den ökonometrischen 
Verfahren und bei der Zeitreihenanalyse sehr  
 
umfangreich und zwingt zum Einsatz elektronischer 
Datenverarbeitungsanlagen. Um Forschern und Praktikern den Einsatz 
statistischer Verfahren zu erleichtern, wurden leistungsfähige Software-
Produkte entwickelt, die einem permanenten Wandel unterliegen. Waren 
früher die Entwicklungen auf Großrechnern dominierend, so gewannen 
inzwischen die Software-Pakete auf Workstations zunehmend an Bedeutung. 
Zum einen wurden mittlerweile fast alle wichtigeren Statistik-Pakete aus  
 
der Großrechnerwelt, wie etwa BMDP, SAS und SPSS für Workstations 
portiert. Zum anderen wurde auch eine große Zahl von neuen Produkten 
speziell für Geräte dieser Klasse entwickelt. Heute existieren für Workstations 
mehrere hundert kommerziell vertriebene Statistik-Pakete und unzählige 
Produkte aus dem Share- und Freewarebereich. Dennoch bleiben nach wie 
vor bestimmte statistische Anwendungen Großrechnern vorbehalten. Man 
kann Statistik-Software grob in Pakete  
 
mit allgemeinem Methodenspektrum und solche für spezielle 
Methodengebiete unterscheiden. Statistik-Pakete mit allgemeinem 
Methodenspektrum verfügen zumeist über univariate deskriptive Statistiken, 
Kreuztabellen, Regressionsrechnung, nichtparametrische Tests, 
Varianzanalyse und Grafiken. Vom Anwender verlangen sie häufig keine 
besonderen Methodenkenntnisse; es genügt im Wesentlichen, sich eine 
leicht erlernbare Steuersprache bzw. die Bedienung einer vorgegebenen  
 
Benutzeroberfläche anzueignen. Diese prinzipiell zu begrüßende einfache 
Handhabbarkeit statistischer Software birgt aber auch Gefahren, die nicht 
übersehen werden dürfen. 
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28.10.2014     12:00 Uhr     Kabine: __________ 
 
Aufgabe 2 
Bitte streichen Sie nun nach den neuen Regeln den Buchstaben „e“ 
(auch Großbuchstaben „E“) durch. 
Zusammenfassung der neuen Regeln: Prinzipiell streichen Sie alle „e“ durch. 
Ausnahmen: Sie streichen ein „e“ nicht durch, wenn auf der Position 1, 3 
oder 4 ein Vokal steht: _ _ e _ _ 
 1 2  3 4 
Bitte arbeiten Sie 7 Minuten an dieser Aufgabe. 
  
Gerade weil viele Programme so einfach zu bedienen sind, können sie auch 
von Benutzern mit teils nur rudimentären Statistikkenntnissen eingesetzt 
werden. Über die Voraussetzungen und Implikationen der verwendeten 
Verfahren sowie die angemessene Interpretation der Ergebnisse sind sich 
unerfahrene Anwender oftmals nicht im Klaren. Es steht zu befürchten, daß 
die Verfügbarkeit einfach zu bedienender Statistikprogramme unbedachte 
Auswertungen mit inadäquaten Methoden 
und fragwürdigen Ergebnissen provoziert. Der andere drohende Extremfall ist, 
daß das vom ausgewählten Statistik-Paket abgedeckte Methodenspektrum die 
durchzuführende Untersuchung in dem Sinne vorstrukturiert, daß der 
Anwender nur die von der Software angebotenen Verfahren in Betracht zieht. 
Methoden, die im Hinblick auf das vorliegende Datenmaterial und die zu 
untersuchende Fragestellung unter Umständen geeigneter wären, aber im 
Programm nicht  
 
vorgesehen sind, werden dann a priori ignoriert. Im nachfolgenden Abschnitt 
werden einige gemeinhin als wichtig erachtete Eigenschaften von Statistik-
Paketen erläutert. Aufgrund der Heterogenität des Angebotes wie auch der 
Erfordernisse der Anwender kann ein solcher Anforderungskatalog keinen 
normativen Charakter besitzen. Er ist vielmehr als Entscheidungshilfe zu 
betrachten, die bei der Auswahl eines Statistik-Paketes Hinweise auf 
Qualitätskriterien geben kann.  
 
Oftmals wenig beachtet wird die statistische und numerische Korrektheit 
der von den Programmen generierten Ergebnisse. Bei den Produkten mit 
allgemeinem Methodenspektrum wurde der Schwerpunkt auf 
Programmpakete für Workstations gelegt. Da die angebotenen Produkte und 
ihre Eigenschaften einem ständigen Wandel unterliegen, kann es sich hierbei 
nur um eine Momentaufnahme handeln. Ebenso wenig ist es möglich, 
sämtliche auf dem Markt angebotenen  
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Produkte zu würdigen. Ein Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit wird 
dementsprechend nicht erhoben. Noch viel mehr gilt dies für die erwähnten 
und auf bestimmte Anwendungsgebiete spezialisierten Pakete. Aus der Fülle 
des Angebotes werden nur einige wenige Produkte expressis verbis genannt. 
Die Nennung eines Produktes ist also keineswegs mit einer Wertung 
verbunden. Aufgrund der Unmöglichkeit einer umfassenden Würdigung aller 
verfügbaren Programme ist der nach seinem  
 
Statistik-Paket Suchende auf weiterführende Informationen angewiesen. 
Hinweise zur Beschaffung dieser Informationen, mit besonderer 
Berücksichtigung des Internets, können in diesem Abschnitt gefunden werden. 
Der im Folgenden diskutierte Katalog wünschenswerter Eigenschaften von 
Statistikprogrammen fasst die in der einschlägigen Literatur anzutreffenden 
Forderungen zusammen. In dieser Hinsicht ist er als Minimalkonsens 
anzusehen, der um etliche Kriterien, die für bestimmte  
 
Benutzer oder Anwendungen wichtig sind, ergänzt werden könnte. Auf eine 
Gewichtung der genannten Aspekte wurde bewusst verzichtet. Sie hängt 
entscheidend vom geplanten Einsatzgebiet und den individuellen Präferenzen 
ab und sollte daher von jedem selbst vorgenommen werden. Im Wesentlichen 
können, neben den diskutierten Korrektheitsproblemen, vier Kategorien von 
Kriterien identifiziert werden die bei der Auswahl eines Statistik-Paketes 
berücksichtigt werden  
sollten: Systemvoraussetzungen, Bedienung, Systemschnittstellen und Vielfalt 
der statistischen Verfahren. In die erste Gruppe fallen technische 
Eigenschaften wie unterstützte Hardware in die zweite dagegen Aspekte wie 
Art und Weise der Bedienung oder die Qualität der Handbücher und 
Onlinehilfen. Die dritte Kategorie deckt die Möglichkeiten des 
Datenaustausches sowie der Integration in andere Programmsysteme ab. Und 
die Kernfunktionalität eines Statistikprogrammes,  
 
nämlich der Umfang der angebotenen Verfahren und grafischen 
Darstellungen, wird schließlich im vierten Punkt angesprochen. Die 
Systemvoraussetzungen spezifizieren die Plattform, auf der die betreffende 
Statistik-Software funktionsfähig ist. Unter einer Plattform wird hierbei eine 
konkrete Kombination aus Hardware und Betriebssystem verstanden. 
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3Willingness to take risk: The role of
risk conception and optimism
Joint work with Thomas Dohmen and Simone Quercia
3.1 Introduction
Most decisions in economic and social life are taken under risk or uncertainty.
Expected utility theory posits that risk preference determines behavior in these
situations; and non-expected utility theory allows for reference points and risk
perception (e.g. probability weighting) to matter for risky choice. In this paper,
we demonstrate that risk taking behavior is also determined by the disposition to
focus on favorable or unfavorable outcomes of risky choice, an important factor
beyond curvature of utility and departures from linearity in probabilities. This
disposition, which we call risk conception, is akin to a trait; it is strongly related
to optimism, an enduring facet of personality (Carver and Scheier, 2014). We
show that individuals differ systematically in the way how they conceive risky
situations, and that these differences map into heterogeneity in risk taking be-
havior.
When it comes to predicting risky behavior across contexts, it is advanta-
geous to have measures of all stable characteristics that determine risky choice,
including risk conception. We argue that instruments and methods designed
to reveal risk preference capture risk conception to different degrees. Typically
these risk preference measures are based on a risky choice R which is a func-
tion of the underlying latent risk preference parameter r and a vector of other
relevant factors X, i.e., R= f(r,X). Standard practice in economics is to create
environments and elicitation mechanisms that control for X as much as possible
in order to elicit r (see Charness et al., 2013, for a review). A prime example
is an incentivized lottery choice in a controlled environment. While such mea-
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sures may be suited to reveal parameter r, their predictive power for real life
risk taking may be comparatively low precisely because of their tight control of
other factors that systematically and persistently affect decision making under
risk or uncertainty. In contrast, survey instruments that lack this control, e.g.,
with respect to stake size and probabilities, may capture these elements and
have stronger predictive power for different risky behaviors R across situations.
We focus on one such instrument, the "general risk question", which asks
subjects "Are you generally a person who is willing to take risks or do you try to
avoid taking risks?" on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from "not at all willing
to take risks" to "very willing to take risks". This question has been shown to be
a good predictor of risk taking behavior across different domains (e.g., Bonin
et al., 2007; Caliendo et al., 2009; Grund and Sliwka, 2010; Jaeger et al., 2010;
Dohmen et al., 2011; Lönnqvist et al., 2015).
We hypothesize that part of the variation in answers to the general risk ques-
tion depends on respondents’ disposition to focus on positive or negative out-
comes of risk, and that this disposition is stable and systematic.
Our experimental results support these hypotheses. We find that the degree
to which respondents focus on the positive or negative outcomes of risk when
answering the general risk question is a strong predictor of their responses. We
further show that this disposition is systematically related to optimism, a sta-
ble character trait whose importance has been long recognized in personality
psychology (e.g., Carver et al., 2010; Carver and Scheier, 2014).1 Furthermore,
we show that optimism affects responses to the general risk question but that it
does so mostly through respondents’ focus on the positive or negative outcomes
of risk rather than directly.
In light of this result, we use optimism as a proxy for people’s disposition
to focus on favorable/unfavorable outcomes of risk taking, and in the second
step of our analysis, we examine whether optimism relates to risk taking behav-
ior. We do so using (i) an incentivized measure of risk taking contained in our
experimental dataset and (ii) self-reported real life behaviors from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (henceforth SOEP). For both datasets, we find a signifi-
cant association between risk taking behavior and optimism. We conclude that,
in addition to being a proxy for pure risk preferences, the general risk question
captures important personality characteristics relevant for risk taking behavior,
thereby providing a broader representation of the factors that should be taken
into account when studying decision making under risk.
1 In line with much of the personality psychology literature (Carver et al., 2010), we view opti-
mism as a stable disposition (i.e., a personality trait) that affects beliefs in specific environments.
There is initial evidence that this character trait also manifests itself in differential beliefs about
uncertain events (see Felton et al., 2003, who show that in males optimism increases investment
in stocks).
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the design of our experiment. Section 3.3 establishes the link between the way
how people conceive risk, their responses to the general risk question, and opti-
mism. Section 3.4 investigates the relationship between optimism, the general
risk question and risk taking behavior. Section 3.5 discusses the results and con-
cludes.
3.2 The experiment
The data we analyze in this paper were collected during a longitudinal experi-
ment consisting of three one-hour sessions run in three consecutive weeks. The
experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants
were invited from the BonnEconLab subject pool using hroot (Bock et al., 2014).
Most of the 348 participants were students (95%) from various fields of study.
61% of subjects were female, and the average age was 22.4 years. In what fol-
lows, we describe the variables relevant to our research question.
General risk question. Our main variable of interest is the general risk ques-
tion which was validated in Dohmen et al. (2011) (see also Section 3.1). We
used the same wording as in the SOEP (see for example Wagner et al., 2007).
The question was administered to subjects at the beginning of the session in the
third week.2
Risk conception questions. After subjects had responded to the general risk
question, we asked them what aspects of risk they focused on while answering.
We use the following four questions (7-point Likert scale).3
• Did you rather think of the negative or positive sides of risk? [Risk -
neg/pos; scale: “[1] only of the negative sides” to “[7] only of the positive
sides”]
• Did you rather think of small everyday situations or large important ones?
[Risk - stake size; scale: “[1] small everyday situations” to “[7] large im-
portant situations”]
• Did you rather think of situations in which there are small or large gains?
[Risk - stake size (gains); scale: “[1] small gains” to “[7] large gains”]
• Did you rather think of situations in which there are small or large losses?
[Risk - stake size (losses); scale: “[1] small losses” to “[7] large losses”]
2 It was also asked at the beginning of the other weeks’ sessions. But since the “risk conception”
questions were only asked in the third week to avoid interference with later risk-related tasks, we
focus on week 3 here.
3 All questions are translated from German.
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Before responding to these questions, subjects reported in free-form text what
they thought of when answering the general risk question. To code the free-form
text, we used a similar procedure as Brandts and Cooper (2007): two research
assistants independently coded the free-form answers along the dimensions of
positive/negative valence and stake size (see Section 3.A.2 in the appendix for
details on the coding procedure). Spearman rank correlations between the re-
sulting variables and the corresponding risk conception questions areρ = .39 for
“Free form - neg/pos”(p< .001), ρ = .42 for “Free form - stake size” (p< .001),
ρ = .14 for “Free form - stake size (gains)” (p= .007), and ρ = .14 for “Free
form - stake size (losses)” (p= .011).4
Optimism measures. Our main optimism measure is the so-called SOP ques-
tionnaire (Kemper et al., 2015). It consists of two items eliciting self-reported
degrees of optimism and pessimism (7-point Likert scale). The first item is: “Op-
timists are people who look to the future with confidence and whomostly expect
good things to happen. How would you describe yourself? How optimistic are
you in general?”. The second item reads as “Pessimists are people who are full of
doubt when they look to the future and who mostly expect bad things to happen.
How would you describe yourself? How pessimistic are you in general?”.
The SOP scale is based on the established Life Orientation Test (henceforth
LOT; Scheier et al., 1994; Herzberg et al., 2006), which we also include in our
questionnaire. Similar to Kemper et al. (2015), we find a convergent Spearman
rank correlation between SOP and LOT of ρ = .76 (p< .001). In the main text
of the paper, we restrict our analyses to the SOP measure but results are virtually
the same if LOT is used (see Section 3.A.4 and Section 3.A.8 in the appendix for
the LOT questionnaire and these results, respectively).
Optimism was elicited at the end of the session in the third week after sub-
jects had completed several incentivized tasks without having received feedback.
This makes spillover effects between the risk-related questions and the optimism
measures unlikely. We also elicited SOP and LOT in the second week session of
our longitudinal experiment. The Spearman rank correlation of measured opti-
mism across weeks is ρ = .81 for SOP and ρ = .84 for LOT (Spearman, p< .001
for both). All the results presented in the paper are robust to using these previ-
ously elicited optimism measures (see Section 3.A.8 in the appendix).
Risk taking behavior. Our behavioral risk measure is based on the risk premia
for three different lotteries. We elicited certainty equivalents of these lotteries
in week 1 and week 3 using a multiple price list format. In both weeks, subjects
4 Some free-form text answers were not classifiable according to our categories. This is es-
pecially prominent for the three variables referring to stake size where 50%, 56%, and 62%,
respectively, of coded answers take the value 0, compared to 42% for “Free form - neg/pos” (see
Table 3.A.2.) This suggests that it is rather the positive or negative sides of risk than stake sizes
that subjects think about when answering the general risk question.
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went through the same three choice lists (see Section 3.A.5 in the appendix). In
all tables, subjects chose between a safe payment and a lottery paying 15 with
probability p and 0 with probability 1− p. The probability p was 0.25, 0.5, and
0.75 in tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The safe payment increased from 0€ to
15€ in steps of 0.50€. For each lottery, we average over the risk premia across
weeks to reduce noise in our measure of risk taking. Furthermore, we construct
a risk premium index aggregating the risk premia for the three lotteries for each
subject.
Controls. We control for sociodemographics that were elicited in the first
week of the experiment and a proxy for cognitive ability that was elicited in the
third week. This proxy is based on ten Raven matrices (see Section 3.A.6 of the
appendix for the distribution of responses). In addition, in some specifications
we also use the Big Five personality characteristics that we elicited in every
session using the 15 item questionnaire developed for the SOEP (Schupp and
Gerlitz, 2008).
3.3 Conception of risk and the general risk question
There are two noteworthy patterns in our data. First, there is considerable het-
erogeneity in answers to risk conception questions, as is reflected by standard
deviations in responses. Averages and standard deviations are 3.53 and 1.43,
respectively, for “Risk - neg/pos”; 4.06 and 1.56 for “Risk - stake size”; 4.18 and
1.51 for “Risk - stake size (gains)”; as well as 4.49 and 1.58 for “Risk - stake size
(losses)”. The correlational pattern between the different risk conception ques-
tions suggests that valence and stake size are orthogonal, as “Risk - neg/pos” and
“Risk - stake size” are uncorrelated (Spearman’s ρ = −.071, p= .185), while all
other risk conception questions are significantly correlated with one another
(see Table 3.A.1 for details). Second, pairwise Spearman rank correlations be-
tween the general risk question and each of the conception questions are signif-
icant except for "Risk - stake size".5
Ordinary least squares regressions confirm that answers to the risk concep-
tion questions are systematically related to responses to the general risk question,
even when controlling for gender and cognitive ability. 6 Column (1) of Table 3.1
indicates that subjects who focus on positive rather than negative sides of risk
are significantly more willing to take risk. The effect sizes of all other risk con-
ception questions are smaller. Thinking about higher gains is associated with
5 The correlations are ρ = 0.63 and p< .001 for “Risk - neg/pos”, ρ = −.04 and p= .488 for
“Risk - stake size”, ρ = .27 and p< .001 for “Risk - stake size (gains)”, ρ = −.28 and p< .001
for “Risk - stake size (losses)”.
6 We do not control for age since there is very little variation in a student sample.
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Table 3.1. Relationship between the general risk question and risk conception.
General risk question
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk - neg/pos 0.826*** 0.951***
(0.070) (0.064)
Risk - stake size 0.118* -0.019
(0.065) (0.075)
Risk - stake size (gains) 0.147** 0.373***
(0.065) (0.075)
Risk - stake size (losses) -0.264*** -0.421***
(0.067) (0.071)
Female -0.300 -0.314 -0.627** -0.510** -0.624*** -0.626***
(0.187) (0.191) (0.243) (0.236) (0.231) (0.242)
IQ (Raven) -0.147*** -0.125*** -0.127** -0.132** -0.164*** -0.127**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.058)
Constant 3.272*** 2.644*** 6.273*** 4.589*** 8.257*** 6.193***
(0.532) (0.365) (0.476) (0.471) (0.484) (0.352)
R2 0.44 0.41 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.03
N 348 348 348 348 348 348
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
The dependent variables is the general risk question elicited on an 11-point scale. The inde-
pendent variables “Risk - neg/pos” to “Risk - stake size (losses)” consist of the answers to
questions eliciting what subjects thought of while answering the general risk question along
the dimensions of valence and stake size.
a significantly higher willingness to take risk and thinking about higher losses
with a significantly lower willingness to take risk.
Whether subjects focus on the positive or negative aspects of risk also has
by far the highest explanatory power. This is evident from comparing the R2
of the regressions in columns (2) to (5), in which we successively regress the
general risk question on one of the risk conception questions and the set of con-
trol variables (R2 = 0.44 and R2 = 0.41 for models (1) and (2), respectively, and
R2 = 0.03, R2 = 0.09 and R2 = 0.12, respectively, for models (3) to (5)). In sum-
mary, this indicates that conception of risk is strongly related to self-assessed
willingness to take risk.
Table 3.1 also reveals an interesting finding regarding the gender effect in
willingness to take risk. Not controlling for risk conception, women report to be
significantly less willing to take risk than men (model (6)). This is consistent
with the gender difference in willingness to take risk reported in many previous
studies using representative population samples of particular countries (e.g.,
Dohmen et al., 2011) and across the globe (Falk and Zimmermann, 2017) as
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Table 3.2. Relationship between risk conception and optimism.
Risk - neg/pos Risk - stake size Risk - stake size Risk - stake size
(gains) (losses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Optimism (SOP) 0.261*** -0.018 0.036 -0.177***
(0.061) (0.068) (0.066) (0.068)
Female -0.317** -0.075 -0.308* -0.004
(0.156) (0.173) (0.168) (0.174)
IQ (Raven) -0.006 -0.027 0.013 -0.084**
(0.037) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042)
Constant 3.506*** 4.252*** 4.271*** 5.056***
(0.232) (0.259) (0.250) (0.259)
R2 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03
N 348 348 348 348
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01. The dependent variables consist of the answers to questions eliciting what subjects
thought of while answering the general risk question along the dimensions of valence and
stake size.
well as in various non-representative population studies (Vieider et al., 2015).7
However, once we condition on whether respondents think about positive or neg-
ative aspects of risk when answering the general risk question, the gender differ-
ence becomes small and insignificant (models (1) and (2)). This indicates that
the gender difference in self-assessed willingness to take risk is largely driven
by gender differences in disposition to focus on positive or negative outcomes
of risk taking, and not so much by gender differences in curvature of the utility
function.
Our findings are corroborated when we measure risk conception in an alter-
native way, using the variables constructed from the free-form text question that
was elicited before the risk conception questions (see Section 3.2 for details on
variable construction).8 When we replicate the regressions reported in Table 3.1
using variables derived from free-form text we find qualitatively very similar
results (see Table 3.A.3 in the appendix).
As a next step, we investigate to what extent conception of risk is system-
atically related to stable individual characteristics. For this purpose, we regress
answers to the four questions described in Section 3.2 on the optimism measure
(SOP), our main proxy for personality characteristics, controlling for gender and
cognitive ability. The results are shown in Table 3.2. The coefficient associated
7 For reviews and meta-studies see Eckel and Grossman (2008), Croson and Gneezy (2009),
Charness and Gneezy (2012), and Buser et al. (2014).
8 The Spearman rank correlation between the general risk question and “Free form - neg/pos”
is positive and significant (ρ = .265, p< .001), while this is not the case for “Free form - stake
size”(ρ = −.024, p= .652),“Free form - stake size (gains)”(ρ = −.003, p= .949) and “Free form
- stake size (losses)”(ρ = .043, p= .420).
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with optimism is significantly different from zero only for the regressions using
“Risk - neg/pos” and “Risk - stake size (losses)”, which were also the strongest
predictors of answers to the general risk question. In line with the findings from
Table 3.1, women exhibit a significantly lower propensity to think of the posi-
tive rather than the negative sides of risk, even when optimism is not controlled
for (see Table 3.A.4 in the appendix). This supports the conjecture that gender
differences in risk taking are partly due to systematic gender differences in risk
conception.
The data enable us to perform a number of robustness checks on the relation-
ship between conception of risk and optimism (see Table 3.A.7 to Table 3.A.10
in the appendix). A potential concern is that measurement error in optimism
might be correlated with answers to the risk conception questions. For example,
subjects’ momentary psychological state might affect the optimismmeasure and
answers to the risk conception questions, and hence introduce a spurious rela-
tionship between the measures, which does not reflect a relationship between
the trait component of optimism and risk conception. We address this in several
ways. First, we regress the answers to the risk conception questions on self-stated
mood elicited at the beginning of the session (see model (5) in each of the afore-
mentioned tables). Additionally, we regress the answers to the four risk concep-
tion questions on the optimism measures elicited one week prior to asking the
risk conception questions (see model 2 in each of the aforementioned tables).
Further, to correct for measurement error in the optimism measure we (i) ag-
gregate the SOP measures elicited in week 2 and 3 and (ii) we instrument SOP
elicited in week 3 with SOP elicited in week 2 using a two stage least squares
estimation (see models (3) and (4) of each table). Finally, to validate the impor-
tance of optimism as a relevant personality characteristic in our context, we run
the same specifications of models (3) and (4) adding the Big 5 personality traits
also corrected for measurement error (see models (6) and (7) of each table).9
Similar to the results in Table 3.2, the coefficient associated with optimism is
significantly different from zero across all additional specifications when we use
”Risk - neg/pos” and ”Risk - stake size (losses)” as dependent variables, while it
is not for the other two risk conception variables.
Since our hypothesis is that optimism is a reliable proxy (and might be
causal) for people’s disposition to focus on favorable/unfavorable outcomes of
risk taking, which in turn affects responses to the general risk question, we next
9 In personality psychology, optimism is viewed as a distinct trait that cannot be readilymapped
into the Big Five inventory, even though there is a partial overlap between optimism and some
dimensions of the Big Five (in particular agreeableness and extraversion; see Carver and Scheier
(2014)). In our setup, optimism seems ex-ante an aspect of personality that can be used as a
reliable proxy people’s disposition to focus on favorable or unfavorable outcomes of risk taking.
The models reported in Table 3.A.7 to Table 3.A.10 confirm this.
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Table 3.3. Relationship between the general risk question and optimism controlling for
risk conception.
General risk question
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Optimism (SOP) 0.406*** 0.149** 0.166** 0.405*** 0.392*** 0.337***
(0.093) (0.075) (0.076) (0.093) (0.090) (0.090)
Risk - neg/pos 0.799*** 0.919***
(0.071) (0.065)
Risk - stake size 0.112* -0.014
(0.065) (0.074)
Risk - stake size (gains) 0.151** 0.363***
(0.065) (0.074)
Risk - stake size (losses) -0.253*** -0.385***
(0.067 (0.070)
Female -0.609** -0.302 -0.318* -0.610** -0.497** -0.610***
(0.236) (0.186) (0.190) (0.237) (0.230) (0.227)
IQ (Raven) -0.134** -0.149*** -0.128*** -0.134** -0.139** -0.166***
(0.057) (0.045) (0.045) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055)
Constant 5.839*** 3.195*** 2.619*** 5.900*** 4.288*** 7.784***
(0.353) (0.531) (0.363) (0.472) (0.464) (0.492)
R2 0.08 0.45 0.42 0.08 0.14 0.15
N 348 348 348 348 348 348
Notes.OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
study whether optimism has a direct effect on measured risk attitudes and how
risk conception mediates this relationship.
In Table 3.3 we regress the general risk question on the SOP optimism mea-
sure. When we only include SOP and controls as explanatory variables (model
(1)), the coefficient on optimism is sizable and significantly different from zero.
However, once the question on whether subjects thought about the positive or
negative sides of risk is added in the regression, the coefficient on optimism de-
creases considerably (model (2) and (3)). This pattern is weaker or non-existent
for the other risk conception questions (models (4) to (6)).
The coefficient on “Risk - neg/pos” in models (2) and (3) is significantly
different from zero and of the same order of magnitude as in Table 3.1, when
optimism was not included. This suggests that it is not optimism itself but rather
its influence on subjects’ conception of the general risk question, in terms of
positive or negative outcomes of risk taking, that affects stated risk attitudes.
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3.4 Optimism and risk taking behavior
So far, we have shown that responses to the general risk question are affected
by aspects beyond parameters of a standard utility function. In fact, one crucial
aspect is whether people have a disposition to focus on the positive or nega-
tive outcomes of risk taking. This disposition has persistence as it is related to
optimism, an important and stable character trait. An intriguing question that
extends beyond the relationship between risk conception and self-assessed will-
ingness to take risk is whether actual risk taking behavior is also affected by risk
conception. If this was not the case, answers to the general risk question would
simply contain information irrelevant for risky behavior.10 Below, we analyze
data from our experiment and from a representative sample, and show that this
disposition to focus on positive/negative outcomes of risk, proxied by optimism,
is in fact related to risk taking behavior.
As a measure of risk taking behavior among our student sample, we use the
risk premium index derived from three incentivized lottery choices (see Sec-
tion 3.2). We regress this index on the SOP optimism measure, the general risk
question, and basic control variables. Model (1) in Table 3.4 shows a significant
association between risk taking behavior and optimism. Model (2) replicates
findings from the previous literature and shows that the general risk question
is a significant predictor of risk taking in lottery choice. When in model (3), we
include both optimism and the general risk question in the regression, the co-
efficient on optimism is smaller and not statistically significant. This indicates
that the general risk question captures the optimism component, thus making it
a useful predictor for risk taking behavior. A similar pattern arises when using
each risk premium separately rather than the risk premium index as a dependent
variable (see Table 3.A.14 and Table 3.A.15 in the appendix).
Next, we investigate whether the association between optimism and risk tak-
ing behavior extends to real life behavior in a representative sample of the Ger-
man population. For this purpose we use information on self-reported behaviors
in the 2014 wave of the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP). In particular,
we focus on two domains that are relevant for economics and directly related to
risk taking: portfolio choice and career choice. As a proxy for portfolio choice,
we use information about household stock holdings. In particular, the variable
"Stocks" takes value 1 if at least one household member holds stocks, shares,
or stock options and zero otherwise. Since the question is only administered to
the household head, the regressions involving this variable use the subsample of
household heads. The variable “Self-employed” takes value 1 if an individual is
self-employed and zero for individuals who are in other employment. As a proxy
10 Such information unrelated to risk taking behavior would generate measurement error in
responses to the general risk question lowering its predictive power (Beauchamp et al., 2017).
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Table 3.4. Optimism and Risk Taking Behavior.
Risk premium index
(1) (2) (3)
Optimism (SOP) -0.096** -0.055
(0.041) (0.041)
General risk question -0.107*** -0.100***
(0.022) (0.023)
Female 0.431*** 0.368*** 0.370***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.102)
IQ (Raven) 0.008 -0.008 -0.006
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant -0.197 0.385* 0.389*
(0.154) (0.202) (0.201)
R2 0.064 0.108 0.113
N 348 348 348
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The variable
“risk premium index” is created by standardizing the
risk premia (aggregated over measurements in week
1 and 3), averaging, and then standardizing again.
for optimism we use the following question: “If you think about the future: Are
you...”(translated fromGerman). Respondents could answer on a scale from 1 to
4, where 1 = “optimistic”, 2 = “rather optimistic than pessimistic”, 3 = “rather
pessimistic than optimistic", and 4= “pessimistic”. For ease of interpretation, we
reverse the scale, such that, a higher scores means higher optimism. The general
risk question has the exact same wording as in our experiment. We standardize
both variables to ensure comparability. As expected from our experimental data,
the correlation between the willingness to take risk as measured by the general
risk question and optimism is positive and significant (ρ = .165, p< .0001).
To investigate whether optimism is also predictive of real life risk taking we
run a series of linear probability models reported in Table 3.5 where we regress
the aforementioned measures of risk taking on the optimism measure, the gen-
eral risk question, and a set of control variables.11 In line with the results from
our experiment, models (1) and (4) show that optimism is a significant predic-
11 We control for gender, age, and height which have been shown to predict risk taking in the
previous literature (Dohmen et al., 2011). We also control for parents’ education (Abitur mother
and Abitur father) rather than own education to avoid the reverse causality problem that would
occur with regard to self-employment. These variables are equal to 1 if a parent has “Abitur”
or “Fachabitur”, high school degrees that are awarded after 12 or 13 years of schooling and that
grant access to (specific types of) university education. Further controls are logarithmic household
wealth, logarithmic household debt, and logarithmic net household income. We also control for
the number of adults (defined as older than 17) in the household in the stock-holding regression.
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Table 3.5. Relationship between risk taking behavior and optimism.
Risk taking: Stocks Risk taking: Self-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Std. Optimism 0.012*** 0.009** 0.012*** 0.007**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Std. General risk question 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female 0.008 0.011 0.011 -0.021** -0.012 -0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Age 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Height 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Abitur mother -0.030* -0.028 -0.031* 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.053***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Abitur father 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.040***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Log househ. wealth 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log househ. debt -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log net househ. income 0.205*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Number of adults in hh -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.044***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -1.675*** -1.663*** -1.648*** -0.189* -0.212* -0.199*
(0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109)
R2 0.138 0.138 0.139 0.032 0.041 0.041
N 9,324 9,325 9,267 8,593 8,573 8,537
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The sam-
ples in columns 1 to 3 include only household heads. The dependent variable takes a value of 1
if the household holds stocks and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 takes a
value of 1 if respondent is self-employed and 0 otherwise. Here, we limit the sample to individuals
under 66 years who are part of the labor force.
tor of both holding stocks and being self-employed. In particular, an increase by
one standard deviation in the response to the optimism question raises the prob-
ability of holding stocks (being self-employed) by 1.2 (1.2) percentage points.
When we use the general risk question (models (2) and (5)) as a predictor of
holding stocks or being self-employed, we find that an increase by one standard
deviation in willingness to take risk raises the probability of holding stocks (be-
ing self-employed) by 1.9 (3.2) percentage points. These results are consistent
with Dohmen et al. (2011), who find similar effects for the 2004 wave of SOEP.
Finally, when we include both optimism and the general risk question (mod-
els (3) and (6)), the optimism coefficients are reduced, similar to the regressions
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reported in Table 3.4, indicating that the general risk question is also partly cap-
turing the optimism component.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided evidence that responses to the general risk ques-
tion (Dohmen et al., 2011) are influenced by factors that extend beyond param-
eters of a standard utility function. The way how people conceive risk and in
particular whether they have a tendency to focus on favorable or unfavorable
outcomes of risk taking is a crucial determinant of their responses. We have
shown that heterogeneity in this disposition is systematic as it is related to op-
timism, a stable character trait. While optimists tend to focus on the positive
outcomes associated with risk, pessimists tend to focus on the potential nega-
tive outcomes of risky decisions, leading to divergent responses.
Our data strongly suggest that the disposition to focus on positive or neg-
ative aspects of risks affects actual risk taking behavior. In our student sample
and in a representative sample, we find that optimism, which predicts this dis-
position, is related to risk taking behavior. In the student sample it predicts lot-
tery choices and in the representative sample investing in the stock market or
being self-employed. The fact that the general risk question captures the disposi-
tion to focus on favorable or unfavorable outcomes of risky alternatives and that
this factor is relevant for risk taking behavior, may explain why the general risk
question is a better predictor of risk taking behavior across contexts than other
measures of risk preferences that control more tightly risk conception, stakes
and probabilities.
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3.A Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A.1 Correlations between responses to risk conception questions
Table 3.A.1. Spearman rank correlations between responses to risk conception
questions.
Risk - neg/pos Risk - stake size Risk - stake size (gains)
Risk - stake size -0.071
(0.185)
Risk - stake size (gains) 0.278 0.205
(<0.001) (<0.001)
Risk - stake size (losses) -0.288 0.449 0.133
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.013)
Notes. N= 348. p-values in parentheses
3.A.2 Coding of free-form responses
Before answering the four risk conception questions described in the main text,
subjects were asked to report in free-form text what they thought about when
answering the general risk question. Answers varied substantially, with some
subjects stating financial risk, others considering the risk of being the victims of
crime, or risk taking in sports. We coded the answers employing a strategy simi-
lar to that used by Brandts and Cooper (2007). Two research assistants unfamil-
iar with the research question and the rest of the dataset coded the answers inde-
pendently such that coding errors would be uncorrelated. They created four cat-
egorical variables for each answer, one referring to the positive/negative valence
and three referring to the stake size in general, stake size in the gains dimension,
and stake size in the loss dimension respectively . “Free-form - neg/pos” could
be either positive (1) or negative (−1), while “Free-form - stake size”, “Free-
form - stake size (gains)” and “Free-form - stake size (losses)” could be large
(1) or small (−1). Furthermore, each variable took the value 0, if answers were
mixed or not classifiable.12 We found significant cross-coder Spearman rank cor-
relations of ρ = .49, ρ = .71, ρ = .61, and ρ = .38 (p< .001 for all four) for va-
lence, stake size, stake size (gains), and stake size (losses), respectively. For the
analysis reported in the paper, following Brandts and Cooper (2007), we aver-
age the values across coders. Average responses to the risk conception questions
split by coded free-form question response are reported in Table 3.A.2 below.
12 Mixed answers can occur in situations where subjects state more than one risky situation.
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Table 3.A.2. Responses to selected risk conception questions
(by coded answer to Free-form question).
Free-form - neg/pos Free-form - stake size
Value Frequency Mean SD Frequency Mean SD
-1 44 2.682 1.137 74 3 1.365
-0.5 43 2.767 1.231 42 3.571 1.548
0 146 3.479 1.266 175 4.325 1.391
0.5 93 4.097 1.533 36 5.028 1.464
1 22 4.545 1.405 21 4.905 1.411
Free-form - stake s. (gains) Free-form - stake s. (losses)
Value Frequency Mean SD Frequency Mean SD
-1 40 3.675 1.269 30 3.333 1.583
-0.5 42 4.095 1.559 54 4.5 1.587
0 194 4.175 1.472 217 4.631 1.498
0.5 48 4.708 1.557 44 4.545 1.745
1 24 4.125 1.801 3 4.333 1.154
3.A.3 Regression on coded free-form variables
Table 3.A.3. Robustness check to Table 3.1.
General risk question
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Free-form - neg/pos 1.345*** 1.090***
(0.237) (0.211)
Free-form - stake size -0.023 -0.074
(0.277) (0.213)
Free-form - stake size (gains) 0.931*** 0.381
(0.322) (0.235)
Free-form - stake size (losses) -0.223 0.466
(0.356) (0.296)
Female -0.602*** -0.628*** -0.622** -0.614** -0.620**
(0.232) (0.234) (0.243) (0.242) (0.242)
IQ (Raven) -0.131** -0.127** -0.127** -0.127** -0.119**
(0.0557) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Constant 6.195*** 6.184*** 6.178*** 6.201*** 6.194***
(0.339) (0.340) (0.355) (0.351) (0.351)
N 348 348 348 348 348
R2 0.130 0.099 0.029 0.036 0.036
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
The dependent variable is the general risk question elicited on an 11-point scale. The
independent variables are generated by coding the answer to the Free-form question
“What kind of risk did you think of while answering the general risk question?”
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3.A.4 LOT-R questionnaire
For the validation of the German version we used refer to Herzberg et al. (2006).
English version by Scheier et al. (1994): Please state to what extent your opin-
ion agrees with the following statements (7 point Likert Scale from “does not
apply to me at all” to “applies to me exactly” ).
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
2. It’s easy for me to relax.
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will. (R)
4. I’m always optimistic about my future.
5. I enjoy my friends a lot.
6. It’s important for me to keep busy.
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way. (R)
8. I don’t get upset too easily.
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me. (R)
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.
Items marked with (R) are reverse-scaled, while items 2, 5, 6 and 8 are
fillers.
3.A.5 Risk behavior measure - lottery choice lists
Figure 3.A.1. Exemplary Choice list: Certainty equivalent of lottery “15 €with 25% and 0
€with 75%”
Translation from German: "TABLE 1 - Please choose an alternative in each row.".
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3.A.6 Measurement of cognitive ability
The appropriateness of the level of difficulty for a student population is con-
firmed by the roughly normal distribution of the number of correctly solved
matrices displayed in Figure 3.A.2.
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Figure 3.A.2. Distribution of proxy for cognitive ability.
3.A.7 Gender dierences in risk conception
Table 3.A.4. Relationship between gender and risk conception.
Risk - neg/pos Risk - stake size Risk - stake size Risk - stake size
(gains) (losses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.328** -0.074 -0.310* 0.003
(0.159) (0.173) (0.167) (0.175)
IQ (Raven) -0.002 -0.027 0.014 -0.087**
(0.038) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042)
Constant 3.733*** 4.236*** 4.303*** 4.902***
(0.231) (0.252) (0.243) (0.254)
R2 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02
N 348 348 348 348
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01 The dependent variables consist of the answers to questions eliciting what
subjects thought of while answering the general risk question along the dimensions
of valence and stake size.
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3.A.8 Robustness of results to use of dierent specications
Table 3.A.5. Robustness check to Table 3.2.
Risk - neg/pos Risk - stake size Risk - stake size Risk - stake size
(gains) (losses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Optimism (SOP) - week 3 0.263*** -0.019 0.040 -0.182***
(0.061) (0.068) (0.066) (0.069)
Constant 3.278*** 4.078*** 4.141*** 4.655***
(0.095) (0.105) (0.102) (0.106)
R2 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02
N 348 348 348 348
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variables consist of the answers to questions eliciting what subjects thought of while
answering the general risk question along the dimensions of valence and stake size.
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Table 3.A.6. Robustness check to Table 3.2.
Specication 1 Risk - neg/pos Risk - stake size Risk - stake size Risk - stake size
(gains) (losses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Optimism (LOT) - week 3 0.283*** -0.003 0.080 -0.239***
(0.074) (0.084) (0.081) (0.084)
Female -0.327** -0.052 -0.360** 0.058
(0.158) (0.180) (0.172) (0.179)
IQ (Raven) -0.007 -0.022 -0.010 -0.082*
(0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Constant 2.355*** 4.214*** 4.056*** 6.002***
(0.409) (0.466) (0.446) (0.462)
R2 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04
N 326 326 326 326
Specication 2 Risk - neg/pos Risk - stake size Risk - stake size Risk - stake size
(gains) (losses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Optimism (SOP) - week 2 0.293*** 0.004 0.025 -0.266***
(0.060) (0.068) (0.065) (0.067)
Female -0.340** -0.023 -0.316* 0.077
(0.157) (0.178) (0.171) (0.175)
IQ (Raven) -0.003 -0.023 0.004 -0.076*
(0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Constant 3.451*** 4.190*** 4.305*** 5.049***
(0.235) (0.265) (0.255) (0.261)
R2 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.06
N 335 335 335 335
Specication 3 Risk - neg/pos Risk - stake size Risk - stake size Risk - stake size
(gains) (losses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Optimism (LOT) - week 2 0.327*** 0.026 0.033 -0.243***
(0.073) (0.082) (0.079) (0.082)
Female -0.343** -0.021 -0.316* 0.082
(0.158) (0.178) (0.171) (0.177)
IQ (Raven) -0.017 -0.024 0.002 -0.067
(0.038) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043)
Constant 2.258*** 4.078*** 4.179*** 5.894***
(0.398) (0.446) (0.429) (0.444)
R2 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.04
N 335 335 335 335
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variables consist of the answers to questions eliciting what subjects thought of while
answering the general risk question along the dimensions of valence and stake size. The optimism
measure varies by specication. LOT-R is the Life Orientation Test. SOP is a two-item measure
assessing subjects self-stated optimism and pessimism. Both were elicited in weeks 2 and 3.
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Table 3.A.7. Robustness check: Relationship between optimism and risk conception
questions.
Risk - neg/pos
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Optimism (SOP - week 3) 0.261*** 0.366*** 0.231**
(0.061) (0.076) (0.095)
Optimism (SOP - week 2) 0.293***
(0.060)
Optimism (SOP - agg) 0.305*** 0.304*** 0.167**
(0.064) (0.066) (0.095)
Female -0.317** -0.340** -0.340** -0.337** -0.340** -0.113 -0.136
(0.156) (0.157) (0.158) (0.160) (0.158) (0.169) (0.173)
IQ (Raven) -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0.024 0.018
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Mood (week 3) 0.0004
(0.037)
Conscientiousness (agg) -0.168**
(0.076)
Extraversion (agg) 0.225***
(0.068)
Openness(agg) 0.0152
(0.061)
Agreeableness (agg) -0.174**
(0.085)
Neuroticism (agg) -0.200***
(0.069)
Conscientiousness (week 3) -0.101
(0.084)
Extraversion (week 3) 0.194**
(0.076)
Openness (week 3) 0.0390
(0.066)
Agreeableness (week 3) -0.192**
(0.096)
Neuroticism (week 3) -0.164**
(0.078)
Constant 3.506*** 3.451*** 3.447*** 3.401*** 3.445*** 4.754*** 4.378***
(0.232) (0.235) (0.236) (0.240) (0.321) (0.749) (0.810)
R2 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.15
N 348 335 335 335 335 335 335
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. While “Risk -
neg/pos” was elicited in week 3, models 1 and 2 use the SOP measures from weeks 3 and 2, respectively.
Models 3,5 and 6 use the SOP measure aggregated over these two weeks, with model 5 including mood
(beginning of session in week 3) and model 6 including the Big Five (aggregated across weeks 2 and 3) as
controls. Models 4 and 7 are two-stage least squares estimations using the variables for SOP and the Big
Five from week 2 as instruments for those from week 3.
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Table 3.A.8. Robustness check: Relationship between optimism and risk conception
questions.
Risk - stake size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Optimism (SOP - week 3) -0.018 0.005 -0.055
(0.068) (0.084) (0.111)
Optimism (SOP - week 2) 0.004
(0.068)
Optimism (SOP - agg) -0.005 -0.001 -0.053
(0.072) (0.075) (0.086)
Female -0.075 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 0.0062 0.036
(0.173) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.197) (0.201)
IQ (Raven) -0.027 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 -0.030 -0.030
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Mood (week 3) -0.007
(0.042)
Conscientiousness (agg) 0.072
(0.089)
Extraversion (agg) -0.061
(0.080)
Openness (agg) 0.143**
(0.071)
Agreeableness (agg) 0.054
(0.099)
Neuroticism (agg) -0.101
(0.090)
Conscientiousness (week 3) 0.060
(0.098)
Extraversion (week 3) -0.061
(0.089)
Openness (week 3) 0.126*
(0.076)
Agreeableness (week 3) 0.043
(0.112)
Neuroticism (week 3) -0.101
(0.090)
Constant 4.252*** 4.190*** 4.198*** 4.189*** 4.241*** 3.554*** 3.824***
(0.259) (0.265) (0.265) (0.268) (0.362) (0.876) (0.940)
R2 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.019 0.021
N 348 335 335 335 335 335 335
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. While “Risk -
stake size” was elicited in week 3, models 1 and 2 use the SOP measures from weeks 3 and 2, respectively.
Models 3,5 and 6 use the SOP measure aggregated over these two weeks, with model 5 including mood
(beginning of session in week 3) and model 6 including the Big Five (aggregated across weeks 2 and 3) as
controls. Models 4 and 7 are two-stage least squares estimations using the variables for SOP and the Big
Five from week 2 as instruments for those from week 3.
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Table 3.A.9. Robustness check: Relationship between optimism and risk conception
questions.
Risk - stake size (gains)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Optimism (SOP - week 3) 0.036 0.031 -0.060
(0.066) (0.081) (0.106)
Optimism (SOP - week 2) 0.025
(0.065)
Optimism (SOP - agg) 0.034 0.023 -0.033
(0.069) (0.072) (0.083)
Female -0.308* -0.316* -0.316* -0.316* -0.316* -0.273 -0.257
(0.168) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.189) (0.193)
IQ (Raven) 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.023 0.025
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Mood (week 3) 0.021
(0.040)
Conscientiousness (agg) -0.009
(0.086)
Extraversion (agg) 0.147*
(0.076)
Openness (agg) 0.015
(0.068)
Agreeableness (agg) -0.146
(0.095)
Neuroticism (agg) -0.047
(0.078)
Conscientiousness (week 3) -0.036
(0.094)
Extraversion (week 3) 0.159*
(0.085)
Openness (week 3) 0.018
(0.073)
Agreeableness (week 3) -0.113
(0.107)
Neuroticism (week 3) -0.048
(0.087)
Constant 4.271*** 4.305*** 4.298*** 4.301*** 4.171*** 4.479*** 4.375***
(0.250) (0.255) (0.255) (0.258) (0.348) (0.841) (0.904)
R2 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.033 0.033
N 348 335 335 335 335 335 335
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. While “Risk - stake size (gains)”
was elicited in week 3, models 1 and 2 use the SOP measures from weeks 3 and 2, respectively. Models
3,5 and 6 use the SOP measure aggregated over these two weeks, with model 5 including mood (beginning
of session in week 3) and model 6 including the Big Five (aggregated across weeks 2 and 3) as controls.
Models 4 and 7 are two-stage least squares estimations using the variables for SOP and the Big Five from
week 2 as instruments for those from week 3.
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Table 3.A.10. Robustness check: Relationship between optimism and risk conception
questions.
Risk - stake size (losses)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Optimism (SOP - week 3) -0.177*** -0.331*** -0.375***
(0.068) (0.085) (0.113)
Optimism (SOP - week 2) -0.266***
(0.066)
Optimism (SOP - agg) -0.248*** -0.217*** -0.264***
(0.071) (0.074) (0.086)
Female -0.004 0.078 0.078 0.075 0.079 0.022 0.051
(0.174) (0.175) (0.176) (0.179) (0.176) (0.197) (0.205)
IQ (Raven) -0.084** -0.076* -0.075* -0.072* -0.072* -0.073* -0.067
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045)
Mood (week 3) -0.061
(0.041)
Conscientiousness (agg) 0.030
(0.089)
Extraversion (agg) 0.002
(0.080)
Openness (agg) 0.060
(0.071)
Agreeableness (agg) 0.060
(0.099)
Neuroticism (agg) 0.0311
(0.081)
Conscientiousness (week 3) -0.028
(0.100)
Extraversion (week 3) 0.041
(0.090)
Openness (week 3) 0.035
(0.078)
Agreeableness (week 3) 0.079
(0.114)
Neuroticism (week 3) 0.004
(0.092)
Constant 5.056*** 5.049*** 5.028*** 5.094*** 5.392*** 4.171*** 4.467***
(0.259) (0.261) (0.263) (0.269) (0.358) (0.875) (0.957)
R2 0.032 0.058 0.047 0.020 0.054 0.051 0.017
N 348 335 335 335 335 335 335
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. While “Risk - stake size (losses)” was
elicited in week 3, models 1 and 2 use the SOP measures from weeks 3 and 2, respectively. Models 3,5 and 6 use
the SOP measure aggregated over these two weeks, with model 5 including mood (beginning of session in week 3)
and model 6 including the Big Five (aggregated across weeks 2 and 3) as controls. Models 4 and 7 are two-stage
least squares estimations using the variables for SOP and the Big Five from week 2 as instruments for those from
week 3.
90 | 3 Willingness to take risk: The role of risk conception and optimism
Table 3.A.11. Robustness check to Table 3.3: Alternative specications showing the
relationship between the general risk question and optimism controlling for the risk
conception questions.
Specication 1 General risk question
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Optimism (LOT - week 3) 0.512*** 0.212** 0.252*** 0.512*** 0.483*** 0.421***
(0.114) (0.093) (0.094) (0.114) (0.111) (0.111)
Risk - neg/pos 0.796*** 0.919***
(0.075) (0.069)
Risk - stake size 0.112* -0.009
(0.067) (0.076)
Risk - stake size (gains) 0.155** 0.363***
(0.068) (0.076)
Risk - stake size (losses) -0.264*** -0.379***
(0.070) (0.073)
Female -0.602** -0.265 -0.301 -0.602** -0.471** -0.580**
(0.244) (0.194) (0.198) (0.244) (0.238) (0.235)
IQ (Raven) -0.144** -0.156*** -0.138*** -0.145** -0.141** -0.175***
(0.059) (0.047) (0.047) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057)
Constant 3.778*** 2.382*** 1.613*** 3.816*** 2.304*** 6.055***
(0.632) (0.682) (0.534) (0.708) (0.685) (0.750)
R2 0.08 0.41 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.44
N 326 326 326 326 326 326
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
The dependent variables consist of the answers to the general risk question elicited on an
11-point scale. The optimism measure LOT is the Life Orientation Test elicited in week 3.
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Table 3.A.12. Robustness check to Table 3.3 - continued: Alternative specications
showing the relationship between the general risk question and optimism controlling
for the risk conception questions.
Specication 2 General risk question
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Optimism (SOP - week 2) 0.442*** 0.130* 0.171** 0.442*** 0.433*** 0.345***
-0.092 -0.076 -0.076 -0.092 -0.089 -0.091
Risk - neg/pos 0.812*** 0.925***
-0.073 -0.068
Risk - stake size 0.130* -0.006
-0.067 -0.075
Risk - stake size (gains) 0.149** 0.376***
-0.067 -0.075
Risk - stake size (losses) -0.263*** -0.365***
-0.069 -0.073
Female -0.652*** -0.306 -0.338* -0.652*** -0.533** -0.624***
(0.242) (0.191) (0.195) (0.242) (0.235) (0.234)
IQ (Raven) -0.125** -0.140*** -0.123*** -0.125** -0.127** -0.153***
-0.058 -0.045 -0.046 -0.058 -0.056 -0.056
Constant 5.759*** 3.094*** 2.568*** 5.785*** 4.142*** 7.604***
(0.361) (0.537) (0.371) (0.478) (0.475) (0.508)
R2 0.093 0.452 0.422 0.093 0.157 0.156
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variables consist of the answers to the general risk question elicited on an 11-point
scale. The optimism measure SOP was elicited in week 2.
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Table 3.A.13. Robustness check to Table 3.3 - continued: Alternative specications
showing the relationship between the general risk question and optimism controlling
for the risk conception questions.
Specication 3 General risk question
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Optimism (LOT - week 2) 0.543*** 0.207** 0.241*** 0.543*** 0.530*** 0.451***
(0.111) (0.0904) (0.0916) (0.112) (0.108) (0.109)
Risk - neg/pos 0.804*** 0.922***
(0.073) (0.067)
Risk - stake size 0.128* -0.0114
(0.067) (0.075)
Risk - stake size (gains) 0.151** 0.375***
(0.066) (0.075)
Risk - stake size (losses) -0.264*** -0.377***
(0.069) (0.072)
Female -0.654*** -0.307 -0.338* -0.655*** -0.536** -0.624***
(0.242) (0.190) (0.194) (0.242) (0.234) (0.233)
IQ (Raven) -0.149** -0.150*** -0.133*** -0.149** -0.150*** -0.174***
(0.058) (0.046) (0.046) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056)
Constant 3.740*** 2.326*** 1.658*** 3.786*** 2.174*** 5.959***
(0.606) (0.651) (0.507) (0.680) (0.664) (0.722)
R2 0.094 0.456 0.425 0.094 0.158 0.163
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variables consist of the answers to the general risk question elicited on an 11-point
scale. The optimism measure LOT is the Life Orientation Test elicited in week 2.
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Table 3.A.14. Robustness check to Table 3.4:
Optimism and Risk taking behavior using each risk premium separately.
Risk premium choice list 1
(1) (2) (3)
Optimism (SOP) -0.104** -0.073*
(0.040) (0.041)
General risk question -0.087*** -0.077***
(0.023) (0.023)
Female 0.105 0.055 0.058
(0.103) (0.102) (0.102)
IQ (Raven) 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.070***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Constant -0.314** 0.131 0.136
(0.153) (0.203) (0.202)
R2 0.047 0.069 0.078
N 348 348 348
Risk premium choice list 2
(1) (2) (3)
Optimism (SOP) -0.067 -0.023
(0.041) (0.041)
General risk question -0.111*** -0.108***
(0.023) (0.023)
Female 0.354*** 0.288*** 0.289***
(0.105) (0.102) (0.102)
IQ (Raven) -0.026 -0.042* -0.049*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Constant -0.020 0.609*** 0.611***
(0.156) (0.203) (0.203)
R2 0.046 0.102 0.103
N 348 348 348
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;*** p < 0.01. Choice list 1
elicits the risk premium for a lottery with 25% chance
of receiving 15€ and 75% chance of receiving noth-
ing, while choice list 2 elicits the risk premium for a
lottery with 50% chance of receiving 15€. The depen-
dent variables are aggregates over measurements in
weeks 1 and 3.
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Table 3.A.15. Robustness check to Table 3.4 - continued:
Optimism and Risk taking behavior using each risk premium separately.
Risk premium choice list 3
(1) (2) (3)
Optimism (SOP) -0.073* -0.045
(0.040) (0.040)
General risk question -0.077*** -0.070***
(0.022) (0.023)
Female 0.640*** 0.596*** 0.597***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
IQ (Raven) -0.034 -0.045* -0.043*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant -0.168 0.242 0.245
(0.151) (0.199) (0.199)
R2 0.125 0.146 0.149
N 348 348 348
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Choice list 3
elicits the risk premium for a lottery with 75% chance
of receiving 15€ and 25% chance of receiving noth-
ing. The dependent variable is an aggregate overmea-
surements in week 1 and 3.
4Will you win? Optimism, risk
assessment and risk preferences
Joint work with Armin Falk, Thomas Dohmen and Simone Quercia
4.1 Introduction
Risk is a key feature of most economic decisions, be they investment decisions,
choosing a career, or buying a house. This ubiquity is reflected in the amount of
research concerning decision-making under risk. Regardless of whether decision-
making under risk is itself the object of study or whether another research sub-
ject just contains a risk element, a way of eliciting risk preferences is usually
needed. The measures available range from lottery choices to self-reported will-
ingness to rake risk.
However, convergent correlations between different measures are often low
(Frey et al., 2017). A possible explanation is that these measures differ in the
degree to which the underlying situation probabilities and outcomes are spelled
out. But even when different representations of risk contain the same “hard
facts”, can they evoke different responses. For example, Slovic (1987) show that
a frequentist representation (e.g., 1 in 10) may be perceived differently than a
probabilistic one (e.g., 10%). Similarly, framing may affect measured risk pref-
erences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
In this paper, we do not view such behavior as erratic but will argue that
heterogeneity in responses to different risk preference measures is explained
not only by differences in risk preferences in different scenarios but rather by
heterogeneity in another factor that affects the way people interpret risky situ-
ations.
To structure our line of argument we think of risk preference measurement
in terms of the following framework. Let risk preference measure R be the out-
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come of a function f(r,X) where r is a risk preference parameter that describes
a person’s taste for riskiness and X is a vector of other factors, part of which may
be systematic and part of which may be noise. We stay agnostic about the exact
content of X but will argue that amongst the elements of that vector there is one
that is captured by a novel measure that we introduce.
For this purpose we present evidence from a longitudinal laboratory experi-
ment with a total of 370 subjects. It introduces the “Will you win?” task showing
that even when a lottery is completely described and objective probabilities ex-
plicitly stated do people’s assessments of whether or not they will win the lottery
vary. The measure consists of subjects’ self-stated assessment of whether they
will win a 50-50 lottery on a scale from “absolutely sure to lose” to “absolutely
sure to win”. We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the responses to
that question. Moreover, that heterogeneity is systematic in the sense that it is
related to a stable character trait that but not to the transitory state of mood.
Responses to the “Will you win?” question exhibit strong correlations with
the standard risk preference measures we elicited. These range from rather cog-
nitive lists of lottery choices with a fully described and abstract choice environ-
ment, to the more affect-driven bomb risk elicitation task where probabilities
are known but lotteries not explicitly stated, to the general risk question that is
open to subjective interpretations of the task. Correlations between “Will you
win?” and risk preference measures are robust to including a rich set of control
variables, e.g., sociodemographics, cognitive ability, numeracy and optimism.
Several control tasks enable us to test the following possible channels that could
be driving these results.
A possible interpretation of our results would be that subjects exhibit het-
erogeneity in the way the process probabilities. The same objective probability
could always be perceived asmore likely by some people compared to others, i.e.,
some subjects could have a systematic bias in one or the other direction in the
way they process probabilities. We test this channel using a control task where
subjects estimate the number of balls in an urn (see Section 4.4.1). The mea-
sure generated from this task shows no systematic relationship with the “Will
you win?” task or measured risk preferences.
Another interpretation that our data allows us to explore is that the response
to the “Will you win?” question is related to the extent to which subjects violate
the axioms of expected utility theory and hence engage in probability weighting.
If this were the case, those who engage in probability weighting (e.g., exhibit
the common ratio effect) would also be more likely to exhibit a correlation be-
tween the “Will you win?” task and measured risk preferences. Again, there is
no compelling evidence that this is the case.
An alternative interpretation of the heterogeneity in subjects’ responses to
the “Will you win?” question would be that for risky situations that regard them-
selves, like the 50-50 lottery in that task, subjects hold beliefs that differ from
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objective probabilities, and that these beliefs differ systematically between sub-
jects. If this was the case, heterogeneity in beliefs may translate into heterogene-
ity in risk preference measures. We test whether subjects actually hold different
beliefs for events that concern themselves compared to general events in one of
our control tasks (see Section 4.4.3). Although this seems to be the case, we do
not find any systematic relationship between the measures elicited in the control
task and either the “Will you win?” task or measured risk preferences.
Since according to our data, none of the professed interpretations explains
our empirical findings regarding the “Will you win?” task, we propose another
explanation in Section 4.5; namely that responding that oneself is more likely
to win a 50-50 lottery is expressive of focusing on positive outcomes when con-
fronted with decision-making under risk rather than having a belief that differs
from 50% probability. This would be in line with the findings of a companion
paper (Dohmen et al., 2018b).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 contains the
design of our experiment. Section 4.3 presents its main results, while Section 4.4
presents evidence on specific channels that may be driving them and Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2 Design of the experiment
The following measures were elicited as part of a longitudinal experiment, tak-
ing place over the course of three consecutive weeks. The experiment is part of a
larger project on preferences and beliefs in the risk but also in the social domain.
In what follows we will focus on the risk domain and on those variables that are
of interest to the research question of this paper. For a complete overview of all
tasks refer to Table 4.A.1 in the appendix. The fact that the experiment runs over
several weeks and contains tasks from different domains that may serve as filler
tasks offers the advantage that potentially related measures can be elicited with
minimal influence on one another. For example, the “Will you win?” measure is
elicited in week 2, while lottery choice measures eliciting risk preferences are
elicited in weeks 1 and 3. Furthermore, some essential measures are repeated
to reduce measurement error.
4.2.1 Main measure: “Will you win?”
Amain contribution of the paper is that we introduce a novel non-choicemeasure
designed to capture subjects’ assessment of a risky situation.
In this measure, subjects are exposed to a risky situation; without having a
choice to opt in or out. They take part in a lottery with a 50% chance of winning
15 € and a 50% probability of getting nothing. Objective probabilities in this
setup are explicitly announced to subjects. Their task is to state whether they
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will win the lottery and receive 15€ or lose the lottery and receive nothing on an
11-point Likert scale ranging from “absolutely sure to lose” to “absolutely sure
to win”. The aim of this task is to measure to what extent subject’s assessment
of the likelihood of winning the lottery deviates from the middle option that we
interpret as the objective probability.
We elicit this in a verbal fashion rather than asking for a specific number.
This is done to evoke a subjective perception and to avoid subjects feeling the
need to “get it right”. Moreover, the task is unincentivized to avoid making risk
preferences a confounding factor by creating strong hedging motives for risk-
averse subjects. At the same time, monetary incentives might crowd out the
affective response we would like.
This measure is taken in the beginning of the second week such that it re-
mains uninfluenced by other risk belief measures.
4.2.2 Risk preference measures
We employ three different measures of risk preferences; risk premia of lotter-
ies, the general risk question, and the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET). These
measures differ along several dimensions, most importantly the degree of cogni-
tion involved in answering the task and how explicitly the choice environment
(probabilities and outcomes) is described.
4.2.2.1 General risk question
The first measure we employ is the general risk question (Dohmen et al., 2011)
as used in the German Socio-economic Panel (see for example Wagner et al.,
2007). It asks subjects to answer the following question on an 11-point Likert
scale: "Are you generally a person who is willing to take risks or do you try to
avoid taking risks?".
This measure offers scope for different interpretations of the question. For
example, there may be heterogeneity in what subjects think about concerning
stake size, or concerning gains and losses of risk taking (see Dohmen et al.,
2018b). Thus, the answer to this question may be influenced most strongly by
the way subjects tend to assess risky situations. To reduce measurement error
and to learn about test-retest stability, this measure was elicited in all three
weeks of the experiment.
4.2.2.2 Risk premia of lotteries
Eliciting the risk premium of a lottery is an established way to measure prefer-
ences over risk (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2011; Dohmen et al., 2011). An ad-
vantage of the method compared to many other lottery choice-based measures,
most prominently the one by Holt and Laury (2002), is that there is no need
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to make assumptions about the shape of the utility function. Instead it relies
on the classic definition of risk aversion based on mean-preserving spreads as
introduced by Stiglitz and Rothschild (1970).
To cover different ranges of probabilities we elicit the certainty equivalent of
three different lotteries: receiving a prize of 15€with 25%, 50%, and 75% prob-
ability, respectively, and receiving nothing otherwise. We do so using a choice
list format where subjects choose between the lottery and a certain payoff. In
addition, we elicit the difference in risk premia when both options are lotteries.
There is full information about the decision environment, i.e., objective prob-
abilities as well as outcomes for each lottery are explicitly stated. One row of one
choice list is randomly selected for payment if this part of the experiment is paid.
Refer to Section 4.A.2 in the appendix for a detailed description of the choice
lists.
To reduce measurement error, this measure was elicited in the first and third
week of the experiment. It was omitted, however, in the second week where the
“Will you win” measure was elicited to avoid the two influencing one another.
4.2.2.3 Bomb risk elicitation task
Our third measure of risk preferences is the dynamic version of the bomb risk
elicitation task (BRET; Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). This task aims at providing
a more affect-driven risk measure than lottery choices. Subjects express their
willingness to take risk in the following way. On the screen they see a 10-by-
10 grid of boxes, one of which is automatically collected each second. Subjects
receive 0.30 € per collected box. But one randomly placed box out of the 100
boxes contains a hidden “bomb” which reduces payment to 0 if collected. By
clicking on a stop button, subjects decide how many boxes they want to collect.
To avoid truncation of decisions, subjects are only informed at the end of the
session which box contained the bomb and whether they collected it. As each
collected box increases the potential payoff by 0.30 € as well as the probability
of receiving nothing by 1 percentage point, they essentially choose between
100 lotteries of the type 〈0.30€ ∗ x, (1− x)%; 0€,x%〉where x ∈ {1,2, ..., 100}
denotes the number of collected boxes. Thus, a risk-neutral agent should choose
x = 50, which yields an expected value of 15€, while a risk-averse agent should
choose 1≤ x < 50, and a risk loving one 50< x < 100. Detailed instructions and
control questions made sure that subjects understood the trade-off between the
increasing potential payoff and the increasing likelihood of collecting the bomb.
Although, same as in the choice list measures, there is full information about
all outcomes and their assigned probability, this is less obviously presented to
subjects. Thus, the task may provide larger scope for heterogeneity in assess-
ment of the risky situation than the choice list measures.
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4.2.3 Questionnaire
The questionnaire parts of the experiment include several variables that we will
use as control variables in the regression analyses. The character trait optimism
will be of particular importance. We elicit it using two different measures: the es-
tablished Life Orientation Test (henceforth LOT; Scheier et al., 1994; Herzberg
et al., 2006) and a very short two-item optimism measure (Kemper et al., 2015).
For the exact wording of both refer to Section 4.A.3 in the appendix. Similar to
Kemper et al. (2015), we find a convergent correlation between SOP and LOT
of ρ = .77 (Spearman correlation coefficient, p< .001, optimism measures ag-
gregated across weeks). In the main text of the paper, we restrict our analyses
to the SOP measure but results are virtually the same if LOT is used (see Sec-
tion 4.A.8).
Other relevant questionnaire measures include a mood measure both at the
beginning and end of each week’s experiment, a 15-item Big Five personality
inventory (Schupp and Gerlitz, 2008) as well as sociodemographic information.
Furthermore, we perform a detailed test of cognitive ability at the end of the
third week. Subjects’ numeracy regarding probabilities is tested using the Berlin
numeracy test (Cokely et al., 2012); an adaptive test containing three to four
math problems in text form.
4.2.4 Procedures
A total of 370 subjects participated in our experiment in the summer and fall of
2016. Participants were recruited from the BonnEconLab subject pool using the
software hroot (Bock et al., 2014). The vast majority of subjects were students
(95%), with mean age 22.3 years. The experiment was computerized using z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and took place over the course of three consecutive
weeks. Each week’s experiment lasted about one hour, during which subjects
completed several parts of the experiment that were clearly labeled as distinct.
Subjects were also informed that one randomly selected part per week would
be paid out. We chose this payment scheme to preclude hedging and to keep
the stakes within one part sizable enough for subjects to exert effort. Attrition
was kept at a low rate of 9% by rewarding subjects a bonus of 10 € if they
participated in all three weeks. On average, subjects received a total payoff of
31.99 € (about 35 US-$ at the time).
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 "Will you win?" measure
The implicit assumption of standard models of decision making under risk is
that subjects take objective probabilities at face value. This would mean that in
the ”Will you win?” measure, where subjects were asked to state how likely they
thought it was that they would win a 50-50 lottery on an 11-point Likert Scale,
everyone chooses the middle option. Interestingly, only about half the subjects
(52%) do. About 30% express that they are more likely to win than to lose a 50-
50 lottery, while 18% state the opposite (see Table 4.1). For the full distribution
refer to Figure 4.A.1 in the appendix.
Result 1. About half the subjects deviate from the middle option when asked to
assess their chances of winning a 50-50 lottery.
Table 4.1. ”Will you win?” measure: Answers on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from
"absolutely sure to lose" (-5) to "absolutely sure to win" (+5).
Losing more likely Middle option Winning more likely
(-5 to -1) (0) (+1 to +5)
Absolute frequency 64 182 103
Relative frequency 18% 52% 30%
The regression in Table 4.2 is constructed to understand whether the “Will
you win?” measure actually expresses a relatively stable trait-like tendency to
assess risk or whether it is rather influenced by subjects’ current state of mind.
For this purpose we regress “Will you win?” on two factors that may influence
beliefs: a stable character trait, optimism, and a more transitory state, mood.1
Specifications 1 and 2 regress “Will you win?” on optimism (without and with
controls). Specifications 3 and 4 do the same for mood. Although the coeffi-
cients on both optimism and mood are significantly different from zero in the
respective regressions, the explanatory power of optimism exceeds that of mood
in the simple regression (R2opt = .119 and R
2
mood = .019) as well as in the regres-
sion containing control variables (R2opt = .140 and R
2
mood = .029). More impor-
tantly, once both are included in the regression (specifications 5 and 6), only
the coefficient on optimism is sizable and significantly different from zero. This
1 In line with much of the personality psychology literature (Carver et al., 2010; Carver and
Scheier, 2014), we view optimism as a stable disposition akin to a personality trait affecting
beliefs in specific environments. One such environment may be decision-making under risk. The
finding of Felton et al. (2003) that optimism in males increases investment in stocks is in line
with that argument.
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Table 4.2. Explanatory variables of the ”Will you win?” measure
“Will you win?”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Optimism (SOP) 0.464*** 0.504*** 0.492*** 0.419***
(0.072) (0.074) (0.078) (0.091)
Mood (beginning week 2) 0.116** 0.115** 0.021 0.020
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
Female -0.232 -0.238 -0.234 -0.108
(0.198) (0.210) (0.199) (0.218)
Budget (in 100 €) 0.016 0.041 0.016 0.013
(0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Political Orientation 0.029 -0.007 0.028 0.038
(0.071) (0.075) (0.071) (0.073)
Cognitive ability (Raven) -0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.007
(0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048)
Numeracy 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.021
(0.094) (0.099) (0.094) (0.094)
Conscientiousness -0.017
(0.096)
Extraversion -0.007
(0.083)
Agreeableness 0.026
(0.107)
Neuroticism -0.159*
(0.086)
Openness 0.093
(0.078)
Constant -2.085*** -2.355*** -0.533* -0.599 -2.423*** -1.944*
(0.373) (0.567) (0.311) (0.538) (0.586) (1.073)
N 349 335 349 335 335 335
R2 0.106 0.132 0.019 0.029 0.133 0.146
Notes.OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Answers
to “Will you win?” measure (dependent variable) are on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from
"absolutely sure to lose" (-5) to "absolutely sure to win" (+5). The optimism measure consists
of the two-item SOP measure (7-point Likert scale). It is aggregated over measurements of
weeks 2 and 3. Current mood is elicited in the beginning of the experiment in week 2 on
an 11-point Likert scale. The Big Five measures were elicited in all three weeks. They are
aggregated over measurements of all three weeks. The control variables Female, Budget, and
Political Orientation were elicited in week 1. Throughout the paper we do not include age as a
control variable since its variation is limited in a student sample and estimates would hence
be strongly inuenced by outliers.
pattern is consistent with mood containing a stable component related to opti-
mism, but the transitory part of mood that remains once optimism is controlled
for not influencing the answers to the “Will you win?” question. The stable char-
4.3 Results | 103
acter trait optimism, however, seems to be systematically related to the “Will
you win?” measure. We interpret this as evidence for the measure expressing a
stable characteristic.
Result 2. Subjects’ assessment of their chances of winning a 50-50 lottery are
systematically related to a stable character trait.
4.3.2 Quantitative analysis: “Will you win?” measure and risk
preferences
4.3.2.1 Descriptive statistics - risk preference measures
General risk question. The first measure of risk preferences is the general risk
question. It was asked each week at the beginning of the experiment (with only
the mood measure preceding it). In Table 4.A.2 in the appendix we report sub-
jects’ answers in each week as well as an aggregate measure created by averag-
ing over all weeks. The answers in different weeks correlate significantly with
one another (Pearson correlation coefficient: ρ12 = .78, ρ23 = .80, ρ13 = .74,
p< .001 for all) indicating good test-retest reliability (see also Section 4.A.4.1
in the appendix). On average, subjects report a value of 5.195 on a Likert scale
ranging from 0 (not at all willing to take risks) to 10 (very willing to take risks).
This is consistent with values found in the German Socio-economic Panel for a
similar age group.2
Risk Premia. Our second measure of risk preferences consists of the risk pre-
mia of lotteries. For a detailed account of how these were calculated refer to
Section 4.A.2 in the appendix.
The means and standard deviations for subjects’ risk premia are reported
in Table 4.3 as aggregates over weeks 1 and 3. Pearson correlation coefficient
between the two measurements vary between ρ = .37 and ρ = .48 for the lot-
tery with 25% and that with 75% probability of winning, respectively (p< .001
for all). Note that a positive risk premium indicates risk aversion, while a neg-
ative risk premium indicates risk seekingness. In line with frequently observed
patterns of risk attitudes (Harbaugh et al., 2010), subjects on average engage
in risk seeking behavior when chances of winning are low (25%), while exhibit-
ing risk aversion for lotteries with 50% and 75% probability of winning 15 €.
When both options are lotteries with 50% probability attached to each outcome,
subjects are also risk averse. Refer to Figure 4.A.2 in the appendix for the exact
distributions.
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET). In this task subjects had to decide how
many out of 100 boxes to collect, with 50 boxes indicating risk neutrality.
2 The average answer to the general risk question reported by people born before 1993 and
after 1983 in the 2013 survey is 5.168.
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Table 4.3. Aggregate Risk Premia Elicited Through Choice Lists.
Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium
25% of 15 € 50% of 15 € 75% of 15 € Both Lotteries
Mean -1.74 0.11 1.33 1.86
SD (2.063) (2.108) (2.281) (1.843)
N 368 368 368 368
According to BRET, 62% of subjects are classified as risk averse, while 10%
are classified as risk-neutral, and 28% as risk-loving (see also Figure 4.A.4 in
the appendix).
4.3.2.2 Risk assessment and risk preferences
As a next step we examine the relationship between responses to the “‘Will you
win?” question and risk preference measures. If risk preference measures indeed
contained a component related to the assessment of the riskiness of a situation,
we would find that subjects expressing more optimistic views on their chances
of winning in the “Will you win?” question would also exhibit lower degrees of
risk aversion as measured by standard risk preference measures than those who
state the realistic middle option. Similarly, those expressing pessimistic views on
their chances of winning would exhibit the higher degrees of risk aversion. The
data reported in Table 4.4 shows just the expected pattern. Subjects who state
that they are more likely to lose the lottery in the “Will you win” question have an
average response of 4.315 on the scale from 0 to 10 for the general risk question,
while the response of subjects who think they are more likely to win is around
three-quarters of a standard deviation higher at 5.833 (significant difference;
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p< .0001). Similarly, subjects stating they are more
likely to lose the lottery exhibit significantly higher risk premia (i.e. more risk
aversion) than those who state they are more likely to win it for all three lotter-
ies (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests: p25 = .0069, p50 = .0295, and p75 = .0018.) The
same tendency is visible for the Bomb Risk Elicitation task (Wilcoxon rank-sum
test: p= .0671). For the choice list where both options are lotteries, however,
measured risk premia do not differ significantly between those subjects express-
ing they are more likely to lose and those expressing they are more likely to win
the 50-50 lottery (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p= .4197.)
The same relationship can be expressed in terms of a simple regression of
risk preference measures on “Will you win?” (see Table 4.5, Panel 1). The coef-
ficients on “Will you win?” are significantly different from zero for the general
risk question, risk premia elicited from choice lists and the Bomb Risk Elicitation
Task.
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Table 4.4. Measured risk preferences grouped by response to “Will you win?”.
"Will you win?" General risk Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium BRET
question 25% of 15 € 50% of 15 € 75% of 15 € Both Lotteries
Losing more likely Mean 4.315 -1.383 .558 2.184 2.238 -10.806
(-5 to -1) SD (1.993) (1.942) (2.021) (2.386) (1.933) (13.809)
N 64 64 64 64 64 62
Middle option Mean 5.071 -1.594 .076 1.190 1.633 -6.511
(0) SD (2.035) (1.987) (2.020) (2.259) (1.763) (-6.511)
N 182 181 181 181 181 176
Winning more likely Mean 5.833 -2.154 -.063 1.102 2.016 -6.236
(+1 to +5) SD (1.927) (2.181) (2.257) (2.173) (1.880) (15.813)
N 124 123 123 123 123 110
Notes. Risk preferencemeasures are aggregated overmultiplemeasurements when applicable, i.e., weeks 1 and 3 for choice
lists, and weeks 1, 2 and 3 for the general risk question.
Table 4.5. Linear Regressions of the Risk Preference Measures.
Panel 1: General risk Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium BRET
Simple Regression question 25% of 15 € 50% of 15 € 75% of 15 € Both Lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
”Will you win?” 0.349*** -0.150** -0.194*** -0.261*** -0.041 1.083**
(0.059) (0.061) (0.063) (0.068) (0.055) (0.471)
Constant 5.091*** -1.638*** 0.124 1.385*** 1.878*** -7.354***
(0.106) (0.108) (0.113) (0.120) (0.099) (0.827)
N 349 347 347 347 347 335
R2 0.091 0.017 0.027 0.041 0.002 0.016
Panel 2: General risk Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium BRET
Including controls question 25% of 15 € 50% of 15 € 75% of 15 € Both Lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
“Will you win?” 0.244*** -0.104 -0.147** -0.212*** -0.034 0.912*
(0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.068) (0.058) (0.503)
Female -0.570** 0.307 0.783*** 1.315*** 0.734*** -4.621**
(0.227) (0.228) (0.236) (0.245) (0.208) (1.808)
Budget (in 100 €) 0.085* 0.030 -0.008 -0.044 0.022 0.431
(0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.053) (0.045) (0.389)
Political orientation 0.119 -0.014 -0.148* -0.130 0.002 0.269
(0.082) (0.082) (0.085) (0.088) (0.075) (0.649)
Cognitive ability (Raven) -0.102* 0.134** -0.055 -0.068 -0.054 0.155
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.057) (0.049) (0.422)
Numeracy -0.050 0.139 0.098 -0.027 -0.071 -1.686**
(0.107) (0.108) (0.111) (0.115) (0.098) (0.852)
Optimism (SOP) 0.343*** -0.175* -0.086 -0.083 0.067 0.295
(0.090) (0.091) (0.094) (0.097) (0.083) (0.718)
Constant 3.706*** -1.974*** 0.583 1.923*** 1.463** -4.602
(0.667) (0.669) (0.692) (0.717) (0.610) (5.298)
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
R2 0.167 0.057 0.077 0.161 0.060 0.047
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Risk preference measures are aggre-
gated over multiple measurements when applicable, i.e., weeks 1 and 3 for choice lists, weeks 1, 2 and 3 for the general
risk question. “Will you win?” is elicited on an 11-point scale, while optimism is elicited on a 7-point scale. Cognitive ability
ranges from 0 to 10 correct answers, and numeracy from 0 to 4 points.
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Panel 2 shows the regression including various sociodemographic control
variables as well as measures of numeracy, fluid intelligence and optimism. The
purpose of this exercise is to examine whether the inclusion of control variables
lowers the explanatory power of responses to the “Will you win?” question for
risk preferences measures. As can be seen when comparing the coefficients on
“Will you win?” between Panel 1 and Panel 2, this is rarely the case. For the
risk premium measures as well as for BRET (columns 2, 3, 4, 6), they are not
significantly smaller when the aforementioned control variables are included
(χ2-test withH0 : βPanel 11 = β
Panel 2
1 ; p
25% = .3580, p50% = .2461, p75% = .2088,
pBRET = 0.371.
When considering the general risk question (column 1), however, the coeffi-
cient on “Will you win?” when including control variables is significantly smaller
((χ2-test with H0 : βPanel 11 = β
Panel 2
1 ; p= .0015) with optimism apparently ex-
plaining some of the variance in responses to the general risk question. Never-
theless, the coefficients on “Will you win?” are sizable for both specifications.
For example in Panel 2, an increase of 2 points on the 11-point Likert scale for
“Will you win?” would be comparable in size to the coefficient on gender.
These observations along with Result 2 are consistent with a framework as
we describe in the introduction where standard risk preference measures do
indeed contain a component beyond standard risk preference parameters.
Result 3. Measured risk preferences are correlated with responses to the “Will you
win?” measure.
4.4 Testing possible channels
In this section we will present additional measures that we elicited during our
experiment. Each is designed to test one of three related explanations for the
observed relationship between the “Will you win” measure and risk preference
measures. What these explanations have in common is that they relate to the
probabilities assigned to positive and negative outcomes of a lottery rather than
the outcomes themselves. The first explanation is that there is systematic hetero-
geneity in the way that subjects process probabilities. We examine this using a
choice-free measure of probability perception. The second measure is based on
lottery choices and elicits heterogeneity in how subjects weight probability. This
is done to understand whether the response to the “Will you win” question is
a manifestation of probability weighting. The third measure explores whether
subjects have systematically different beliefs about the riskiness of a situation
when that situation regards themselves compared to when it does not.
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4.4.1 Perception of probabilities - urns task
In this task we examine whether people differ systematically in the way they
process probabilities. Furthermore we want to learn whether such heterogene-
ity translates into heterogeneity in both the “Will you win?” measure and
risk preference measures. For example, someone who systematically perceived
their chances of winning as higher than they actually are would overstate their
chances of winning in the “Will you win?” task. Such a person would also overes-
timate their chances of winning in a lottery and as a result demand a higher risk
premium than someone who perceived probabilities realistically. Hence, the cor-
relation between reported chances of winning in the “Will you win?” task and
risk preference measures as we observe in the data.
The control task we report here aims to measure if and to what extent such
a systematic heterogeneity in the way that subjects process signals relating to
their chances of winning actually exists. In this task, subjects participate in a se-
ries of lotteries, for which objective probabilities exist but are not communicated
explicitly. Instead subjects are provided with a strong visual signal: the image of
an urn that they see for 1.5s. The urn contains 100 balls, each of which can be
either red or black (see Figure 4.1). Subjects receive 15€ if a red ball is drawn,
and nothing otherwise. Subjects’ task is to state their estimated chance of win-
ning the lottery. The idea of the task is that those with a disposition towards
perceiving their chances in lotteries more favorably, perceive signals of probabil-
ities more positively and, hence, state seeing a higher number of red balls. If the
urns task is selected for payment, either belief elicitation is paid or one of the
lotteries is played out (see Section 4.A.5 in the appendix for details).
The task consists of 29 trials organized in two blocks with different urns, con-
taining either a small, medium-sized, or large number of red balls, i.e., chance of
winning. The sequence, in which the urns appear, as well as the position of each
colored ball are pre-randomized and the same for all subjects. For an overview
of the number of correct balls in each urn refer to Table 4.A.3 in the appendix.
To be able to control for possible distortions during the visual perception of each
particular urn, there was an additional stage before the main task, in which sub-
jects estimated the number of red balls in each urn without any connotation of
lotteries or winning and losing. A description of how the data are aggregated
as well as detailed descriptive statistics can be found in Section 4.A.6 in the
appendix.
Our first observation is that subjects on average overstate the number of
balls both in stage 2 when they represent probabilities and in stage 1 when
they do not (see Table 4.6). However, on average they to do less so in stage 2
(significant difference; Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p< .0001). This could either
indicate that subjects estimate the number of red balls more realistically when
they represent probabilities or simply reflect learning over time.
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Figure 4.1. Exemplary urn. Each urn contains 100 balls and was shown for 1.5s.
Table 4.6. Urns task: Avg deviations from the correct answer
Stage 1 Stage 2 Dierence
(number of red balls) (chances of winning) (Stage 2 - Stage 1)
Mean 3.432 2.680 -0.728
SD 2.775 2.518 2.466
Notes.N= 349. Stage 1 and Stage 2 averages are signicantly dierent from 0
(t-tests: p < .0001 for both). Stage 1 and Stage 2 averages dier signicantly
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p < .0001).
If systematic misperception of probabilities manifested itself in stage 2 but
not in stage 1, the difference between them would be the appropriate measure
to capture that misperception. However, if it was captured by responses in both
stages, an aggregate measure of both would be preferable. We remain agnos-
tic about this issue and correlate both the difference and aggregate measures
with risk preference measures as well as the response to “‘Will you win?” (see
Table 4.7). For any of the two, we would expect a lower degree of risk aversion
(lower risk premia, higher response to the general risk question, more bombs
collected in BRET) and a more optimistic response to “Will you win?”(i.e., a
higher value), the more positively probabilities are perceived. Such a pattern is
neither visible for the difference measure nor for the aggregate measure. Corre-
lations are either not significantly different from 0 or do not go in the expected
direction. Hence, the urns task does not provide evidence that the correlation
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Table 4.7. Urns task: Correlations with average deviations from the true number
“Will you win?” General risk Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium BRET
question 25% of 15€ 50% of 15€ 75% of 15€ MPS
Stage 1 -0.085 0.006 0.053 0.047 0.168*** 0.068 0.092*
(number of red balls) (0.123) (0.912) (0.338) (0.396) (0.002) (0.215) (0.092)
Stage 2 -0.103* -0.033 0.082 0.057 0.113** 0.053 0.020
(chances of winning) (0.060) (0.542) (0.134) (0.300) (0.038) (0.329) (0.711)
Measure 1: Dierences -0.028 -0.047 0.002 -0.025 -0.093* -0.045 -0.097*
(Stage 2 - Stage 1) (0.605) (0.388) (0.971) (0.654) (0.089) (0.417) (0.076)
Measure 2: Aggregate -0.115** -0.027 0.057 0.039 0.150*** 0.055 0.071
(Avg (Stage 2, Stage 1)) (0.036) (0.627) (0.300) (0.477) (0.006) (0.316) (0.192)
Notes. Spearman rank-order correlation coecients. p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 335. Risk preference
measures are aggregated over multiple measurements when possible, i.e., weeks 1 and 3 for choice lists, and weeks 1, 2 and 3 for
the general risk question. All non-trivial trials are included in the average.
between “Will you win?” and risk preference measures is caused by systematic
misperception of probabilities.
4.4.2 Decision weights - the common ratio eect
The second control task tests whether subjects display a common ratio effect
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). It serves to understand whether there is a rela-
tionship between our findings with respect to the “Will you win?” question and
probability weighting.
This control task relies on a hypothetical-choice example in (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) but uses lower stakes that are actually paid out if this part is
chosen for payment. Subjects make two binary lottery choices in random order:3
• 16 € with 80% probability (A) versus 12 € for sure (B)
• 16 € with 20% probability (C) versus 12 € with 25% probability (D)
According to the substitution axiom that is part of expected utility theory, a
subject who prefers B over A (as 71% of our subject do), should also prefer D
over C because D= 14 ∗ B and C = 14 ∗ A. Violations of this axiom by choosing B
over A but C over D are known as the common ratio effect. This occurs for about
45% of subjects in our experiment, whereas 8% display the opposite pattern and
46%make consistent choices (see Table 4.8). These fractions are almost exactly
the same as in prior research (see, e.g., Carlin, 1992).
We now examine whether the correlation between “Will you win?” and risk
preference measures is caused by those subjects whose behavior violates the
substitution axiom of expected utility theory. Average responses to the “Will
you win?” question are slightly higher for subjects who violate the substitution
3 All lotteries were presented as “x1 euros with p% probability and x2 euros with 1− p% prob-
ability”.
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Table 4.8. Absolute number of subject displaying each choice pattern.
A (16€, p=.8) B (12€, p=1) Total
C (16€, p=.2) 74 157 231
D (12€, p=.25) 28 89 117
Total 102 246 348
Table 4.9. Correlations between “Will you win?” measure and risk preferences by type.
General risk Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium BRET
question 25% of 15€ 50% of 15€ 75% of 15€ MPS
Violate substitution 0.295*** -0.258*** -0.220*** -0.177** 0.006 0.088
axiom (0.0001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.018) (0.941) (0.244)
N 179 179 179 179 179 179
Consistent choices 0.289*** -0.026 -0.086 -0.217*** -0.039 0.122
(0.0001) (0.735) (0.267) (0.005) (0.620) (0.130)
N 170 168 168 168 168 156
All 0.289*** -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.187*** -0.009 0.106*
(0.0000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.0005) (0.870) (0.052)
N 349 347 347 347 347 335
Notes. Spearman correlation coecients. p-values in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Risk preference
measures are aggregated over multiple measurements when possible, i.e., weeks 1 and 3 for choice lists, weeks
1, 2 and 3 for the general risk question.
axiom than for those who make consistent choices (0.352 rather than 0.112),
but not significantly so (two-sided t-test: p= 0.205).4 However, for some risk
preference measures the correlations between “Will you win?” and the respec-
tive measure differ between those who violate the substitution axiom and those
who don’t. For lottery choices with a low and moderate chance of winning 15
€(p= 25% and p= 50%, respectively) the correlation with the “Will you win?”
measure seems to be driven mostly by those who violate the substitution axiom
(see Table 4.9), being much lower and insignificant for those who make consis-
tent choices. Correlations between the “Will you win?” measure and the general
risk question as well as the risk premium of the lottery with a 75% chance of
winning are similar for both groups of subjects.
4.4.3 Beliefs about personal risk - risk scenarios
The third explanation for the relationship between the “Will you win?” task
and risk preference measures is related to the idea that subjects may have sub-
stantially different beliefs about the probability of an event occurring when the
4 The results are quantitatively very similar if instead we classify subjects depending on
whether or not they display the common ratio effect.
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event concerns themselves compared to when it does not. If this were the case,
someone who systematically overestimates probabilities attached to positive out-
comes for themselves, would also overestimate both their chances of winning in
“Will you win?” as well as in tasks measuring risk preferences, leading to the ob-
served correlation between “Will you win?” and risk preference measures. For
this reasoning to apply there needs to be scope for beliefs to vary even when ob-
jective probabilities are given (as in the “Will you win?” question and certainty
equivalent elicitation). The heterogeneity in responses to the “Will you win?”
question (where probabilities are also stated explicitly) indicate that this may
be the true.
The following task is designed to test whether subjects indeed attach differ-
ent probabilities to events that concern themselves compared to those that do
not. Subjects are presented with descriptions of eight different real-world events.
For each scenario they sequentially state two probabilities: i) the probability of
the event happening to an average person (henceforth: general probabilities) and
ii) the probability of it happening to themselves (henceforth: personal probabil-
ities). For all scenarios objective probabilities exist (derived either from theory
or official statistics) but are unknown to subjects. Our measure of interest is the
difference between personal and general probabilities.
Some of the events presented in this task are completely exogenous in the
sense that outcomes cannot be influenced (e.g., "What are the chances of win-
ning any money at all in the lottery for the average person [if you played your-
self]?"). These scenarios provide the cleanest measure for how much subjects
think that personal probabilities differ from objective probabilities because com-
pletely rational subjects would state the same personal and general probabilities.
Other scenarios, for which it is reasonable that personal and general probabil-
ities differ due to heterogeneity in personal characteristics and behavior, were
included to provide more scope for heterogeneity in responses as these scenarios
make it easier for subjects to rationalize why probabilities for themselves may be
different. While we cannot incentivize questions about the personal probability,
we employ the same two-step procedure as described in Section 4.A.5 to elicit
beliefs between 0 and 100%. The risk scenarios are included at the end of the
first week to avoid interaction with other measures.
We will now present an overview of the descriptive statistics relating to this
task. For the full distribution of answers to each set of questions refer to Ta-
ble 4.A.5 in the appendix.
Subjects’ estimations of the general probabilities of the described event differ
substantially from the objective probabilities given by official statistics or theo-
retical calculations. But since estimations also differ substantially between the
eight scenarios, it is reasonable to assume that subjects exerted effort completing
the task despite its difficulty.
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On average, subjects over- rather than underestimate the general probability
for all events except one.5 This is the case for both positive and negative events
and is in line with the common observation that the likelihood of an event is
overestimated once it is brought to someone’s attention.
In line with the reasoning that people hold different beliefs about risky
situation when events concern themselves, subjects report significantly differ-
ent personal probabilities compared to the associated general probability for
all but one scenario (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: p1 < .001,p2 < .001,p3 <
.001,p4 < .001,p5 = .008,p6 = .530,p7 < .001,p8 < .001). Moreover, differ-
ences between personal and general probabilities correlate significantly with
one another for all but two items (see Table 4.A.6 in the appendix), thus
indicating that responses are systematic.
For further analysis we aggregate the data by reverse-coding negative events
and averaging over the ranks of the 8 items. This way we create three variables
“Avg. rank - general probability”, ”Avg. rank - personal probability”, and “Avg.
rank - difference” for each subject, with the latter being our main measure.6
A higher value indicates that higher probabilities are assigned to good events
and lower probabilities to bad events. The measure for the personal probability
created this way correlates significantly with both measures of optimism (Pear-
son correlation coefficients ρpers,LOT = .144, ρpers,SOP = .146, p-values .006 and
.005, respectively).
Next, we examine whether a heterogeneity in the extent to which subjects
over- or underestimate personal compared to general probabilities translates
into heterogeneity in responses to the “Will you win?” question and risk pref-
erence measures. In Table 4.10 we report correlations between the measures
elicited in the risk scenarios task and “Will you win?” as well as risk preferences.
We do not find any significant correlations that would serve as evidence for the
proposed channel.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a novel non-choice measure designed to cap-
ture the assessment of a risky situation: the “Will you win?” task. Subjects par-
ticipate in a lottery with a 50% chance of winning a prize and 50% chance of
receiving nothing. Their task is to state whether they will win or lose the lottery.
5 Subjects underestimate the probability of trains being on time by on average 67 percentage
points. This constitutes by far the largest average deviation from the true probability and may
have been caused by difficulties in understanding the wording of the question.
6 We use ranks instead of absolute values because the latter will differ by scenario depending
on the objective probability. Thus, using absolute values would give items with a higher variance
in answers more weight.
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Table 4.10. Correlations between stated probabilities, “Will you win?” and risk
preference measures.
Will you win? General risk Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium Dierence RP BRET
question 25% of 15€ 50% of 15€ 75% of 15€ Both Lotteries
“Risk scenarios: -0.042 0.033 0.008 0.027 0.078 -0.015 -0.004
dierence” (0.431) (0.525) (0.881) (0.601) (0.136) (0.769) (0.946)
“Risk scenarios: 0.011 -0.010 0.003 -0.022 0.033 0.006 -0.011
general prob.” (0.838) (0.856) (0.951) (0.671) (0.525) (0.912) (0.837)
“Risk scenarios: 0.046 -0.079 0.011 -0.066 -0.041 0.046 -0.036
personal prob.” (0.390) (0.131) (0.835) (0.210) (0.431) (0.378) (0.499)
Notes. Spearman rank-order correlation coecients. N = 347 for column 1. N = 368 for columns 2 to 5. N = 348 for column 6. p-
values in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Risk preference measures are aggregated over multiple measurements
when possible, i.e., weeks 1 and 3 for choice lists, weeks 1, 2 and 3 for the general risk question. “Risk scenarios - general”
refers to the aggregate rank of answers to the assessment of the general probability or average person. “Risk scenarios -
personal” refers to the aggregate rank of answers to the assessment of the probability for oneself. “Risk scenarios - dierence”
refers to the aggregate rank of the dierence between the two.
About half (48%) of our subjects state either that losing is more likely or that
winning is more likely. We consider these responses to be systematic since they
are related to a stable character trait, optimism, but not to the more transitory
state of mood.
The “Will youwin?”measure correlates with responses to standardmeasures
of risk preferences like the risk premia of lotteries. This is the case even when
control variables such as gender, cognitive ability and optimism are included in
the regression. As the measure may invoke the need to state the middle option
in the “Will you win?” question, what we find is most likely a lower bound of
the influence of assessment of risk on risk preferences.
Several explanations for the close relationship between the “Will you win?”
measure and measured risk preferences are possible. For example, people could
process probabilities in systematically different ways or have different beliefs
about the riskiness of a situation when it regards themselves compared to when
it does not, or probability weighting could matter. We use different control tasks
to test these three different channels but do not find evidence that any of the
three plays a decisive role.
While the control tasks all target explanations relating to probabilities, it is
conceivable that channels relating to outcomes explain our finding. In a com-
panion paper based on the same data set (Dohmen et al., 2018b) we argue that
there is systematic heterogeneity in whether people focus on the positive or neg-
atives aspects of risk taking and that this affects decision-making under risk as
well as responses to the general risk question. If such a tendency also manifested
itself in responses to the “Will you win?” question, i.e., subjects who tend to fo-
cus on the positive aspects of risk stated they were more likely to win than to
lose a 50-50 lottery, it may explain the correlation between the “Will you win?”
and risk preference measures.
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4.A Appendix to Chapter 4
4.A.1 Full study
Table 4.A.1. Overview of all task participants completed.
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
Mood Question Mood Question Mood Question
General Risk Question General Risk Question General Risk Question
Big Five Big Five Big Five
Trust Question Locus of Control
Binary Trust Game: Treatments Binary Trust Game: Treatments
Risk Premia (Choice Lists) “Will you win?” task Risk Premia (Choice Lists)
Risk Scenarios Urns Task Common Ratio Eect
Bet: Heads or Tails? BRET
Ambiguity preferences and Beliefs
Sociodemographics Optimism: LOT and SOP Optimism: LOT and SOP
IQ
Mood Question Mood Question Mood Question
Notes. For detailed information on the tasks not described in this paper refer to Dohmen et al. (2018a)
and Dohmen et al. (2018b)
4.A.2 Details on risk preference elicitation using choice lists
In this task subjects are presented with four lists containing several choices be-
tween a fixed lottery and either a certain amount (tables 1 to 3) or another
lottery (tables 4). The left-hand side of each table stays constant across rows.
The right-hand side of each table contains a dominated option in the first row
so that subjects should always choose the left-hand side if they have preferences
that are increasing in money. The payoffs on the right-hand side then increase by
0.50€ per row, making it gradually more attractive so that subjects will switch
at some point. Since there are four tables of around 20 rows each, clicking each
row would be quite tedious. Thus, once a subject switches, the remaining rows
are automatically filled out. Subjects are aware, however, that they can revise
their choices as long as they have not moved on to the next screen.
For each choice list and subject we observe a switching row. To generate a
measure of risk preferences that is comparable across tables, we calculate the risk
premium RP from this switching row (RP= EV − (CEswitch − 0.25€), where EV
is the expected value of the lottery on the left hand side of the table, and CEswitch
is the lowest safe option the subject prefers to that lottery). The expected value
on the right hand side increases by 0.50€ in each row. Due to the discreteness of
the measure ”switching row”, we cannot technically observe indifference. Thus,
we assume that the point of indifference between the lottery and the safe option
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is right between the last row subjects choose the lottery and the first row they
choose the safe option. This means we have to subtract 0.25€ from CEswitch. The
procedure for the fourth choice list where both options are lotteries is analogous,
just that CEswitch is substituted by the expected value of the lottery on the right
hand side of the table.
Tables 1 to 3 elicit the certainty equivalents of lotteries paying 15€ with
25%, 50%, and 75% probability, respectively and nothing otherwise. Table 4
elicits the difference in risk premia demanded for a lottery paying 3€ or 22€
with 50% probability each and a lottery paying 3€ or 7€ with 50% probability
each.
4.A.3 Optimism measures
4.A.3.1 LOT-R
For validation of the German version we used refer to Herzberg et al. (2006).
English version by Scheier et al. (1994): Please state to what extent your opin-
ion agrees with the following statements (7 point Likert Scale from “does not
apply to me at all” to “applies to me exactly” ).
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
2. It’s easy for me to relax.
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will. (R)
4. I’m always optimistic about my future.
5. I enjoy my friends a lot.
6. It’s important for me to keep busy.
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way. (R)
8. I don’t get upset too easily.
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me. (R)
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.
Items marked with (R) are reverse-scaled, while items 2, 5, 6 and 8 are
fillers.
4.A.3.2 SOP
The SOP questionnaire (Kemper et al., 2015) consists of two items eliciting self-
reported degrees of optimism and pessimism on a 7-point Likert scale.
1. Optimists are people who look to the future with confidence and who
mostly expect good things to happen. How would you describe yourself?
How optimistic are you in general?
2. Pessimists are people who are full of doubt when they look to the future
and who mostly expect bad things to happen. How would you describe
yourself? How pessimistic are you in general?
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4.A.4 Additional descriptive statistics
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Figure 4.A.1. Answers to the “Will you win?” question.
4.A.4.1 Risk preference measures
Table 4.A.2. General Risk Question.
Aggregate Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
Mean 5.195 5.185 5.135 5.201
SD (2.055) (2.222) (2.186) (2.208)
25th Percentile 3.333 3 3 3
Median 5.333 5 5 5
75th Percentile 6.667 7 7 7
N 370 368 349 348
Notes. The general risk question asks subjects “Are you gener-
ally a person who is willing to take risks or do you try to avoid
taking risks?” on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all willing
to take risk) to 10 (very willing to take risk).
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Figure 4.A.2. Distributions of risk premia including a kernel density estimation.
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Figure 4.A.3. Answers to the general risk question (aggregated over measurement in
three subsequent weeks).
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Figure 4.A.4. Answers to the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET).
4.A.5 Belief elicitation procedure (urns task and risk scenarios)
In both tasks, we employ the same two-step procedure to elicit beliefs about the
respective probability between 0 and 100%, i.e, winning the lottery, the event in
a specific risk scenario, respectively (or the number of red balls between 0 and
100 in the first stag of the urns task). The procedure is designed to encourage
subjects to exert effort while still eliciting a fine enough measure. In the first
step subjects are asked to choose between 10 intervals (0-9; 10-19; etc.). If the
true value lies in that interval, they receive 1€. In the second step the interval
is "zoomed into". For example, if a subject chose "10-19", she is asked to choose
between the values in that interval (10, 11, etc.). If she chooses correctly, she
receives another 1€. Such a procedure ensures incentive-compatibility as long
as we assume beliefs to be symmetrically distributed around their modal value.
4.A.6 Details on urns task
The complete list of the number of red balls, i.e., the probability of winning the
lottery in stage 2, is presented in Table 4.A.3. There were five urns that contained
very few balls of one color (5 or less) such that stating the right number of red
balls is trivial for any subject paying attention to the task. These were included
as an indicator of whether subjects took the task seriously. The share of answers
within an interval of 1 below or above the correct answer is between 92.8% and
98.6% for these urns in stage 1 and between 96.0% and 99.4% in stage 2. We
will not use those trials in further analyses since i) there is very little variation in
answers and ii) with the correct answers being close to the boundaries possible
answers are effectively censored.
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Table 4.A.3. Urns task - Correct solutions for each urn.
Number of red balls
Urn 1 81 Urn 6 25 Urn 11 50
Urn 2 78 Urn 7 81 Urn 12 64
Urn 3 97 Urn 8 22 Urn 13 81
Urn 4 25 Urn 9 19 Urn 14 36
Urn 5 3 Urn 10 5 Urn 15 1
Urn 16 53 Urn 21 25 Urn 26 50
Urn 17 64 Urn 22 61 Urn 27 84
Urn 18 64 Urn 23 50 Urn 28 3
Urn 19 30 Urn 24 75 Urn 29 28
Urn 20 47 Urn 25 67
It seems that some subjects inverted the colors when answering, e.g. stated
95 when they saw 5 red balls, thus generating large outliers. To reduce some of
the noise generated this way, we exclude answers for which the stated number
differs by more than 50 from the correct number in the following analyses. This
amounts to 3.3% and 0.08% of answers for stage 1 and stage 2, respectively.
We classify all remaining observations by the number of red balls into “low
probability” (19 - 30 red balls), “medium probability” (36 - 67 red balls), and
“high probability” (75 - 84 red balls) and report descriptive statistics by category
in Table 4.A.4.
When there is a medium or high share of red balls, subjects on average over-
state the number of balls both in stage 2 when they represent probabilities and
in stage 1 when they do not (see Table 4.A.4). However, they tend to do less
so in stage 2. Average answers between stage 2 and stage 1 differ significantly
for the low and medium probability category as well as when aggregating over
all trials, but not for the high probability category (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:
plow < .0001, pmed = .0004, phigh = .674,and pall < .0001, respectively).
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Table 4.A.4. Urns task: Avg deviations from the correct answer by category.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Dierence
(number of red balls) (chances of winning) (Stage 2 - Stage 1)
Low Probability Mean 0.932 -0.503 -1.517
SD 5.977 5.331 6.147
Min -12.3 -11.0 -25.0
Max 29.7 23.6 22.3
Medium Probability Mean 5.803 5.064 -0.735
SD 4.191 4.437 3.842
Min -6.4 -6.5 -12.9
Max 20.6 20.0 14.3
High Probability Mean 2.261 2.417 0.118
SD 3.491 3.592 3.353
Min -20.0 -28.2 -15.7
Max 9.5 9.3 12.7
All (except “Trivial”) Mean 3.432 2.680 -0.728
SD 2.775 2.518 2.466
Min -5.5 -5.3 -8.8
Max 15.9 9.4 6.6
Notes. N = 349. All stage 1 averages are signicantly dierent from 0 (t-tests: plow = .004, pmed <
.0001, phigh < .0001, and pall < .0001, respectively). All stage 2 averages except for category “low
probability are signicantly dierent from 0 (t-tests: plow = .079, pmed < .0001, phigh < .0001, and
pall < .0001, respectively).
4.A.7 Details on risk scenarios
Find below the wording of the Risk Scenarios (translated from German). The
question for the probability in general (or for the average person) is listed as (a),
with the correct answer from official statistics or theory rounded to the nearest
integer in parentheses. The question for the personal probability is listed as (b).
Question 1 (a) For an average person, what is the probability in percent, that they
suffer from an accident within the course of one year? Accidents
are defined sudden events that cause an injury or another health
impairment (e.g., a concussion due to falling). The data refers to
Germany in 2013.(1%)
(b) How do you rate the probability to suffer from an accident yourself
(for the next year)?
Question 2 (a) What is the probability in percent that an average marriage is di-
vorced within 25 years? The data refer to divorce in Germany in
2013. (36%)
(b) How do you rate the probability of divorce within 25 years of mar-
riage for yourself?
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Question 3 (a) What is the probability in percent that an average person that is
registered as unemployed and has tertiary education starts a new
job withing one month? The data refer to Germany in 2011. (10%)
(b) How do you rate this probability for yourself, should you become
unemployed?
Question 4 (a) What is the probability that a long-distance train in Germany reaches
a train station on time? The value refers to passenger transportation
of Deutsche Bahn in the first half of 2015 and a delay of at most 5
mins and 59 s. (79%)
(b) How do you rate the probability that a long-distance train in Ger-
many is on time if you take the train yourself?
Question 5 (a) What is the probability in percent that an average suffers from ap-
pendicitis within their life-time? (8%)
(b) How do you rate the probability that you suffer from appendicitis
yourself within your life-time?
Question 6 (a) What is the probability in percent that there is no rain in Siebenge-
birge near Bonn on an arbitrary day? The value refers to days with
0mm precipitation between March and May 2015.(18%)
(b) How do you rate the probability that there is no rain in Spring (March
to May) on an arbitrary day, if you visit this area yourself?
Question 7 (a) What is the probability of winning anything (regardless of the
amount) when participating in the lottery (6 out of 49) once?(3%)
(b) How do you rate the probability of winning anything (regardless of
the amount) when participating in the lottery (6 out of 49) if you
played the lottery once?
Question 8 (a) Given someone in Bonn becomes the victim of a damage to property
and reports this crime to the police, what is the probability that the
case is solved? The data refer to 2015. (18%)
(b) How do you rate the probability that the case is solved, if you yourself
reported a damage of property to the police?
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Table 4.A.5. Descriptive statistics for risk scenarios.
Percentiles
Mean Std Dev 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Q1 True 1
General probability 41.6 24.1 12 22 37 63 76
Personal probability 52.0 17.1 30 40 51.5 65.5 76
Dierence 10.4 27.6 -29 -8 13 29.5 43
Q2 True 36
General probability 50.8 22.9 18 32 53.5 69 78
Personal probability 59.0 21.2 28 43 62.5 75 87
Dierence 8.1 32.0 -36 -13 9 32 48
Q3 True 10
General probability 35.3 20.0 10 22 32.5 49 65
Personal probability 47.3 22.2 20 31.5 45 64 77
Dierence 12.0 30.2 -29 -9 10 36 50
Q4 True 79
General probability 12.0 16.4 0 1 7 14 34
Personal probability 32.3 21.7 10 15 27 44 66
Dierence 20.3 25.7 -6 7 18 33 55
Q5 True 8
General probability 32.7 23.6 8 13 26 48.5 68
Personal probability 28.1 23.1 2 10 22 45 60
Dierence -4.6 31.0 -44 -23 -3 14 34
Q6 True 18
General probability 54.9 27.3 15 32 56 78 89
Personal probability 53.6 24.0 20 35 55 74 86
Dierence -1.3 35.4 -50 -23.5 -3.5 24.5 45
Q7 True 3
General probability 35.3 27.6 7 15 27 50 82
Personal probability 50.9 25.1 20 31.5 50 69 85
Dierence 15.6 38.2 -35 -9 18 45 62
Q8 True 18
General probability 11.0 15.6 0 1 5 13 30
Personal probability 30.1 21.9 5 12 25 43 65
Dierence 19.2 25.7 -9 5 18 33 53
Notes. N = 368. ”Dierence = Personal probability - general probability” for each
subject.
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Table 4.A.6. Inter-item correlations for “Risk scenarios - dierence”.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7
Q2 0.211
(0.000)
Q3 0.208 0.086
(0.000) (0.102)
Q4 -0.016 -0.108 -0.030
(0.761) (0.039) (0.565)
Q5 0.520 0.170 0.188 0.057
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.278)
Q6 0.172 0.642 0.047 -0.001 0.184
(0.001) (0.000) (0.376) (0.990) (0.000)
Q7 0.194 0.055 0.706 -0.001 0.201 0.086
(0.000) (0.294) (0.000) (0.990) (0.000) (0.103)
Q8 -0.019 -0.164 -0.072 0.856 0.007 -0.041 -0.009
(0.721) (0.002) (0.173) (0.000) (0.893) (0.440) (0.865)
Notes. Spearman (rank-order) correlation coecients. p-values in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 368.“Dierence = Per-
sonal probability - general probability” for each subject.
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4.A.8 Robustness of the analyses to using another optimism measure
Table 4.A.7. Robustness Check to Table 4.2: Explanatories of the ”Will you win?” measure.
“Will you win?”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Optimism (LOT) 0.600*** 0.628*** 0.615*** 0.544***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.094) (0.108)
Mood (beginning week 2) 0.116** 0.115** 0.019 0.020
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Female -0.234 -0.238 -0.236 -0.096
(0.197) (0.210) (0.198) (0.217)
Budget (in 100€) 0.003 0.041 0.003 0.004
(0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Political Orientation 0.020 -0.007 0.020 0.033
(0.071) (0.075) (0.071) (0.073)
Cognitive ability (Raven) -0.027 0.002 -0.028 -0.021
(0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047)
Numeracy 0.038 0.024 0.037 0.034
(0.093) (0.099) (0.093) (0.094)
Conscientiousness -0.089
(0.096)
Extraversion 0.031
(0.080)
Agreeableness -0.0001
(0.107)
Neuroticism -0.132
(0.087)
Openness 0.115
(0.077)
Constant -2.612*** -2.669*** -0.533* -0.599 -2.725*** -2.258**
(0.425) (0.587) (0.311) (0.538) (0.603) (1.075)
N 349 335 349 335 335 335
R2 0.119 0.140 0.019 0.029 0.140 0.156
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Answers to “Will you
win?” measure (dependent variable) are on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from "absolutely
sure to lose" (-5) to "absolutely sure to win" (+5). The optimism measure consists of the Life
Orientation test (LOT-R) on a 7-point Likert scale. It is aggregated overmeasurements of weeks
2 and 3. Current mood is elicited in the beginning of the experiment in week 2 on an 11-point
Likert scale. The Big Five measures were elicited in all three weeks. They are aggregated over
measurements of all three weeks. The control variables Female, Budget, and Political Orienta-
tion were elicited in week 1. Throughout the paper we do not include age as a control variable
since its variation is limited in a student sample and estimates would hence be strongly in-
uenced by outliers.
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Table 4.A.8. Robustness Check to Table 4.5: Linear Regressions of the Risk Preference
Measures.
Panel 1: General risk Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium Dierence RP BRET
Simple Regression question 25% of 15€ 50% of 15€ 75% of 15€ Both Lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
”Will you win?” 0.349*** -0.150** -0.194*** -0.261*** -0.041 1.083**
(0.059) (0.061) (0.063) (0.068) (0.055) (0.471)
Constant 5.091*** -1.638*** 0.124 1.385*** 1.878*** -7.354***
(0.106) (0.108) (0.113) (0.120) (0.099) (0.827)
N 349 347 347 347 347 335
R2 0.091 0.017 0.027 0.041 0.002 0.016
Panel 2: General risk Risk Premium Risk Premium Risk Premium Dierence RP BRET
Including controls question 25% of 15€ 50% of 15€ 75% of 15€ Both Lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
“Will you win?” 0.249*** -0.122* -0.139** -0.215*** -0.031 0.906*
(0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.068) (0.058) (0.505)
Female -0.570** 0.303 0.786*** 1.315*** 0.734*** -4.624**
(0.228) (0.229) (0.236) (0.245) (0.208) (1.808)
Budget (in 100 €) 0.079 0.030 -0.004 -0.043 0.022 0.423
(0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.053) (0.045) (0.391)
Political orientation 0.111 -0.007 -0.148* -0.128 0.000 0.265
(0.082) (0.082) (0.085) (0.088) (0.075) (0.648)
Cognitive ability (Raven) -0.115** 0.136** -0.049 -0.066 -0.056 0.141
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.057) (0.049) (0.424)
Numeracy -0.041 0.136 0.095 -0.029 -0.069 -1.677*
(0.108) (0.108) (0.111) (0.115) (0.098) (0.853)
Optimism (LOT) 0.379*** -0.123 -0.136 -0.083 0.065 0.377
(0.110) (0.111) (0.114) (0.118) (0.101) (0.873)
Constant 3.701*** -2.283*** 0.761 1.887** 1.499** -4.828
(0.699) (0.701) (0.722) (0.749) (0.637) (5.534)
N 335 335 335 335 335 335
R2 0.160 0.050 0.078 0.160 0.059 0.047
Notes. OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Risk preference measures are
aggregated over multiple measurements when applicable, i.e., weeks 1 and 3 for choice lists, weeks 1, 2 and 3 for
the general risk question. “Will you win?” is elicited on an 11-point scale, while optimism is elicited on a 7-point
scale. Cognitive ability ranges from 0 to 10 correct answers, and numeracy from 0 to 4 points.
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5Knowing who you are: Salience of
own preferences and the
consensus eect
Joint work with Thomas Dohmen and Simone Quercia
5.1 Introduction
The term consensus effect refers to an egocentric tendency in assessing and pre-
dicting others’ actions or preferences. This phenomenon is typically identified
empirically as a correlation between personal characteristics and beliefs about
the same characteristics in others. This correlation has been documented in sev-
eral domains in social psychology (see, e.g., Mullen et al., 1985) and in eco-
nomics (see, e.g., Blanco et al., 2014). Early literature in social psychology in-
terpreted this as a cognitive bias and referred to it as a false consensus effect.
However, it has been noted that it is rational for an individual to take informa-
tion about themselves into account when making inferences about a population
if the individual is part of that population (Dawes, 1989).
One important question which we tackle in this paper is under which condi-
tions people take such information about themselves into account when making
inferences about other people. From a rational point of view, individuals should
know their preferences and holding everything else constant should always give
the same weight to their own “type”. However, there is evidence that with re-
spect to information about others people are very sensitive to the way informa-
tion is presented (Engelmann and Strobel, 2012). If information about others is
particularly prominent or salient, they oversample that information and under-
sample information about themselves. But if a little cognitive effort is required
to retrieve the same information about others, the opposite is true, i.e., people
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undersample that information. This suggests that salience of available informa-
tion is crucial in determining how beliefs are formed.1
In this paper we advance the hypothesis that people are also sensitive to
the salience of information about their own type. This is particularly important
when agents need to form a belief in environments where little or no informa-
tion about others is available. Salience of their own type is not usually reflected
in economics models of decision-making where instead agents know their own
preferences with certainty. A more realistic assumption may be that people are
not always completely aware of their preferences. This awareness may depend
on the extent to which the decision environment favors the emergence of salient
information about own preferences. Take social media as an example decision
environment: Users are continuously invited to share information about them-
selves, thus making their own type very prominent. If our conjecture is correct,
this extreme focus on themselves will cause users to use their own “type” exten-
sively when making inferences about others. This may intensify polarization in
social media.2
To examine this question we conduct a longitudinal laboratory experiment,
in which we exogenously vary the salience of individual preferences in a binary
trust game. In this game, a first mover decides whether to trust and expose
themselves to a socially risky situation or not to trust and get a safe payoff. If
they trust, a second mover can decide to reciprocate trust splitting the efficiency
gains from trust or to betray and leave the first mover with less than their safe
outcome from not trusting. In our experiment, subjects play both roles in the
trust game and state their beliefs about strategies of other participants playing
as second movers. As second-mover actions do not involve strategic uncertainty
we interpret them as a pure measure of preferences. To influence the degree of
salience of own preferences we use two main manipulations: first we vary the
order in which beliefs and preferences are elicited and second we vary the time
in which they are elicited measuring them either in the same session or two
weeks apart.
1 Note that the notion of beliefs that we employ here differs from that in a game-theoretical
sense where in equilibrium beliefs are always equal to objective probabilities and adjust instanta-
neously if new information becomes available. Such a definition leaves no scope for a consensus ef-
fect. In contrast, we consider a belief to be the subjective probability assessment a decision maker
holds and which experimenters can measure independently frommeasuring behavior. Such an as-
sessment exists even in the absence of information and can be sticky, i.e., does not adjust fully and
instantaneously once additional information is revealed. A similar notion of beliefs is postulated
in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) and employed by Blanco et al. (2014).
2 Another common explanation for polarization in social media is the existence of echo cham-
bers, that is, the fact that people can self-select into groups of like-minded people and neglect
that this is an endogenously selected sample (Enke and Zimmermann, 2018).
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We find that both order and time of measurement substantially affect the
strength of a consensus effect. A large and significant correlation between pref-
erences and beliefs is found when beliefs are elicited directly following prefer-
ence elicitation (the setup that has been used most frequently in prior studies).
If, however, the order is switched or measurement takes place in different ses-
sions, the correlation is much smaller. This is in line with the interpretation that
the consensus effect is largely driven by salience of individuals’ own preferences.
Therefore, institutional arrangements that foster egocentricity, for example re-
peatedly sharing information or focusing on about oneself, may increase the
extent to which people believe others to be like themselves.
Our paper contributes to an extensive literature on the consensus effect (see
Mullen et al. (1985) who provide an influential meta-study of 115 studies and
Bazinger and Kühberger (2012) a more recent overview).3 Although a consen-
sus effect has been found across different domains (Mullen et al., 1985), we
focus our attention on the domain of strategic interaction. This setting is partic-
ularly interesting for several reasons. First, in such a setting forming a correct
belief has a specific monetary value beyond the psychological benefits that may
come from agreeing with other people. Examples include business interactions
like negotiations or auctions. Second, the setup allows us to elicit revealed pref-
erences via incentivizing choices using the strategy method (Selten, 1965). This
would not be possible in less stylized settings such as eliciting political or reli-
gious preferences. Finally, a large portion of economic studies on the consensus
effect have used social dilemmas and this allows us to compare our results with
theirs.
The first of these studies to explicitly examine the consensus effect in eco-
nomics was the one by Offerman et al. (1996) who provide evidence for a con-
sensus effect in public goods games.4 Engelmann and Strobel (2000) use a wide
variety of different choices and tastes. They explicitly distinguish between a con-
sensus effect and a truly false consensus effect where information about the self
is overweighed compared to information about others. Their study attests the
presence of a consensus effect but reject the presence of a false consensus effect.
Further evidence for the existence of a consensus effect has been provided for
the trust game (Altmann et al., 2008), the sequential prisoner’s dilemma (Blanco
et al., 2011, 2014;Miettinen et al., 2017) and the leader-follower game (Gächter
et al., 2012). The most telling evidence, comes from Blanco et al. (2014) who
are the first to explicitly elicit beliefs about second-mover actions and show that
these are influenced by subjects’ own second-mover actions. However, all men-
3 Another term for this phenomenon that highlights the mechanism rather than its effect is
social projection (see, e.g., Bazinger and Kühberger, 2012).
4 Correlations between preferences and beliefs in social dilemmas have been documented first
in papers whose main objective was not to investigate the consensus effect (Jacobsen and Sadrieh,
1996; Selten and Ockenfels, 1998; Charness and Grosskopf, 2001).
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tioned economics studies rely on elicitation of preferences and beliefs in the
same session, with beliefs being elicited after preference elicitation, a setup
where subjects’ own types are extremely salient. It is unclear whether similar
effects would have been found, had subjects’ own types been less salient. In this
paper we address this question explicitly.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes
the design and procedural details of our experiment. Section 5.3 derives testable
hypotheses from different sets of assumptions on the consensus effect. The re-
sults of the experiment are presented and contrasted with the hypotheses in
Section 5.4, while Section 5.5 discusses implications and alternative explana-
tions and concludes.
5.2 Design and procedures of the experiment
The data presented were gathered as part of a longitudinal experiment in which
participants were invited to take part in three sessions over three consecutive
weeks. The whole experiment included measures on the relation between pref-
erences and beliefs in different domains. A complete overview of all tasks and
the order in which they were administered is provided in Table 5.A.5 of the ap-
pendix. In the main text of the paper we describe the relevant measures for the
research question of this paper. In particular, we present four between-subject
treatments constituting a 2× 2 design. Importantly, these were the only treat-
ment variations in the longitudinal experiment and all elicitations of additional
measures were constant across the four treatments.
5.2.1 The binary trust game
As a workhorse to examine our research question, we use the binary trust game
shown in Figure 5.1. In this game, a first mover chooses between actions “OUT”
and “IN”. If they choose “OUT”, the payoff for both players is 10 €, regardless
of the second mover’s action. If they choose “IN”, there is an efficiency gain and
players’ payoffs depend on the second mover’s choice who can decide whether
to distribute the payoffs equally (“Option B” yielding 15€ for each player), or to
keep more for themselves (“Option A” yielding payoffs of 8 € to the first mover
and 22 € for the second mover).
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for self-interested players is (“OUT”,
“Option A”). However, joint payoff is maximized if the first mover chooses “IN”.
5.2.1.1 Measures and interpretation
In our experiment, subjects play the trust game in both roles. For each partici-
pant, the main measures we elicit are: first-mover actions, second-mover actions,
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First mover
(10,10)
OUT
Second mover
(8,22)
A
(15,15)
B
IN
Figure 5.1. Game tree of the binary trust game.
and beliefs about other second-movers’ behavior. At the end of the experiment,
one of these decisions is randomly selected for payment to exclude hedging pos-
sibilities (Blanco et al., 2010).
First-mover actions. First movers’ actions are elicited by asking players to
make a decision between “IN” and “OUT”. Assuming purely self-interested pref-
erences, these decisions reflect only beliefs about second-movers behavior. In
particular, if the first mover ranks outcomes (8,22)≺ (10,10)≺ (15,15) and
they have purely self-interested preferences, they will choose “IN” if and only
if their belief about the probability that the second mover chooses “Option B”
exceeds some positive threshold. Such a belief is rational in case it is commonly
known that some second movers have social preferences leading them to choose
“Option B”. However, choosing “IN” may also be related to social preferences,
preferences for efficiency or other motives such as risk preferences, betrayal
aversion or altruism (see, e.g., Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Cox, 2004). Due to
these potential confounds, in our design we also measure beliefs directly rather
than inferring them from first-mover choices.
Second-mover actions. Second-mover actions were elicited using the strategy
method (Selten, 1965). Participants were asked whether they would choose “Op-
tion A” or “Option B” in case the first mover chose “IN”. The sequentiality of play-
ers’ moves ensures the absence of a strategic component in the second-mover
choice. Thus, it can be interpreted as a pure preference measure. Moreover, this
measure of (social) preferences is not confounded with efficiency concerns since
“Option A” and “Option B” lead to the same sum of payoffs.5 Choosing ‘Option
5 In a sequential prisoner’s dilemma preferences for efficiency may cause a correlation be-
tween first- and second-mover actions. In this game as it is usually parameterized (2 ∗pii(C,C)>
pii(C,D)+pij(C,D)> 2 ∗pii(D,D)), players who care only about efficiency, i.e., seek to maximize
total payoff, should always choose C as first and second movers, thus leading to a perfect corre-
lation of actions even in the absence of a consensus effect. This relationship is less pronounced,
but present for players who care about their own payoff as well as efficiency.
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B” can be consistent with several models of social preferences such as inequity
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), and guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg, 2007). As the main objective of the paper is not related to the main mo-
tivation behind these choices, it is sufficient to assume that individual have a
psychological cost high enough to make them choose “Option B” instead of “Op-
tion A”.
Beliefs. Our third measure is the belief that a participant has about other
second-movers’ actions. We ask subjects to state how many out of 20 students
playing as “Player 2” (i.e., the second mover) in another session they think will
choose “Option B”. They answer by choosing between 7 equally-sized inter-
vals from “0− 2” to “18− 20”. Correct guesses are rewarded with 8 €, while
there is no payoff for incorrect guesses. This incentive scheme ensures incentive-
compatible elicitation of subjects’ beliefs in a way that is not confounded with
risk preferences.6 Giving subjects a choice between 7 intervals rather than all
21 possibilities makes the measurement coarser but at the same time increases
subjects’ chances of actually guessing correctly, thus increasing the perceived
importance of their decision. Throughout the paper we will report beliefs as rel-
ative frequencies converted from subjects’ answers by taking the mid-point of
the chosen interval and dividing by 20.
Since first movers’ choices may not (only) reflect beliefs about secondmovers’
behaviour (see above), we focus our attention on second-mover actions and be-
liefs about others’ second-movers actions to identify the consensus effect.
5.2.2 Treatments
We employ four main between-subjects treatments, in which we manipulate
salience of own preferences. To do this, across treatments we vary the order
and time of elicitation of the above mentioned measures. An overview of the
main treatments is displayed in Table 5.1.
5.2.2.1 High salience
To ensure comparability with prior research on the consensus effect we conduct
a baseline treatment where in week 1 we elicit our measures in the following or-
der: second-mover actions first, then beliefs about other second movers’ actions
and finally first-mover actions. We label this order of elicitation Order 1. The
same elicitation is repeated in week 3 to learn about stability of elicited prefer-
ences and beliefs. As subjects did not know in week 1 the tasks of week 3, the
6 Similar to the literature, we treat beliefs as if they were point beliefs. If, instead, one assumes
subjects to have a distribution of beliefs, the method described here elicits the interval, in which
its mode lies.
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Table 5.1. Main treatments.
Same session Dierent sessions
High salience Low salience - time
Order 1 2nd mover (W1) 2nd mover (W1)
Belief (W1) Belief (W3)
1st mover (W1) 1st mover (W3)
N 34 54
Low salience - order Low salience - time & order
Order 2 Belief (W1) Belief (W1)
1st mover (W1) 1st mover (W1)
2nd mover (W1) 2nd mover (W3)
N 44 34
Notes. The terms (W1) and (W3) following a measure indicate
that this measure was elicited in week 1 and week 3, respec-
tively.
elicitation in week 1 serves as our main measure. To our knowledge, all prior
economics experiments on the consensus effect have relied on this particular or-
der, i.e., have second-mover actions directly precede belief elicitation (Jacobsen
and Sadrieh, 1996; Selten and Ockenfels, 1998; Charness and Grosskopf, 2001;
Blanco et al., 2014).
5.2.2.2 Low salience - order
The first method we use to manipulate the salience of subjects’ own preferences
during belief elicitation is to vary the order, in which preferences and beliefs are
elicited. If having to express one’s preference by making a decision increases its
salience when forming beliefs, eliciting preferences after belief elicitation should
reduce their salience. Hence, in our low salience - order treatment we modify the
order of elicitation from second mover – belief – first mover to belief – first mover
– second mover.
5.2.2.3 Low salience - time
The second way we exogenously vary salience exploits the longitudinal nature
of our experiment. In treatment low salience – time, the measurement of prefer-
ences and beliefs takes place two weeks apart. Subjects play the trust game in
the role of second movers in week 1, but beliefs (and first-mover actions) are not
elicited until week 3. The assumption behind this manipulation is that subjects’
own preferences are less salient if beliefs are elicited two weeks later.
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5.2.2.4 Low salience - time & order
A fourth treatment low salience – time & order (time & order) combines our two
manipulations of salience. That is, beliefs (and first-mover actions) are elicited
in week 1, while second-mover actions are elicited in week 3. We speculate that
salience should be at least as low as in treatments order and time, but possibly
lower.7
5.2.3 Procedures
A total of 346 subjects (95% students, 62% female, mean age 22.4 years) par-
ticipated in all sessions, 174 of which took part in the main four treatments and
170 in four robustness treatments.8 Each session lasted about one hour and con-
tained several distinct parts. The experiment took place in the summer and fall
of 2016. It was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants
were recruited from the BonnEconLab subject pool using the software h-root
(Bock et al., 2014). We only invited subjects who had played not the trust game
in the BonnEconLab before.
One part per week was randomly selected for payoff, with each part being
equally likely to be selected. This was clearly communicated to subjects. This
payment scheme precludes hedging, while keeping the stakes within one part
sizable enough for subjects to exert effort. On average, subjects received a total
payoff of 31.99 € (about 35 US-$ at the time). This includes a bonus of 10 €
that we used to incentivize participation in all three weeks, hence achieving a
low attrition rate of around 5% and leaving us with a sample of 327 subjects
in total (166 in the main treatments, 159 in the robustness treatments) who
completed at least weeks 1 and 3 of the experiment. To ensure comparability of
all statistics as well as for simplicity of exposition we will restrict our analysis to
these subjects.
5.3 Framework and predictions
In this section we will state testable predictions from different sets of assump-
tions. Since our main research question relates to a direct test of the consensus
effect, we focus on predictions regarding the relationship between second-mover
actions and beliefs.
7 As robustness checks, we conducted four treatments that control for the influence of play-
ing the game in both roles and measuring beliefs in the same session (see Section 5.A.2 in the
appendix). Results are in line with our findings presented in the main body of the paper.
8 There were an additional 2 subjects who participated only in week 2 and a session of 22
subjects that had to be dropped from the sample because of a programming error.
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Throughout we assume that each agent is of one of two types t ∈ {0,1},
a selfish (t= 0) or a trustworthy (t= 1) type. As second movers, selfish types
always choose “Option A”, while trustworthy types always choose “Option B”.
First-mover actions depend on beliefs b that the second mover is a trustworthy
type; they choose “IN” as soon as this belief exceeds a specific positive threshold.
This is, of course, an oversimplification of the vast literature on social preferences
and not meant to generalize beyond the given setup. However, it serves our
purpose of leading to a positive chance of second movers choosing the equal
payoff distribution and hence justifies beliefs higher than zero. Moreover, it does
generate a direct relationship between between first- and second-mover actions
and does not predict a correlation between them in the absence of a consensus
effect.9
The consensus effect enters the framework through an influence of types on
beliefs. We assume that subject i’s own type ti, and the weight σ thereof, in-
fluences beliefs bi in the following way: bi(ti,σ)= b0i +σ(ti − b0i )= (1−σ)b0i +
σ(ti), with σ ∈ [0,1], and b0i the realization of a random variable. We assume
that initial belief b0 follows a normal distribution truncated at 0 and 1with mean
equal to the share of trustworthy subjects in the population, i.e., the correct be-
lief.10 Such a framework encompasses the special cases of both the absence of a
consensus effect (σ = 0) where subjects disregard their own type during belief
formation as well as full egocentricity (σ = 1) where they disregard the initial
belief and believe all others to be exactly like themselves.
We interpret the weight σ that is placed on an agent’s type as the salience
level, a feature of the decision environment and therefore common to all agents
in the same situation.11 Wewill now state different sets of predictions depending
on the nature of σ.
Consensus effect independent of salience. Contrary to the standard model we
could assume that a consensus effect exists but is the consequence of the relation-
ship of agents’ innate personality traits. That is, preferences and beliefs follow
a joint distribution, for example, because of intergenerational transmission, dif-
ferences in experiences that people of different types make, or heterogeneity in
9 For a thorough discussion of which social preference models predict positive and which pre-
dict negative correlations between first- and second-mover actions in the absence of a consensus
effect refer to Blanco et al. (2014) (pp. 126-128). If one wanted to model a direct interaction
between first- and second-mover behavior (independent of a consensus effect) in our framework,
the belief threshold for first movers to choose “IN” could be type-dependent, with prosocial types
requiring a lower belief than selfish types.
10 Of course, other assumptions such as biased initial beliefs or other distributional forms are
possible.
11 In addition this weight could capture heterogeneity in agents’ egocentricity, i.e., the specific
extent to which they think everyone is the same as themselves. Since we can neither measure such
heterogeneity nor do we know whether it exists, we focus on treatment differences in salience.
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the updating process between types. In this case, the weight σ determines the
influence of an agent’s own belief would not depend on how salient the type is
during decision-making. Thus, in our experiment we would observe a correla-
tion between second-mover actions but no treatment differences.
Prediction set 1. a) Second-mover behavior and beliefs are positively correlated
in high salience.
b) The timing of measurement is irrelevant, i.e., the same positive correlation
between second-mover behavior and beliefs as in high salience is observed in low
salience – time.
c) The order of measurement is irrelevant, i.e., the same positive correlation
between second-mover behavior and beliefs as in high salience is observed in low
salience – time and low salience – time & order.
Consensus effect depends on salience. Our second set of predictions is de-
rived from the assumption that the level of the consensus effect depends on
the salience level of an agent’s type. Possible explanations for agents weighting
their own type more strongly when it is more salient includes the availability
heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) or anchoring on one’s own type (Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1974). In case subjects have already played the game as
second-movers, the wish tomake consistent decisions to signal skills as professed
in Falk and Zimmermann (2016) could also play a role. In our framework, σ
would differ between treatments, taking its highest value in high salience, where
subjects have just played the game as second movers when asked to state their
belief. We would thus expect the following pattern in our data.
Prediction set 2. a) Second-mover behavior and beliefs are positively correlated
in high salience.
b) The timing of measurement matters. If belief elicitation takes place two weeks
after subjects have played as second movers (low salience – time), the positive corre-
lation between second-mover behavior and beliefs is smaller than in high salience.
c) The order of measurement matters. If beliefs are measured before subjects
play as second movers (in low salience – time and low salience – time & order), the
positive correlation between second-mover behavior and beliefs is smaller than in
high salience.
5.4 Results
In this section we will first report descriptive statistics on subjects’ behavior in
the experiment. We will then consider relationships between our preference
measure (second-mover actions) and beliefs to test the differential predictions
made in Section 5.3.
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Table 5.2. Averages of actions and beliefs in trust game by treatment.
High salience Low salience - time
2nd mover 41.2% 46.3%
Belief 42.1% 43.3%
1st mover 41.2% 59.3%
N 34 54
Low salience - order Low salience - time & order
2nd mover 52.3% 41.2%
Belief 44.5% 49.6%
1st mover 63.6% 61.8%
N 44 34
Notes. “2nd mover” displays the share of participants who
chose the equal distribution (15,15) as second movers in the
binary trust game. “Belief” describes the average belief sub-
jects hold about the share of second movers in another ses-
sion choosing (15,15). “First mover” describes the share of par-
ticipants who chose “IN” as rst movers in the binary trust
game.
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Considering all four main treatments jointly, 45.7% of our subjects choose “Op-
tion B” when playing as second mover and 57.2% choose “IN” when playing
as first movers. Neither first- nor second-mover actions differ significantly be-
tween treatments (see Table 5.2): χ2-tests for homogeneity do not reject the
null hypothesis of the four treatments being drawn from the same distribution
(first-mover action: p= .196; second-mover action:p= .721).
Subjects’ beliefs about the second-mover action of other subjects were quite
accurate. Averaging over the four main treatments they predicted that 44.6%
would reciprocate as second movers. Also with respect to beliefs, we do not find
a significant difference between treatments (see Table 5.2; χ2-test for homo-
geneity: p= .454).
5.4.2 Consensus eect
Next, we move to our main research question by analyzing the relationship be-
tween beliefs and second movers’ strategies. Figure 5.2 displays the distribution
of beliefs conditional on second mover strategies in each of the four main treat-
ments. The figure shows that the two distributions partially overlap in all treat-
ments but are more clearly distinct in the high salience treatment. Comparing
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Figure 5.2. Beliefs about the share of second movers in another session choosing
(15,15) by second mover type.
the belief distributions using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveals a significant dif-
ference by type only for the high salience treatment (two-sided test: p= .008)
but not for the other treatments (low salience - order p= .284, low salience - time
p= .473, and low salience - time & order p= .425, respectively).
Following the previous literature (Mullen et al., 1985; Blanco et al., 2014),
we attest the presence of a consensus effect whenever there is a significant pos-
itive correlation between second-mover actions and beliefs. Because the data
are ordinal for actions in the trust game and cardinal for beliefs, we report the
Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient. We report these correlations in Ta-
ble 5.3.
In the high salience treatment, second movers choosing the payoff-equalizing
option on average believe that 59.6% of other secondmovers would do the same,
while those who choose the higher payoff for themselves express significantly
lower beliefs (average belief: 29.8%; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p= .001). This
leads to a large and significant correlation between second-mover actions and
beliefs (ρ = .559,p= .001; see Table 5.3). Note that the high salience treatment
employs the order of elicitation typically used in previous studies and hence
replicates previous findings (see, e.g., Blanco et al. (2014)).
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Table 5.3. Consensus eect by treatment.
High salience Low salience - time
ρ2nd ,belief .559*** .234*
(.001) (.089)
N 34 54
Low salience - order Low salience - time & order
ρ2nd ,belief .218 .268
(.155) (.126)
N 44 34
Notes. ρ: Spearman’s correlation coecient (between second-
mover actions and beliefs). p-values in parentheses.
Result 1. A large and significant consensus effect (correlation between beliefs and
second-mover actions) can be documented when both measures are elicited in the
same session and belief elicitation follows second-mover actions (treatment high
salience).
When preferences and beliefs are elicited in the same session but belief
elicitation comes first (low salience - order), the difference in beliefs between
trustworthy and untrustworthy subjects is positive (average beliefs: 49.4% and
39.3%, respectively) but smaller than in the high salience treatment. The cor-
relation coefficient between second movers’ strategies and beliefs is ρ = .218
(p= .155) and it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover,
this correlation is significantly smaller than the correlation found for treatment
high (one-sided z-test: p= .043).12
Result 2. When both measures are elicited in the same session, a consensus ef-
fect can only be documented when second-mover decisions precede belief elicitation
(treatment high salience) but not when the beliefs are elicited first (treatment low
salience - order).
12 To test whether correlations coefficients are significantly different from one another we use
the following procedure. We apply the approximate Fisher’s z transformation (Fisher, 1915) to
transform the distribution of the relevant correlation coefficients: z′ = 12 (ln(1+ρ)− ln(1− r)).
This generates variables distributed with an approximate normal distribution with standard error
σz =
1p
N−3 on which a z-test can be performed. Although this procedure is aimed at Pearson
correlation coefficients, Myers and Sirois (2006) find it to be the most efficient for Spearman
correlation coefficients as well. It was implemented using the CORTESTI package (Caci, 2000) in
Stata.
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Next, we analyze the low salience - time treatment where beliefs were elicited
two weeks after second-mover actions. As before, the average belief of a trust-
worthy type (49.4%) is significantly higher than that of an untrustworthy
(38.1%, Wilcoxon rank-sum test p= .089). However, similar to the low salience
(order) treatment, the relevant correlation (ρ = .234,p= .089) is significantly
smaller than in the high salience treatment (one-sided z-test p= .042).
Result 3. The consensus effect is significantly smaller when beliefs are elicited two
weeks after second-mover actions (treatment low salience - time) than when mea-
surement takes place in the same session (treatment high salience).
Finally, we look at the low salience - time and order treatment in which both
the time and order of elicitation should induce lower salience of own preferences.
We find a non-significant correlation coefficient ρ = .268 (p= .126). This cor-
relation is not significantly different from those in treatments low salience - time
and low salience - order (two-sided z-tests p= .872 and p= .823, respectively).
5.4.3 Robustness check: Preference instability
An obvious concern with the interpretation of the low salience - time treatment
is that lower correlations between preferences and beliefs measured at different
points in timemay be caused by fluctuations in our preferencemeasure over time
rather than an exogenous reduction of salience of own preferences. Instability of
the preference measure may be due either to true underlying preference insta-
bility or to measurement error. If our measure for preferences is highly unstable
this could constitute a confound in the identification of our salience channel.
To tackle this concern, we employ the following procedure. We consider our
high salience treatment where we have data on individuals’ preferences for week
1 as well as week 3. A share of 85% of second movers make the same decision
in both weeks. Using this information we construct a simulated sample “mock
low salience - time” by changing our elicited preference measure in week 1 for a
randomly selected 15% of the subjects. This simulates the same degree of pref-
erence instability found in the high salience treatment. We then correlate the
obtained distribution of preferences with the beliefs elicited in week 3 of our
experiment. This process is repeated 10 000 times. The obtained distribution of
correlation coefficients can be found in Figure 5.3. By comparing this distribu-
tion of correlation coefficients with the one obtained in our low salience - time
treatment we can assess whether the result we obtain is a likely outcome of pref-
erence instability or at least part of it can be imputed to salience. The average
correlation between beliefs and simulated preferences is ρ = .394 and exceeds
the correlation that is found in the real treatment low salience - time in over 95%
of cases. This means that even though preference instability may play some role
in lowering the observed correlation between second-mover actions and beliefs
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Figure 5.3. Correlation between simulated second-mover actions and beliefs in “mock
treatment low salience - time”. The vertical line marks the correlation of rho = .234 in
the real low salience time.
when they are elicited two weeks apart (compare with high salience treatment),
this cannot fully account for the strong reduction in the correlation that we find
in our real treatment which is at least partially caused by a reduction in salience
of own preferences.
5.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we have tested whether the extent to which subjects make infer-
ences from themselves to other people depends on the salience of own prefer-
ence “type” during belief elicitation. Overall, we can clearly document the exis-
tence of a consensus effect in our data. However, the strength of the consensus
effect depends heavily on the salience of own preferences. While it is large and
significant when beliefs are elicited right after preferences, it is considerably
smaller as soon as the order or timing of measurement (or both) is changed.
This is in line with our Prediction Set 2 that was derived from the assumption
that salience of one’s own preferences during belief elicitation is crucial.
Throughout the paper we interpret a correlation between preferences and
beliefs as preferences influencing beliefs. However, it is also conceivable that be-
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lief elicitation influences preferences. This is not usually considered in the liter-
ature. A noteworthy exception is the work by Denolf et al. (2017) who establish
a quantum-like model of the measurement of preferences and beliefs in a social
dilemmas which they fit to the data elicited by Blanco et al. (2014). Although
our design is not ideally suited to understand the impact of belief elicitation on
second-mover actions since there is no treatment where second-mover decisions
directly follow belief elicitation with no first-mover decision in between, the ev-
idence that our data can provide does not favor such a channel. The fact that
the correlation between second-mover actions and belief is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero in treatment low salience - order where second-mover actions
are elicited following beliefs and first-mover actions as well as our finding in Re-
sult 2 suggest that the influence of preference elicitation on belief elicitation is
stronger than in the opposite direction. Comparing the treatments low salience
- order and low salience - order & time that both elicit beliefs first but where
second-mover actions are taken either in the same session or two weeks later is
particularly telling. The fact that correlations do not differ between them could
be interpreted as salience of beliefs not mattering during preference elicitation.
So in our experiment there is no evidence of reverse causality for the consensus
effect.
In summary, we find that the correlation between preferences and beliefs
is by far strongest when belief elicitation directly follows preference elicitation.
In all other cases, the relationship is much smaller. Hence, the large consensus
effects previously reported in the literature are partially caused by the mode of
measurement. We thus conclude that salience of one’s own type plays a crucial
role in determining the strength of the consensus effect.
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5.A Appendix to Chapter 5
5.A.1 Full descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 5.A.1. Main treatments: Average actions and beliefs in the trust game.
High salience Low salience - time
1st mover 41.2% 59.3%
2nd mover 41.2% 46.3%
Belief 42.1% 43.3%
N 34 54
Low salience - order Low salience - time & order
1st mover 63.6% 61.8%
2nd mover 52.3% 41.2%
Belief 44.5% 49.6%
N 44 34
Notes. Values for baseline from week 1. Belief on second-
mover action of 20 participants in another session.
5.A.2 Robustness checks
In addition to the treatments reported in the main body of the paper, we con-
ducted four robustness treatments. Their aim is to further examine the influence
of the mode of measurement. For this purpose only one action and the belief
were elicited. That means subjects play the game either as second movers or
as first movers in one week, while beliefs are elicited in the other week (see
Table 5.A.3).
In treatments robustness: second mover and robustness: second mover - order
second-mover actions and beliefs are elicited in different weeks. The only differ-
ence treatments low salience - time and low salience - time & order, respectively, is
that there subjects are never asked to play in the role of first movers. In the for-
mer treatments, we do not find significant correlations between second-mover
actions and beliefs (see Table 5.A.4, left column). This is in line with our inter-
pretation of the findings in treatments low salience - time and low salience - time
& order that the consensus effect is small or non-existent unless measurement
beliefs are measured immediately following preferences.
In treatments robustness: first mover and robustness: first mover - order first-
mover actions and beliefs are elicited two weeks apart. This procedure is unlike
any of the main treatments and aims at understanding the effect of simulta-
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Table 5.A.2. Main treatments: Correlations between rst-mover actions, second-mover
actions and beliefs.
High salience Low salience - time
ρ1st,2nd .150 .165
(.397) (.233)
ρ2nd,belief .559*** .234*
(.001) (.089)
ρ1st,belief .371** .237*
(.031) (.084)
N 34 54
Low salience - order Low salience - time & order
ρ1st,2nd .413*** -.080
(.005) (.655)
ρ2nd,belief .218 .268
(.155) (.126)
ρ1st,belief .036 .158
(.816) (.373)
N 44 34
Notes. ρ: Spearman’s correlation coecient. p-values in paren-
theses.
neous elicitation of first-mover actions and beliefs and the role of timing. The
correlations between first-mover actions and beliefs are virtually identical in the
robustness treatments.
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Table 5.A.3. Treatments: Robustness checks.
Same session No No
Role 2nd mover 1st mover
Robustness: Robustness:
Second mover First mover
Order 1 2nd mover (W1) 1st mover (W1)
Belief (W3) Belief (W3)
N 45 34
Robustness: Robustness:
Second mover - order First mover - order
Order 2 Belief (W1) Belief (W1)
2nd mover (W3) 1st mover (W3)
N 41 41
Notes. The terms (W1) and (W3) following a measure indicate
that this measure was elicited in week 1 and week 3, respec-
tively.
Table 5.A.4. Robustness treatments: Correlations between actions and beliefs.
Robustness: Robustness:
Second mover First mover
ρ2nd,belief .167
(.272 )
ρ1st,belief .304*
(.081 )
N 45 34
Robustness: Robustness:
Second mover - order First mover - order
ρ2nd,belief .119
(.458)
ρ1st,belief .281*
(.075 )
N 41 41
Notes. ρ: Spearman’s correlation coecient. p-values in paren-
theses.
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5.A.3 Full study
Table 5.A.5. Overview of all tasks participants completed.
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
Mood Question Mood Question Mood Question
General Risk Question General Risk Question General Risk Question
Big Five Big Five Big Five
Trust Question Locus of Control
Binary Trust Game: Treatments Binary Trust Game: Treatments
Risk Premia (Choice Lists) “Will you win?” task Risk Premia (Choice Lists)
Risk Scenarios Urns Task Common Ratio Eect
Bet: Heads or Tails? BRET
Ambiguity preferences and Beliefs
Sociodemographics Optimism: LOT and SOP Optimism: LOT and SOP
IQ
Mood Question Mood Question Mood Question
Notes. For detailed information on the tasks not described in this paper refer to Dohmen et al. (2018a)
and Dohmen et al. (2018b)
